Iraq’s next parliamentary election is scheduled for 11 November 2025, marking the country’s sixth national vote since 2005. The electoral system, overseen by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), is designed to promote inclusivity and balance among political parties. However, recent changes have deeply undermined that goal. The 2025 election unfolds amid declining public confidence, as years of manipulation and elite dominance have distorted what should be a democratic process. It may be the most unfair election since 2005, shaped by a series of decisions that favor Iraq’s entrenched political blocs at the expense of independents and reformists.

The Election Framework and Its Distortions

This election will determine the 329 seats in Iraq’s Council of Representatives. In total, nine seats are reserved for minority groups, while at least 25 percent of parliamentary seats are constitutionally allocated to women. The official voting day is scheduled for 11 November, with special voting to take place two to three days earlier, primarily for members of the security forces. Official campaigning began on 3 October and will continue until 8 November.

According to IHEC, a total of 21,404,291 voters are eligible to vote. Of these, 20,063,773 are registered for general voting, 1,313,980 for special voting, and 26,538 displaced citizens will cast their ballots separately.

The 2025 election used proportional representation. Each of Iraq’s 18 provinces, excluding Halabja, serves as a single electoral district. (Halabja is recognized as Iraq’s 19th governorate shortly after the election law was finalized, making it still counted under Sulaymaniyah Governorate for the 2025 election) Seat allocation follows a modified Sainte-Laguë method, in which the total number of valid votes in a province is divided by the number of seats assigned to that province to establish an electoral quota.

Modified Sainte- Laguë Method

Compared with the regular Sainte-Laguë method, IHEC has introduced a crucial modification, where the first divisor in the formula has been set at 1.7 instead of the standard 1.0. This seemingly minor change makes the first seat in each district significantly harder for small parties to win, tilting the system towards large, established lists. Coupled with the return to closed party lists, it effectively reduces the visibility and competitiveness of independent candidates, undoing one of the few democratic gains of the 2021 election. (Please see the Appendix at the end for a detailed explanation of the election system from Next Century Foundation Director Jaffar El-Ahmar)

No voting abroad

No out-of-country polling will take place in this election. Ballot boxes will only be placed inside the country. As a result, voters living abroad must return home to cast their votes. According to Nebras Abu Souda, Deputy Spokesperson for IHEC, ‘the rights of citizens residing abroad are preserved within Iraq, and under the current law, they cast their votes in their original provinces on the day of the general election’.

This decision excludes a significant and politically active segment of the Iraq electorate, many of whom had previously participated through embassies and consulates. It has been viewed by members of the diaspora as a political maneuver to restrict participation and weaken their representation. Kurdish representatives suggest the measure aims to prevent a repeat of earlier elections in which the Kurdish diaspora voted overwhelmingly for Kurdish parties.

Candidate Disqualification

Around 850 candidates, nearly ten percent of all applicants, have been barred from contesting Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections. IHEC cited reasons including criminal records, unresolved accountability issues, and administrative irregularities. Those affected include senior public figures, some of whom have served multiple terms in parliament. This unprecedented wave of disqualifications has sparked debate over whether it represents a genuine enforcement of electoral law or a politically motivated purge aimed at weakening challengers.

Alongside the bans, IHEC has recorded over 300 campaign violations nationwide. Most involved earlycampaigningand misuse of public resources, while some candidates were accused of using sectarian or inflammatory rhetoric. In Diyala, 14 candidates were fined two million dinars each (around $1,500) for violating electoral advertising rules (Shafaq News, 2025).

Political landscape

Iraq’s political system operates under an unwritten ethno-sectarian quota arrangement known as muhasasa, where top offices are divided along sectarian lines: a Shia Prime Minister, a Sunni Speaker of Parliament, and a Kurdish President. Although undocumented officially, it has been deeply institutionalized.

Within this framework, the 2025 parliamentary election is set to be crowded. 31 coalitions, 38 political parties, and more than 70 independent lists are competing. Altogether, 7,768 candidates, including 2,248 women, are competing for 329 seats in the Council of Representatives. Despite the appearance of plurality, Iraq’s political scene is still dominated by a few powerful blocs whose influence is strengthened by structural advantages.

