Syria stands at a crossroads between universal prosperity and a potential return to authoritarianism and entrenched inequality. Post-war Syria sits in an extremely fragile position, almost 7 million Syrians remain internally displaced and around 70 percent of the population is still in need of humanitarian assistance, with reconstruction costs estimated at over $216 billion. Promisingly, in the first 10 months of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s presidency, he has made substantial progress towards restoring stability in Syria. Syria is successfully reintegrating into the international community, the president himself has taken major steps in global diplomacy not seen by a Syrian head of state for decades, and his government has secured impressive pledges towards the nation’s rebuilding effort. However, whilst abroad the Syrian president is deftly navigating global diplomacy and convincingly playing the reformer, at home the al Sharaa presidency bears uncomfortable shades of a not too distant past.
Legacy of the Assad Era
The previous Assad dynasty was built on an iron grip of control, violently suppressing dissent and centralising power under the president. Hafez al-Assad relied on Alawite loyalists, placing them in key positions across the Ba’ath Party, government, and security institutions to consolidate control. Although, Assad era Syria is often characterised by favouring the Alawite minority, which makes up only about 12% of the population, including the Assad family, this patronage was not driven by sectarian ideology. Only families directly tied to the Assad family were given preferential treatment, whilst the wider Alawite community remained one of the poorest in the country. This small cohort, predominantly from the Assad ancestral home of Qardaha, came to dominate the state-controlled socialist Syrian government, military and economy.
When Hafez died, his son Bashar inherited this architecture. Despite promising reform, he reinforced the autocracy and established a kleptocracy. Opening the economy to private business and global trade drove an average growth rate of 5.1 % between 2000 and 2010. However, wealth flowed mainly to loyalist families, such as Bashar al-Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf, who reportedly controlled over 60% of the Syrian economy. Meanwhile, poverty rose and the wealth gap widened. During this period, poverty rates actually increased and the wealth gap grew drastically. Whilst the poorest 20% of the population accounted for only 7% of Syrian spending, while the top 20% made up 45%. Political centralisation and nepotism was maintained both in Damascus and across the country, with loyalists endorsed and directly appointed to provincial authorities. Bashar entrenched an economic system which bred inequality and a governance structure unresponsive to local needs and designed solely to preserve presidential authority; key factors that fueled the 2011 uprising.
After the civil war began, Bashar al-Assad intensified his patronage network in a desperate attempt to strengthen his grip. He made sure to cement loyalty within the expanded military and surveillance efforts, a report by analyst Muhsen Al Mustafa expressed that, by 2020, the most powerful 40 positions in the Syrian army were all held by Alawites, most from Qardaha. He also enabled his inner circle to grow their fortunes from war time spoils, before 2011 around 80% of the Syrian economy relied on small to medium-sized businesses, however, after 14 years of war, Syria’s GDP had shrunk by 85% and 90% of the population were living under the poverty line.
Political Idlibisation
When the Assad government collapsed at the end of 2024, Ahmed al-Sharraa, leader of the now delisted al-Qaeda-linked group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), assumed the role of de facto president of Syria’s transitional government. He inherited a golden opportunity to undertake profound structural reforms, many Syrians hoped for the decentralisation of power, genuine democratic processes and local agency, as well as liberal economic reforms.
However, early indications suggest that Al-Sharraa is instead pursuing a rebranded version of the authoritarian monopoly that has plagued Syria for over half a century, a process analysts have coined “Idlibisation”. HTS, had administered the governorate of Idlib during the war under the name the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). The SSG was effectively absorbed into the new national political structure, subsequently flooding key positions in the government with the previous Idlib authorities as well as Al Sharra’s own family; his brother Maher is currently Secretary-General to the Presidency.
On the 5thof October, Syria held its first parliamentary election since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, promising a representative and inclusive assembly to carry out its mandate of drafting a new constitution by 2028. The new People’s Assembly consists of 210 non-partisan members: 140 elected through electoral-college style subcommittees, and 70 appointed directly by the president. Although only 6,000 voters participated and chose from a pool of 1,578 candidates who had been screened and approved by a supreme committee appointed by the president, effectively excluding opposition figures and echoing Assad-era politics.
Reports also reveal the strategic relocation of HTS loyalists from Idlib into constituencies where they had no local connection, creating a facade of nationwide elections while consolidating presidential power. The demographic of the now elected members reflects these reports and extensive representational shortcomings. Of the 119 seats filled, 103 went to Sunni men, only ten to ethnic or religious minorities: including Kurds, Christians, and Alawites and just six to women. Elections were not even held in Kurdish-controlled northern regions or the Druze-held region of Suwayda, leaving 21 seats vacant.
In other worrying developments, similar to the People’s Assembly elections, presidential loyalists are reportedly moving into smaller towns and undertaking hostile takeovers of local administrations. Despite superficially collaborating with established local leaders, in practice, they use power and coercion to sideline those with genuine experience and local knowledge. These administrations remain ineffective and neglect local agency, reigniting the same resentments of the last half-century.
