The following report on the US-Israel-Iran War was written by the Next Century Foundation team, which was issued to Iran on Friday, 20 March. The report outlines an urgent, time-bound proposal for an immediate truce with an established diplomatic process to de-escalate the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, and establish a pathway to a lasting peace agreement.

The Next Century Foundation Proposal for Immediate Diplomatic Action and an end to the US-Israel-Iran War

In light of escalating conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, the Next Century Foundation (NCF) calls for an immediate, time-bound complete pause in the fighting, i.e. a truce, whilst a structured and similarly time-bound diplomatic process takes place. The diplomatic process should be geared to be swift with the incentive that the Straits of Hormuz reopen and the pause in fighting becomes an armistice endorsed by the UN Security Council permanent member states and the State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran together with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Evidence from the February Geneva talks indicates that a negotiated settlement was within reach prior to military escalation. This brief outlines a practical pathway to de-escalation and a framework for achieving a durable peace agreement.

1. Immediate time-bound pause in fighting

The NCF recommends the implementation of an immediate cessation in hostilities lasting18 days. This timeframe should reflect the period of renewal symbolised by key religious and cultural observances, Nowruz, Eid, Passover, and Easter, and provides a critical window for diplomatic engagement.

Oman’s mediation efforts in Geneva suggested that a full agreement could be reached within approximately three months, indicating that a short-term ceasefire could realistically evolve into a sustained diplomatic process. This is too slow, predicated on the fact that the reopening of the Straits of Hormuz is dependent on a full armistice. However, a mechanism should be in place to extend the truce for further eighteen-day periods if the Sultanate of Oman believes constructive progress is being made.

As part of the confidence‑building measures accompanying the pause in hostilities, the Islamic Republic of Iran shall continue to exercise its established responsibilities for operational control and security management in the Strait of Hormuz, as a stabilising guarantee, ensuring uninterrupted commercial navigation until a full armistice is concluded.

2. Diplomatic Opportunity for a Peace Agreement

Credible diplomatic progress has been achieved prior to the escalation of hostilities. Officials present at the February Geneva talks assessed that Iran’s proposals demonstrated increased flexibility and a willingness to compromise.

Senior UK representation in Geneva indicated that a negotiated outcome was both viable and sufficient to prevent conflict. This underscores the importance of returning to diplomacy as a credible alternative to continued military action.

The diplomatic track could explicitly incorporate Iran’s core concerns, including security guarantees, sanctions relief, and mechanisms for compensation for collateral damage endured by civilians as a consequence of the war.

3. Core Components of the Geneva Proposal

The Geneva discussions produced a set of substantive proposals that can serve as the foundation for renewed negotiations:

• A permanent nuclear agreement without sunset clauses, unlike the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
• Dilution of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile under IAEA supervision
• A temporary pause on domestic uranium enrichment (Iran proposed 3-5 years, US demands a longer duration). The Next Century Foundation recommends ten years.
• Potential US participation of a future civilian nuclear programme in Iran
• Significant sanctions relief (approximately 80% of both international and US-initiated) for Iran in exchange for compliance to the deal (the Next Century Foundation suggests full sanctions relief for Iran within one year of signature).

These provisions were widely viewed by mediators as a breakthrough, particularly Iran’s willingness to eliminate stockpiles of highly enriched uranium by dilution.

However the NCF also stresses that any forestalling of Iran’s right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue a civil nuclear programme, including enriching uranium to a level only commensurate with a peaceful civil nuclear power programme, as practised or intended to be practised by many states internationally including some Gulf Arab neighbours, has equally to be dependent on international guarantees for the supply to Iran of only sufficiently enriched uranium in order that it can continue to operate or restart its civil nuclear power programme. The NCF notes that otherwise Iran would be denied an enrichment capacity to all other NPT signatories in the world; a capacity that energy diversity arguably makes imperative. Such a resumed Iranian civil nuclear programme would be monitored by the IAEA under a new protocol that expands its inspectors’ right of access to any sites of potential relevance to an Iranian nuclear programme involving inspectors drawn from any countries in the world excepting Israel.

