Can online voting make elections possible in states where conventional polls are too dangerous or impractical to organise?
Free and fair elections are often central to rebuilding stability after war. They give a new government legitimacy, and they give citizens an active role in maintaining peace. Yet in the states that need them most, the basic conditions for an election, from safe polling stations to an accurate voter roll, have often collapsed. Digital technology has prompted a growing debate about whether some of these barriers could be bypassed by going online.
The promise of E-democracy
The term “E-voting” typically refers to two quite different things. Many countries, including Belgium, Brazil and Japan, have used electronic voting machines inside polling stations. Internet voting, where ballots are cast remotely from a personal device, is far rarer. Canada uses it in some municipal elections, and Estonia has offered it nationally since 2005. However its use is growing. Switzerland, France, Armenia, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand, Oman, Panama, and Pakistan have also utilized internet voting channels specifically to process ballots cast by citizens residing outside the country. In Australia online voting has been piloted regionally, most notably the iVote system used in New South Wales state elections, but it is not an option for Australian federal elections.
Its advocates argue three main benefits. First, inclusivity. People with limited mobility, busy schedules or long distances to travel can vote in minutes. Second, lower costs once the system is built. Third, the potential to raise turnout, a case made early.
These benefits matter most where the barriers to voting are highest. Researchers have explored the potential of internet-based elections in both Palestine and post-war Ukraine.
Significant risks
Internet voting has not yet spread widely, and this is due to the substantial risks.
One demonstrated weakness of online voting is security. Estonia is the most cited success story, yet an independent analysis found serious architectural and procedural weaknesses that could let attackers alter results without detection. The researchers, who reproduced attacks in their lab, recommended that Estonia immediately stop using the system. Even a secure central system cannot protect voters’ own phones and laptops from malware.
Another weakness is vulnerability to disruption. In Ecuador’s 2023 election, around 120,000 citizens abroad were registered to vote online, but many could not cast a ballot. The electoral council blamed cyberattacks from seven countries, and voting in three overseas districts had to be rerun.
Favorability and manipulation by those in power are a further concern. Some argue that authoritarian governments favour internet voting because it makes independent checks of results almost impossible.
Online votes must be linked to a verified identity during processing, which makes a fully secret ballot hard to guarantee. Studies of Ukraine add that a state facing a hostile neighbour should expect cyberattacks and interference throughout the campaign, not just on voting day, as seen in Romania and Moldova. They argue Ukraine is not yet technically or socially ready for bringing voting online.
Why Sudan should still be part of the conversation
None of these risks disappear in Sudan, and several are worse. But Sudan shows a context where online voting could hold significant promise.
The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, now in its fourth year, has effectively split the country. A conventional election depends on stable addresses, voter rolls, and safe polling stations. For a population this scattered, across front lines and borders, those conditions may not return for years. Polling for millions of refugees in Chad, Egypt and South Sudan would be enormously costly. A future peace settlement will still need a government with popular legitimacy. If the choice is between an imperfect but supplementary voting channel and leaving millions with no voice at all, the imperfect option warrants exploration.
Proposing a phased, hybrid path
The defensible case is not for immediate online elections, but for preparing now so the option exists later. The following are recommendations for introductory steps to internet voting in Sudan:
- Introducing lower-risk services first. Pilot digital voter registration, voter-roll checks and voter information could help a dispersed population even if ballots stay on paper.
- Secondly, a non-binding pilot study could help. This could run simulated elections that test usability and security without affecting any real result.
Arguably only if security and institutional conditions are met, allow remote voting for a clearly defined group, such as refugees abroad. This would need independent security testing, a verifiable count and a clear way to suspend the system if compromised.
Throughout, the safeguards from the LSE’s Study on E-Voting Practices, though intended for the EU context, should apply. Internet voting should ideally never be the only option, with polling stations kept for those who want them. It should rest on a secure digital identity system. Voters should be able to override an early online vote in person on election day.
Conclusion
Technology cannot create the political conditions that make an election meaningful. To ensure democracy, you need a ceasefire, trusted institutions and parties willing to accept the result. But when peace talks eventually produce a path to elections, Sudan will need ways to include millions of people who cannot reach a polling station. Starting the groundwork now, cautiously and transparently, would give that future vote a better chance of being credible.
