Following two years of devastation and conflict in the Gaza Strip, a US-led ceasefire agreement came into effect on October 10th. Since this date, there have been complaints of violations and challenges the agreement and what this means for future Palestinian governance.
A main critique of the ceasefire agreement, initiated by President Trump’s 20-point plan, is the absence of Palestinian representation and participation in the creation and acceptance of the peace proposal and ignites many questions for the Gaza governance and reconstruction plans.
Phase I of the Ceasefire Agreement
The ceasefire agreement went into effect on October 10th, which initiated a 72-hour period for Hamas to return all 41 living and deceased hostages. By October 13th, all 20 living Israeli hostages were returned to Israel. On this day, Israel also released 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,718 Palestinian hostages taken from Gaza.
Since then, Hamas has attempted to navigate the destruction of Gaza and, so far, 15 deceased hostages have been returned to Israel. 195 deceased Palestinians have been returned by Israel, of which less than half have been identified and have instead been returned numbered. There have since been burials in Gaza and Israel for the returned hostages.
This past weekend, Egypt has been able to send a team with heavy equipment to enter Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing to assist with the recovery of the rest of the Israeli hostages that remain unfound.
Phase I Challenges
Both Hamas and Israel have accused the other of violating this ceasefire agreement since October 10th.
One challenge with Phase I has been the ability of Hamas to locate and retrieve the bodies of the remaining hostages. Over two years of conflict has created widespread devastation across Gaza, which has proven extremely difficult to locate the deceased hostages within the 72-hour period at the beginning of the ceasefire period. With Israel’s blockade of entry to provide aid and machinery to Gaza until recently, Hamas has stated it has been extremely difficult to navigate and retrieve bodies and that continued strikes by Israel have only worsened the search for the bodies.
Israel has called the inability of Hamas to return the rest of the hostages as a violation and have launched a number of attacks in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel has responded to the use of firearms by Palestinian militant groups in occupied areas in Gaza and the death of an IDF soldier as another violation to the ceasefire agreement. Subsequent air strike attacks on October 29th have killed at least 109 Palestinians, including 46 children and 20 women, and injuring 200 people. This violation is one of many attacks since the beginning of the ceasefire agreement and marks the deadliest day since the ceasefire began. After the attack it was announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump that the ceasefire was back on.
Another criticism of this first phase is that humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts have been used as leverage in order to achieve goals that Israel has set during the past two years of conflict. Since the start of the ceasefire agreement, Prime Minister Netanyahu has maintained the Rafah crossing will not be opened and Israel would limit aid entering Gaza unless Hamas returns all of the hostages.
International Stabilisation Force
On October 17th, the US-led Civil Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) was opened in Kiryat Gat to secure Phase II of the ceasefire. The CMCC is intended to monitor the different phases of the ceasefire agreement and to support peace efforts, facilitating security and humanitarian assistance from the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) into Gaza.
UK Defence Minister Al Carns has confirmed that a team of UK planning officers has been sent to the CMCC in Israel to collaborate on “post-conflict stability”. This UK presence will be strictly limited to the coordination and planning process rather than participating in the military taskforce. France Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot announced on October 30th that a team of military and civilian personnel have been positioned at the CMCC to assist with the implementation of the ceasefire.
Currently the US, UK, and France diplomats are drafting on a UNSC resolution in attempt to grant a UN mandate for the ISF after the ceasefire is secured, with robust policing powers as opposed to the traditional peacekeeping missions. Once secured, the ISF will take over security from the IDF in occupied areas of Gaza,
While there is still discussion on the mandate international participants and the duration of the task force, it will be directed from Cairo under by an internationally led “Board of Peace”. Discussed in Sharm el-Sheikh among regional leaders, this board will directed by UK former Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Trump. Its main responsibilities will be monitoring funding for Gaza’s redevelopment and setting the framework for future governance of Gaza, while the Palestinian Authority undergoes reform under international supervision. As per point 15 of Trump’s 20-point plan, this task force will provide support to “vetted” Palestinian forces with consultation from Jordan and Egypt. The vagueness regarding the timeline of the ISF prompts some reservations, described in the 20-point plan as “long-term internal security solution”, bringing into question when control over security will be Palestinian-led.
