Five years since its foundation, the Government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is virtually at war with its neighbour Pakistan and continues to treat Afghan women as if these were the dark ages. Meanwhile the international community doesn’t engage with it as an equal in the world family of nations. The Next Century Foundation’s Research Mariam Zeinaldinin argues that Afghanistan should at least be permitted to participate in the United Nations:
Five years after the Taliban returned to power, Russia remains the only country to have formally recognized its government. Most of the international community continues to withhold recognition over concerns surrounding the Taliban’s governance, human rights record, and restrictions on women and girls.
Despite this diplomatic stalemate, Afghanistan’s neighbors cannot ignore the strategic realities of sharing borders with the country. As Uzbekistan’s Javlon Vakhabov put it, “Afghanistan should be regarded not as a periphery, but as a full-fledged participant and co-author of regional processes. The stability and economic recovery of Afghanistan are directly linked to the future development of Central Asia as a whole.”
Such engagement does not amount to political normalization, but it challenges the logic of isolation. The question, however, is how far these regional ties can compensate for Afghanistan’s exclusion from the wider international community.
The Strategic Imperative of Regional Engagement
For Afghanistan’s neighbors, engagement with the Taliban authorities is driven less by political endorsement than by the practical realities of geography and regional interdependence. Situated between Central and South Asia, Afghanistan offers opportunities to expand trade, diversify transport routes and develop cross-border energy networks. At the same time, developments within the country have direct implications for regional stability, making continued communication with Kabul important to neighboring states seeking to protect their interests.
Afghanistan’s potential as a transit corridor underpins several regional infrastructure initiatives. Uzbekistan and Pakistan have advanced plans for the Trans-Afghan Railway, which could connect Central Asian markets with Pakistani ports. Turkmenistan continues to pursue the TAPI gas pipeline to supply natural gas to South Asia, while the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project aims to deliver surplus electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Iran has also sought to expand trade and transport links with Afghanistan, including through Chabahar Port, which offers an alternative route to foreign markets when access through Pakistan is disrupted. These efforts differ in their progress, but they reflect a shared interest in connecting regional markets and energy networks. For Afghanistan, deeper integration could create opportunities for trade, investment and economic recovery.
Security provides a parallel incentive for engagement. Cross-border militancy and the activities of armed groups give regional governments reasons to maintain direct contact with the Taliban authorities, discuss security concerns and preserve channels for cooperation. China, for example, has participated in the China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral dialogue, which addresses counterterrorism alongside economic cooperation and regional connectivity. Central Asian states have likewise maintained dialogue with Kabul through bilateral contacts and regional mechanisms, including the Regional Contact Group on Afghanistan, which provides a forum for discussing regional cooperation and shared concerns.
Regional engagement is therefore pragmatic in nature. Neighboring states have incentives to pursue economic opportunities, address shared security concerns and maintain influence over developments in Afghanistan, despite their reservations about its government. Yet the need to maintain contact should not be mistaken for trust or stable relations. Regional engagement has become a practical necessity, but whether it can deliver lasting cooperation is a different question.
The Limits of Regional Pragmatism
Recent escalations between Pakistan and Afghanistan illustrate the fragility of regional cooperation amid mistrust. Islamabad initially expected the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 to strengthen security cooperation, particularly in addressing the threat posed by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Instead, Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Taliban authorities of allowing the group to operate from Afghan territory, allegations Kabul denies. The dispute has deepened mistrust, contributing to cross-border clashes, Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan and recurring border closures. The economic consequences have been particularly severe since October 2025, when Pakistan closed major border crossings, bringing formal bilateral trade to a standstill. The prolonged closure has disrupted established trade routes, increased logistical costs and intensified economic pressures in Afghanistan.
Diplomatic efforts have done little to bridge these divisions. At the October 2026 Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan, disagreements between the Afghan and Pakistani delegations prevented the adoption of a joint statement, underscoring the difficulty of translating regional engagement into effective cooperation.
Beyond bilateral tensions, Afghanistan’s limited access to the wider international financial system presents a broader obstacle to economic recovery. Regional connectivity projects offer opportunities to expand trade and support recovery, but restricted banking channels, limited access to international finance and weak investor confidence complicate cross-border payments and constrain investment. These barriers affect not only major infrastructure projects but also businesses seeking to trade internationally and expand their operations.
CASA-1000 highlights both the potential and the difficulties of regional integration. Construction of the Afghan section resumed in December 2024 under special financial safeguards after being suspended following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Its progress demonstrates that regional cooperation is complicated by political and financial isolation. Without broader access to finance and international markets, regional initiatives alone will struggle to generate sustained economic recovery.
Mass deportations of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran have added another source of strain. Reports have documented arbitrary detention, harassment, discriminatory treatment and, in some cases, physical abuse of Afghans in both countries. Although both countries maintain channels of engagement with Kabul, their deportation policies have sent large numbers of Afghans back to a country with limited capacity to support their reintegration.
Beyond Isolation: Prospects for Recovery
Afghanistan is more than the Taliban. Around 21.9 million Afghans were projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026. Yet international policy continues to leave Afghans caught between diplomatic isolation and the realities of Taliban rule. Isolation has neither secured the reforms demanded by foreign governments nor prevented neighboring countries from engaging with Kabul. After five years, it is time to acknowledge that this approach has failed to deliver the political change it was intended to achieve.
The limits of regional engagement underscore the need for broader international cooperation. International actors should expand practical engagement with Afghanistan by facilitating legitimate financial transactions, sustaining humanitarian assistance and supporting economic recovery, with safeguards against diversion and misuse. Such cooperation should not be contingent on formal recognition of the Taliban, it should be assessed by its ability to improve Afghans’ livelihoods and create opportunities for recovery.
Beyond economic cooperation, the international community must confront Afghanistan’s exclusion from the institutions where decisions affecting its future are made. The unresolved question of Afghanistan’s representation at the United Nations is central to this challenge. While governments debate the legitimacy of the Taliban, Afghanistan risks remaining without an accepted voice in international affairs. If the international community seeks a different future for Afghanistan, how can it shape that future while leaving the country at the margins of the system through which cooperation is pursued? Addressing Afghanistan’s representation should be part of a broader effort to restore its international participation, without treating representation as an endorsement of Taliban rule.
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s recovery requires a shift from isolation as an end in itself to cooperation that delivers tangible change. Regional engagement has kept Afghanistan connected to its neighbors, but without a coordinated international approach, these efforts cannot address the country’s wider economic and diplomatic exclusion. Resolving Afghanistan’s representation at the United Nations, supporting economic recovery and maintaining pressure on the Taliban’s human rights abuses must therefore form part of the same strategy. Afghanistan’s future cannot be reduced to the question of whether the Taliban deserve recognition; it must also be shaped by the rights, livelihoods and prospects of the people who live under their rule.
Image above is from a meeting between Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Jumangarin and the governors of Afghanistan’s Herat and Kunduz provinces (Image: Primeminister.kz, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons).