To address Iran’s economic concerns, the final agreement should guarantee Iran’s unrestricted ability to sell crude oil and petrochemical products to all international buyers without limitation or discrimination, alongside full reintegration into global financial systems including banking, insurance, and shipping services.

4. Recommended Course of Action

The NCF recommends that all parties:

• Agree to a truce, an immediate pause in fighting, and an immediate resumption of talks in Oman
• Resume negotiations using the Geneva framework as a baseline
• Commit to a defined negotiation timeline (in increments of 18 days). Negotiations should proceed in synchronised eighteen-day phases, with each phase requiring reciprocal steps from all parties to maintain momentum and ensure balance
• Remove incentives for assassination, e.g. the $10 million per capita “rogue’s gallery” on the US State Department website and any corresponding countermeasure by Iran.

A truce which is a pause in hostilities should not be treated as an end, but as a mechanism to enable a structured and time-bound diplomatic process.

5. Security Guarantees

A durable agreement must include credible security guarantees. Specifically:

• Enforceable commitments from the United States and Israel to refrain from any further military action against Iran, whatever its ruling political system, and by Israel regarding attacks on the territory of any Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state, unless in any of these cases there is an unequivocal, verifiable and internationally-accepted casus belli. The same enforceable commitment must be made by Iran regarding attacks on both its Arab GCC neighbours and on Israel.
• Reciprocal commitments from Iran regarding its nuclear compliance as per the above-mentioned desired agreements based on the noted Geneva process, and from all of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states to build a regional security apparatus and inspection mechanism in cooperation with interested and mutually approved extra-regional parties. The latter to include, but not be limited to, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. The mechanism could involve verifiable information-sharing by all GCC states’ militaries and that of Iran with all fellow GCC states the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding testing, exercises, and maneuvers. International oversight, with a P5+ mechanism.
• International on the ground and maritime mechanism providing oversight of military activity on both sides of the Persian Gulf, in its waters and on land; a mechanism that is both approved by the UN Security Council and directly involves all five permanent members (known as the ‘P5’) of the UN Security Council, and directly involves mutually-agreed NON-P5 countries drawn from the broader region but excluding Israel.
• Such a ‘P5 Plus’ monitoring system must involve both expert badged military personnel from each P5 state and, it is to be hoped, from ‘extra-regional’ NON-P5 participants e.g. Turkey, India, Pakistan and Indonesia – but excluding Israel – in the policing of both Gulf maritime waters and the territory of states on both sides of the Gulf, to ensure that:

1. There is not any resumed Iranian ballistic missile or drone programme that could enable their use beyond a 1,200-mile radius.
2. That the territory of any Gulf littoral country is not being used by any parties to prepare for attacks on any other Gulf state.

Crucially, Israel must be part of the envisaged regional security agreement and held to the same obligations as the United States, Iran and the Gulf Arab states. Monitoring of Israel to ensure that it is not preparing for offensive military action against either Iran or any of the Gulf Arab states is to be conducted by a team of military personnel drawn in this case only from each of the P5 states.

Should the hoped for agreement materialise, along with an associated regional security agreement, including the principle of enforceable monitoring involving the major powers and regional actors, then something further might be considered and applied in broad terms to enhance stability in the Levant.

Conclusion

Viable diplomatic pathways were actively under development prior to escalation. A temporary ceasefire, coupled with a structured return to negotiations, offers the most credible route to de-escalation and long-term stability.

The Next Century Foundation therefore urges immediate action to halt military action and resume diplomacy before further escalation undermines the remaining prospects for peace.

Addendum

There may be value in using this opportunity to address Iran´s longstanding ideological animosity towards America and its allies?  Might this be the subject for a special council of Islamic scholars to debate as part of the potential rapprochement associated with a peace treaty? The American pope in the Vatican could play a role perhaps in conjunction with the Grand Mufti in Egypt, a significant Jewish religious leader, and one or more senior Ayatollahs.