Shia factions

Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the National Shia Movement, has reiterated his decision to boycott the parliamentary election. In the 2021 early elections, his bloc secured 73 seats, making it the largest in parliament. However, in June 2022, after his attempt to form a national majority government failed, he ordered his MPs to resign. His continued boycott is widely viewed as a major factor in depressing voter turnout.

In the absence of the Sadrist Movement, the Coordination Framework(CF) has become the dominant Shia bloc. This umbrella coalition brings together most of Iraq’s main Shia parties. Al-Maliki remains a central figure seeking to reassert his influence, while al-Sudani, who rose to power with CF backing, has worked to build an independent political base through his Reconstruction and Development Coalition. He recently entered an alliance with Faleh al-Fayyad, head of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). This has raised concerns over the deepening overlap between security institutions and electoral politics. Meanwhile, Hadi al-Amiri continues to play a pivotal role in maintaining cohesion within the CF. Iran’s influence persists through its close ties with CF factions and affiliated armed groups. In the absence of a unifying rival, internal competition has intensified.

In southern Iraq, Basra has emerged as another critical arena. Asaad al-Eidani, leader of the Tasmim Bloc, wields strong local authority and is viewed as a potential national contender. Having previously sought the premiership, his growing influence positions him as a pivotal figure outside the Coordination Framework.

Sunni factions

Iraq’s Sunni political landscape is intensifying ahead of the election. The once-dominant Taqaddum(Progress) Party, led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, has lost some ground following his removal from office earlier this year. However, his political influence remains substantial through Taqaddum-led local lists, keeping the party among the leading Sunni forces despite an increasingly fragmented field. Other contenders are seeking to claim leadership of the Sunni electorate, including Khamis al-Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance, Azm led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, and al-Hasm al-Watani led by Thabit Mohammed Saeed. Sunni participation has risen across several provinces, reflecting a modest resurgence in voter engagement.

Kurdish factions

Nearly a year after the Kurdistan parliamentary elections in October 2024, Kurdish political parties enter the national vote without a regional government. Deep internal divisions have prevented a coalition, leaving the Kurdistan Region politically fragmented. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has been weakened by leadership disputes and the defection of several senior figures to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), while the KDP’s long-standing dominance in Kurdish politics is also showing strain amid growing opposition.

Over 300 candidates from the Kurdistan Region are contesting for 46 parliamentary seats, representing the region’s four provinces. The KDP, PUK, and the New Generation Movement are shifting their focus toward Baghdad, seeking greater leverage in federal decision-making. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Islamic Movement has boycotted the elections.

Election Outlook

With the election approaching, international observers are emphasizing the need for transparency. The European Union has urged the authorities of Iraq to ensure a fair and credible process, confirming the deployment of an election observation mission. Yet, few expect this election to fundamentally reshape Iraq’s political landscape. The power-sharing system remains the backbone of the political order. Over time, it has evolved from a mechanism of inclusion into a structure that entrenches elitism and collusion. The next government will almost certainly be a government of negotiated power-sharing among Iraq’s dominant blocs.

At the same time, troubling trends are deepening concerns regarding democracy in Iraq. The persistence of vote buyingcontinues to distort electoral competition and erode public trust. Low voter turnout is widely expected, following a steady decline in participation over recent election cycles. Combined with controversial IHEC decisions, including the adoption of an electoral formula with a first divisor of 1.7, the disqualification of candidates, and the exclusion of overseas polling, these dynamics reflect growing political fatigue and disillusionment among citizens. They signal a profound crisis at the heart of Iraq’s democracy.

Appendex – How Iraq’s Electoral System Works

1. Calculating a Parliamentary Seat

Under Iraq’s current electoral system, each governorate functions as a single electoral district. Seat allocation is based on a modified Sainte-Laguë formula that begins with a divisor of 1.7 rather than the standard 1.

To determine how many votes are required to win a seat, the total number of valid votes cast in the governorate is divided by the number of seats assigned to that governorate. The result， known as the electoral quotient, represents the number of votes needed for one seat. Seats are then distributed proportionally according to the share of votes each political list receives. Within the winning lists, candidates who secure the highest individual vote totals are awarded the seats, while a further calculation determines how remaining seats are distributed.

