The devastations of war are not simply limited to the innumerable material effects on families, friends and ecosystems of life. War is also waged through narratives, shaped by competing interests, moulded by competing powers. Sudan has become the focal point for this kind of war. A war for legitimacy, for resources, and for rule, outgrowing its borders. Although it is hard to get precise figures, Sudan is one of the largest gold producers in Africa. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces use gold mining to fund their war, attracting foreign investors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and notoriously the UAE. This relationship fuels Sudan’s war, exacerbating the dire fragmentation of the Sudanese people. Without serious engagement with civilian groups and an arms embargo on all of Sudan, a real end to war is hard to envision. Then comes the issue of making things better.
The biggest dangers say ‘safety’
Khartoum recently received its first internal flight in more than two years. For nearly a year now, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has managed to maintain relative control over Khartoum. The SAF are claiming now that Khartoum is safe and that things are returning to ‘normal’. But it is a false narrative in many ways. There is the looming threat of continued violence from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), all the more amplified by the danger of drone attacks. Furthermore, safety is not only a lack of violence, it is also security through access to food, to water, to healthcare and education – all of which is lacking in one way or another in Khartoum, let alone the rest of Sudan. It is the people of Sudan who suffer most deeply in this war. When the RSF holds against a siege against the SAF and they eventually take it, it is the civilians who endure suffering from the hands of the RSF first, and then the SAF. The constant back and forth of the frontline due to both sides stretching themselves thin over a wide areas, taking over key sites but ultimately being unable to hold them produces the horrors of alternating authorities in perpetuity, authorities who prioritise territorial gains over civilian wellbeing.
The attitude towards mediation by other nations is also careless about civilian engagement. Diplomacy around Sudan follows the legitimacy line, involving only the party that they see are the legitimate authority and make no effort to involve civil groups in the discussion. This has led to a particular stalemate, especially given that the Quad, the main mediation initiative made up of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, USA and UAE, have competing positions over who they support. The lack of involvement of civilian groups indicates a reluctance to engage in a post-conflict vision, or rather a post-SAF/RSF vision. Hence, the voices of Sudanese civilians are further side-lined, despite constant attempts by groups like Somoud to decentralise the conversation from SAF or RSF. Furthermore, whilst the RSF’s war crimes and abuses are rightly publicised widely and condemned, most recently the likely situation of genocide in El-Fasher, the SAF’s war crimes are not quite so prevalently acknowledged by the international community, such as ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate bombings, and sexual violence.
The golden status quo
This is made all the more clear by the lack of an extended arms embargo against the entirety of Sudan’s armed groups. Currently, only the RSF has an UN embargo, which the UAE regularly violates by providing arms, including weapons the Emiratis have acquired through deals with other countries, such as the UK and China. However, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have begun to more proactively provide arms to the SAF. It seems everyone wants to get in on the gold. The effect of this in turn is further contribution to the fragmentation of civilians. The reasons for fragmentation are both local and international. Locally, the fragmentation is derived from support to particular groups. One of the reasons the SAF is so keen to portray an image of normalcy in Khartoum is to suggest that the SAF is the side that is protecting Sudan and rebuilding it. But if we look to other areas under SAF control, things are not so pristine. The battleground for legitimacy invades community spaces to divide people along the lines of the warring factions and prevents resistance against de facto authorities by creating the illusion that they are the only group that can make things right. Internationally, the legitimacy/fragmentation issue is compounded on by international support for a specific side whilst creating community initiatives that isolate some groups and include others, instead of a larger, inclusive initiative that allows civilian groups to create their own resolutions together. Hence, a total arms embargo is key. Both the RSF and the SAF are being empowered by international actors and given impunity on their war crimes and violations of other humans. Another issue is enforcement. As I mentioned, the embargo on the RSF so far has been poorly enforced, but we know that arms embargos can work, and in the case of Sudan, it is vital in crippling the capacity of warring groups.
Truth and reconciliation in Sudan
In addition to a total arms embargo and genuine and inclusive peace initiatives with civilian groups, any movement towards a post-conflict Sudan will require honesty and reconciliation from all sides of this war. Restorative justice initiatives like a Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are the first step after the end of war in facilitating closure, remembering the horrors of war and moving onto a wiser, kinder future.
In terms of some kind of justice initiative, there is the issue of impartiality. Any person committed to a certain side whilst another side is favoured is unlikely to play along kindly, perhaps even outright refuse its legitimacy. Hence, a court-based justice system cannot solely rely on people who may have been involved in the war in Sudan to play an impartial role. On the other hand we have systems like the International Criminal Court (ICC), who are looked to because of their supposed impartiality, although there is the issue of the first nine years is marked by a tendency towards some preferential treatment under Luis Moreno Ocampo. So how does one approach justice in a way that is restorative and transitional, without sacrificing a strong process?
Perhaps a combination of things is required. One of the issues with the ICC is that usually only the top commanding minority of a perpetrating group is prosecuted – there will need to be a larger process that also includes mid-level commanders who are responsible for on-the-ground orders. Hence, some kind of hybrid international court, run by Sudanese judges and jurists with international oversight may provide the balance of impartiality and self-organisation. However, for the vast majority of foot soldiers “following orders”, something in the style of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be required. A space where victims can safely come forward and share their experiences and where perpetrators, under amnesty can honestly come forward about how things really functioned, who was hurt, and who might still be alive. The horrors the Sudanese have faced are not bound by borders, and domestic issues are in part formed by international ones and vice versa. As always, the wars of today are mired in the histories of yesterday. Restoration is about making things better if you at least cannot make it right, and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are strong places to digest what has taken place and remember what was done, and eventually forgiveness can result amongst those who can, to move forwards and make a better future. Sudan is dire need of attention and action, especially on the international stage.