What states are involved?
The US, under the direction of President Trump, has been the main instigator of the development of the ceasefire plan and the creation of the international task force. Shortly after the instigation of the ceasefire, 200 US troops were transferred to Kiryat Gat in southern Israel to assist with the taskforce. While planning is still under works, there has been discussion around Egypt leading the bulk of the force with contributions from Qatar, Turkey and the UAE to make up this multinational security group. This may be in the form of providing training, planning, and sending troops. Indonesia has also stated its willingness to deploy 20,000 troops to help secure peace in Gaza.
Israel has determined that it will have the final say in the make-up of the international troops which will form the ISF. Prime Minister Netanyahu has raised his objection to the addition of Turkey’s troops in the International Stabilisation Force, referring to President Erogan’s incompatibility with Israel’s security. This ‘red line’ has been supported by US Vice President Vance, as he stated “no foreign soldier will enter Israel without its consent”.
Troops from Jordan will not be sent to participate in the ISF, as the King Abdullah of Jordan stated Jordan is “too close politically”, referencing the strong ties between Palestine and Jordan, More than half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian descent and having taken approximately 2.3 million Palestinian refugees from previous conflict with Israel.
In a recent interview, King Abdullah showed some apprehensiveness to the future of the ISF, explaining that Jordan would reject participation if they were to be asked to “enforce” peace in Gaza and that “if it’s peace enforcing, nobody will want to touch that”. This raises the importance of the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. King Abdullah extends his support for a peacekeeping process, whereby local police forces would be trained and ISF troops would support their functioning. The UN refers to peace enforcement as the application of coercive measures including the use of military force, requiring the explicit authorization of the UNSC to restore peace.
While it is unclear what form the ISF will take, but with the development of the UNSC Resolution calling for robust policing powers and the unlikely disarmament of Palestinian military groups, it may be concluded that the ISF will likely act as peace enforcement. This may impact Jordan’s involvement in training processes for local police forces and brings into question the involvement of other states.
This sparks another concern that maintaining internationally-led ‘security’ just becomes another justification for external control – particularly as Israel will play a determining role in the makeup of such international security – and acts as the direct enforcement tool for control over Palestinian people and land.
The question of Palestinian governance
Amid the ever-present challenges to this ceasefire, it remains that the core issue and critique of this peace process is the lack of Gazan representation and participation.
Actors of the ceasefire agreement
The basis of the ceasefire agreement, Trump’s peace proposal, was edited by Netanyahu regarding the IDF withdraw lines for the three phases of the ceasefire, with support from Ron Dermer, Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs. Other key figures involved in the ceasefire agreement include Trump’s US Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, and son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who both oversaw the development and approval of the agreement with Israel. Khalil al-Hayya, a senior Hamas official, acted as chief negotiator in the acceptance of the agreement.
Khalil Shikaki, Director of Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, questions the success of this plan with no identified Palestinian actor. Expecting to end the peace process with a Palestinian partner, when it was signed with Hamas, with no promise of legitimacy or statehood is a “nonstarter”. Palestinian consent and determination on who will govern themselves is a necessity for sustained peace.
Palestinian role in the reconstruction phase
The Palestinian Technocratic Committee that will be appointed throughout this peace process will be required to report to the Board of Peace. In a joint statement by Hamas and the main Palestinian factions, there has been acceptance of this committee that will manage basic services and daily affairs for people in Gaza. In a recent Fatah-Hamas meeting in Cairo, it is suspected that Hamas selected members to assemble half of the technocratic committee and Fatah proposed the other half. Further, al-Hayya confirmed the body would be a foundation for future Palestinian elections, in addition to the revitilisation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the legitimate representation for the Palestinian people.