Economic Centralisation
Al-Sharraa’s economic reforms build on his political centralisation. Nepotism is rife, with key sectors consolidated under the presidential palace. His brother, Hazem, is reportedly overseeing the Syrian economic rebuild, despite holding no official position, he has joined the president on major international negotiations, including a trip to Riyadh for negotiations with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Another brother, Jamal, has already been publicly reprimanded for exploiting his newfound status to secure commercial advantages in imports and exports, tourism, and logistics from an office in Damascus.
The wider economic rebuild is reportedly being overseen by an unofficial committee composed of familial and Idlib connections and kept from public view. This shadowy body, led by Hazem al-Sharaa and an Idlib businessman listed as a terrorist in his home country for his role in HTS, has reportedly negotiated a number of shady deals with Assad’s inner circle of business elites.
Around $1.6 billion in assets have been seized in exchange for immunity and permission to resume operations. Companies targeted include Syriatel, the main telecoms provider that generated up to 12% of state income for Bashar al-Assad and controlled over two thirds of the Syrian telecoms market. The company was also used as a state surveillance tool under the ownership of Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf and remains operational under new undisclosed ownership, widely believed to be this same committee.
Further Idlibisation has been alleged by insiders, who say that the commercial presence of Idlib is being felt across Syria. Companies linked to HTS affiliates are reported as dominating reconstruction contracts, and presidential favouritism is providing Idlib figures with the influence to pressure property sales at low prices, including in prime areas of Damascus. These worries have been expanded on by the lack of transparency over foreign investment. Undisclosed contracts with DP World to operate out of the Port of Latakia and with Qatar’s UCC Holding for the Damascus airport, have been signed by Qutaiba Ahmed Badawi, the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports, rumoured to be Al-Sharra’s brother-in-law, raising further concerns about the rebuild project’s lack of oversight.
Despite Syria joining the SWIFT global banking system, card transactions are still largely unavailable. Instead, the country is relying on Sham Cash, a digital payment app provided by Sham Bank, newly mandated to distribute public sector salaries. Developed in Idlib under HTS control, the app bypasses both the Central Bank of Syria and the international financial system, operating with no external oversight or international recognition. It also presents notable digital security and possible surveillance risks, requesting access to cameras, biometric data, and network activity; Digital rights group SMEX rated it 17 out of a possible 22 (22 indicating the highest level of risk). Furthermore, the financial structure reflects similarities to the Assad economic network, salaries can only be withdrawn through two companies with longstanding Assad ties, and stand to earn roughly $3million annually in commissions.
In addition to telecoms, international trade, and finance, the energy sector is also being centralised. In October, the president created the Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC), consolidating the assets, rights, and contracts of all state-owned oil institutions. Headquartered in Damascus, the SPC will be overseen by the Minister of Energy, Mohammed al-Bashir, an Idlib-born former prime minister of both the SSG and the Syrian caretaker government and run by a CEO appointed directly by presidential decree. The company has full legal, financial, and administrative independence.
Virtually every major sector is now consolidated under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, decision-making is dominated by figures from Idlib’s wartime governance, and transparency is almost entirely absent. This restructuring seems to resemble no more than an Idlibised recreation of Assad’s clientelist economy and kleptocracy centralised under the presidential palace.
Sectarian Violence and Devolution
Whilst centralisation has essentially been established both economically and within government positions, regional disputes due to sectarian tensions and separatist movements continue to challenge Al-Sharra’s government.
Just months into the presidency of Ahmed al-Sharaa, violent sectarian clashes broke out across the country. Military units and government allied militias acted swiftly, quashing insurgencies and violently and indiscriminately killing over 1500 Alawite civilians on the coast and 2000 Druze in Suywayda, leading to calls, supported by Israel, for autonomy in the Druze majority areas. Further, violence continues between the government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who maintain their fight for autonomy, and control much of the oil rich region of North-Eastern Syria.
However, Al-Sharaa is determined to unify Syria under the Central government in Damascus and is giving no concessions to separatist ideas. Despite a March 10th agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, backed by US President Donald Trump, and a ceasefire announced in October, clashes continue across northeastern Syria. In Suwayda, violence has eased but stability remains fragile, with Druze leaders rejecting a US and Jordan backed plan to reintegrate the province.
Minority groups remain severely underrepresented in the People’s Assembly, with seats for Druze and SDF-controlled regions still vacant. Elections are expected once negotiations to fully integrate under the central government have materialised. Despite calls for decentralisation, he shows no willingness to compromise and is set on consolidating control across all regions.
Reforming or Entrenching Power?
Al-Sharraa’s rule reflects a rebranded Assad-era programme, substituting old loyalist families with new ones and consolidating political, economic and regional control in a homogeneous group around the president.
Adopting a presumption of good faith, he may be able to justify this by referencing his unique position and capability of delivering such a colossal rebuilding effort, and therefore, the consolidation of all state tools to be used at the expense of reconstruction is a necessary prerequisite to stability, democracy and the possibility of meaningful local agency.
The decision to support Al-Sharaa or not balances on one central question. Will this consolidation eventually be channelled into genuine reconstruction and a universally beneficial transition or entrench a quasi-authoritarian system with a new hierarchy of winners and losers? The current evidence would suggest that Syria’s future is poised to mirror its past.
