On 2 March 2026, Hezbollah launched more than 200 rockets into northern Israel following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The strike also came in the context of Israel’s near‑daily attacks on Lebanon throughout the ceasefire period, supposedly starting in November 2024, during which around 500 Lebanese were killed, thousands injured, and hundreds of homes destroyed. Israel never respected the ceasefire agreement, continuing military operations across Lebanese territory despite the truce. This escalation drew Lebanon into the epicentre of a broader U.S.–Israel war against Iran. Israel retaliated by striking Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. These exchanges mark the most serious hostilities since the ceasefire agreed in November 2024, with no clear signs of de‑escalation.
Will the Litani River Become the Next Gaza?
On 16 March, the Israel Defense Forces announced the start of “limited and targeted ground operations” in southern Lebanon. The objective is to secure territory south of the Litani River and dismantle Hezbollah strongholds near the border. These operations aim to destroy military infrastructure and push Hezbollah forces away from northern Israel.
According to Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, the strategy mirrors tactics used in Gaza against Hamas. This includes the systematic destruction of buildings, tunnels, and bridges suspected of facilitating weapons storage and transport. Israeli forces have already targeted bridges across the Litani River, which they claim are used by Hezbollah’s Radwan Force to move fighters and smuggle arms.
Israel has also accused Hezbollah of using ambulances for military purposes and has continued strikes on hospitals and medical facilities in southern Lebanon. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Health, since 2 March these attacks have hit at least 128 medical sites and ambulances, killing 42 healthcare workers and injuring 107. However, no verifiable evidence has been presented publicly. The Lebanese Ministry of Health rejects these claims, arguing that such allegations are used to justify attacks on civilian infrastructure. It maintains that Israel’s actions are intended to render those areas uninhabitable and repurpose it for military use, echoing accusations made regarding Israeli operations in Gaza.
The IDF is also pursuing the creation of a buffer zone along the border by demolishing buildings in southern Lebanon. Similar tactics were employed in Beit Hanoun and Rafah in Gaza. While military experts warn that such a “prolonged operation” necessitates a long-term occupation that could inadvertently revitalise domestic support for Hezbollah, the IDF remains committed to an extended campaign of attrition.
Continued attacks on infrastructure south of the Litani River are likely to produce severe humanitarian consequences. Beyond immediate casualties, they risk isolating the region from essential supplies, including food and medical care. The area faces the prospect of a humanitarian crisis comparable to that seen in Gaza.
Lebanon Seeks Talks but Lacks Leverage
Before the escalation, Lebanon had already expressed willingness to pursue negotiations. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam indicated readiness to form a delegation and push for an immediate ceasefire.
Lebanese officials suggest that Beirut seeks an end to hostilities prior to formal talks. President Aoun has also criticised Hezbollah, arguing that its actions undermine national interests and public safety. He has pledged to pursue its disarmament. Meanwhile, French president Emmanuel Macron has expressed support for direct negotiations and offered to host talks in Paris.
Despite these signals, Israel has rejected proposals for direct dialogue, arguing that Lebanon’s efforts as “too little, too late.” While Lebanon consistently calls for a ceasefire, it lacks the capacity to enforce it on Hezbollah and fears that such actions could reignite internal conflict.
Lebanon is therefore caught between internal division and external pressure. Hezbollah continues its military campaign and rejects talks on its future capabilities until Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon, halts its attacks, and releases Lebanese prisoners. The United States, preoccupied with its confrontation with Iran and dissatisfied with Lebanon’s earlier inaction against Hezbollah, has shown limited interest in mediation. This has effectively allowed Israel greater freedom to shape the conflict. As a result, Lebanon’s diplomatic options and civilian space for relief are rapidly diminishing.
Will Israel Face Sanctions from Its Allies?
With the United States focused elsewhere, Lebanon may look to the international community and Israel’s allies for restraint. Leaders from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada issued a joint statement warning that a large-scale Israeli ground offensive would trigger a severe humanitarian crisis and called for an immediate halt.
The European Union has similarly urged Israel to cease operations and pledged €100 million in humanitarian assistance to Lebanon. However, these measures have had limited impact. As Israel’s largest trading partner, the EU has potential leverage through economic sanctions, including asset freezes and restrictions on investment. Yet divisions within the bloc, evident during debates over Gaza, make such measures unlikely.
Furthermore, the United States remains entrenched in its conflict with Iran, compounded by a growing crisis of confidence with the EU and other Western allies. The historical precedent of Washington successfully pressuring Brussels to withhold sanctions, as seen during the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, is now increasingly unlikely to be repeated in Lebanon. As the U.S. appears to have acquiesced to Israel’s lead in the Lebanese theatre, the EU may find itself with greater strategic autonomy to pursue its own negotiations or even consider sanctions against Israel.”
However, the strength of ties between individual EU member states and Israel varies, as do the scale and value of their economic relations. Differences in diplomatic positions and political and economic interests will shape whether the European Union is willing to adopt economic sanctions against Israel.
A more plausible outcome is the adoption of limited measures by individual states. These may include trade restrictions, arms export bans, visa limitations on Israeli officials, and suspension of research cooperation. Such steps do not require full EU consensus and have previously been implemented by countries such as Spain, Slovenia, and the Netherlands in response to the Gaza crisis.
Conclusion
Although the EU remains divided on comprehensive sanctions, France remains the primary mediator attempting to navigate the volatile space between Israeli security demands and Lebanese sovereignty. For Beirut, support from individual European states and broader international backing may offer the most immediate means of alleviating the humanitarian catastrophe, while also helping communities recover from the strain of a prolonged economic crisis. Such assistance is also likely to be critical in helping the country avoid deeper entanglement in a war it neither desired nor possesses the resources to sustain.