So far, Amjad al-Shawa, Director General of the Palestinian NGO Network and a key official in humanitarian aid for Gaza, has been named the head of this technocratic committee, a move which has been agreed by Hamas. There are currently no plans for Hamas to step away from a leadership position, despite Trump’s peace deal and Netanyahu’s demands.
Israel’s stance throughout the ceasefire process has continued to be that Hamas will not be involved in the future governance of Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu maintains his refusal to accept a Palestinian state. President Trump has not stated any support for a two-state solution or the Palestinian state, not interesting in providing a “reward” for Hamas. Point 19 of the 20-point plan notes that with Palestinian Authority reform and advances in Gaza’s reconstruction, there may be a path towards Palestinian self-determination and statehood. This is, however, an open-ended and offers no timeline or confirmation of US or Israel recognition of a Palestinian state.
Disarmament of Hamas and Palestinian Military Factions
Hamas has asserted control over 47% of the Gaza Strip as Israel’s military forces retreated to the remaining 53% of the Gaza Strip during Phase I. Other military factions, such as the Doghmush clan, have increased their influence in parts of Gaza, with some relation to the murders of Palestinians and suspected collaboration with Israel to act as a counterweight to Hamas.
Hamas has increased security forces, first to disarm numerous Palestinian military groups. It will also target militias supported by Israel such as Yasser Abu Shabab, Ashraf al-Mansi and Husam al-Astal. Clashes between Hamas and other armed groups and militias in Gaza contributes to the highly volatile environment and raises questions for the disarmament in Phase II of the ceasefire.
Continued violation of the ceasefire and further destruction of the Gaza Strip poses a challenge to any consideration of the disarmament of Hamas. President Trump’s ceasefire plan calls for this disarmament and the demilitarisation of Gaza, whilst Israel’s air strikes continue to take the lives of Palestinians in Gaza and violence continues against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.
Beyond the violations of the ceasefire in Gaza, there have also been reports of intensified, violent raids against Palestinians in the towns of Qabatiya and Anza within the occupied West Bank. These attacks occur amid the olive harvest, continuing the pattern of forced displacement, dispossession and destruction of Palestinian land. This calls for the need for an end occupation, not just of Gaza but of all occupied Palestinian territories.
Barriers to Palestinian governance
There are concerns that the plan under the International Stabilisation Force imposes certain external security arrangements and denies Palestinians control over political processes. The development of the ceasefire deal and the ‘short-term’ plan for Gaza reconstruction repeats previous approaches in prior Palestine governance models which is the “systematic exclusion of Palestinian voices from frameworks that will determine the population’s future”.
The Palestinian’s rights to self-determination and freedom are crucial, and the development and implementation of this peace plan poses a barrier to this as it is implemented as continued occupation ultimately overseen by President Trump and UK former Prime Minister Tony Blair.
In addition to the dire need for occupation in the Gaza Strip to be eradicated, Nur Arafeh, a Fellow at the Malcom H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center specializing in political economy, proposes that a successful reconstruction plan requires a bottom-up process. This involves local ownership in reconstruction and Palestinian participation in the decision-making of recovery mechanisms. Trump’s 20-point plan is vague concerning reconstruction, referring to an “economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza” and the creation of a “special economic zone” benefiting from trade preferences.
The overarching issue with this plan is that it does not address the root of the conflict, which is occupation and disregard for Palestinian rights. If root causes of injustice are not addressed, conflict will continue with either Hamas or another armed group.
Conclusion
There are clear violations and challenges with the implementation of the ceasefire. As stated by Hady Amr a nonresident senior fellow in Foreign Policy in the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, “seeking peace without equality is an illusion”. Palestinian governance and participation in planning processes for Gaza’s future is key for stabilizing peace and reconstruction. Developments to the US, UK and France’s proposed UNSC resolution will give a greater idea of the International Stabilisation Force’s mandate and participants, and thus the ‘short-term’ governance over Gaza.
- Main image featured above credit: Jaber Jehad Badwan, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