This system strengthens the proportional representation of political blocs at the expense of purely individual candidates, signalling a shift away from independent-based representation toward consolidated party power.

2. Distribution of Seats, Quotas, and Representation

Once the electoral quotient has been established, seats are awarded to candidates with the highest personal vote counts within each successful political list.

Women’s Representation
Iraqi law requires that at least 25 percent of all parliamentary seats be held by women. These seats are filled by female candidates with the highest vote counts in each governorate. If the quota is not achieved through direct election, non-winning female candidates with the next-highest vote totals are added until the quota is met in every province.

Minority Representation
Specific seats are reserved for ethnic and religious minorities, including Christians, Mandaeans (Sabians), Yazidis, Shabaks, and Feyli Kurds. These quota seats are assigned to the candidates from each group who obtain the highest vote counts within their category.

3. Example: Baghdad Governorate

To illustrate the process, consider Baghdad, which has sixty-nine seats in total, including quota seats. Suppose 1,070,000 valid votes are cast. Dividing this number by sixty-nine gives an electoral quotient of roughly 15,507 votes per seat.

Under the modified Sainte-Laguë system, each party’s total votes are divided by a sequence of odd numbers beginning with 1.7, then 3, 5, 7, 9, and so on. The highest quotients across all lists receive seats one by one until all sixty-nine are allocated.

For example, in a district electing only five members, three lists—A, B, and C—might produce quotients that distribute two seats to A, two to B, and one to C. This method rewards lists with consistent vote strength rather than isolated spikes, and the 1.7 divisor makes it harder for very small parties to gain a foothold with minimal support.

In Baghdad, seventeen of the sixty-nine seats (twenty-five percent) are reserved for women. If not enough women win directly, the quota is completed by adding the highest-polling female candidates from other lists. Two additional seats are reserved for minorities: one for Christians and one for Mandaeans. These are awarded to whichever candidates from those groups receive the highest nationwide vote totals.

4. Why Use a 1.7 Divisor?

Iraq’s modification of the Sainte-Laguë method serves several political purposes. By dividing the first seat’s vote total by 1.7 instead of 1, the system slightly favours larger and more established parties, making it harder for micro-parties to win a single seat on a small vote share. This adjustment helps limit excessive parliamentary fragmentation.

The change also functions as a soft threshold, ensuring that only parties with a meaningful voter base secure representation. After the first seat is distributed, the system returns to the standard divisors (3, 5, 7, etc.), preserving overall proportionality. The effect can be imagined as a speed bump at the entrance to parliament—slowing, but not entirely blocking small factions.

5. Minority Quota Voting

Of Iraq’s 329 parliamentary seats, nine are reserved for minorities: five for Christians and one each for Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandaeans, and Feyli Kurds.

Unlike general seats, minority quotas are filled through nationwide contests. Any Iraqi voter—regardless of background or province—can vote for minority candidates, who run individually rather than on party lists. Each voter casts a single, non-transferable vote, and the candidate with the highest total in each minority category wins the seat.

For example, if five Christian candidates compete for the Baghdad quota and Candidate A receives 12,000 votes while Candidate B gains 9,000, Candidate A wins even if most of their votes come from non-Christian voters elsewhere in Iraq.

This system has been criticized for allowing dominant sectarian parties to mobilize their broader bases to elect minority-aligned candidates, potentially undermining authentic representation. Minority leaders have therefore called for reforms that would restrict voting on these seats to members of the respective minority communities.

6. Summary

Iraq’s electoral framework blends proportional representation with gender and minority quotas to ensure broad inclusion. In practice, however, the modified Sainte-Laguë method and the open nationwide quota voting system tend to reinforce the strength of established political blocs. The design limits the success of small or independent candidates while maintaining the appearance of proportional fairness—an arrangement that mirrors the balance between inclusion and control at the heart of Iraq’s post-2003 political order.

For the NCF´s last report on the previous elections in Iraq see this link