The second round of indirect talks between the United States (U.S.) and Iran occurred on Tuesday, February 17th, in an effort to reach a nuclear deal that would appease fears in the Middle East. Iran is seemingly open to limited compromises, to the utter satisfaction of U.S. President Donald Trump, eager to agree on a deal following the talks in Geneva.
Nonetheless, the U.S. displays a twofold strategy regarding an Iranian agreement. Beyond diplomacy, Washington is enhancing its Middle East military assets by deploying an additional aircraft carrier strike group alongside the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier. This parallel display of force underscores that negotiations are unfolding under the shadow of potential escalation.
Subsequently, statements from Iranian authorities reflect both sides of the U.S. action plan. On the one hand, Iranian negotiators are indicating readiness for a deal if sanctions are lifted, while on the other, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, addresses the U.S. military intensification by assuring the U.S. will ‘not be able to destroy the Islamic Republic‘. This pronunciation signals a looming risk of escalation should both sides not come to an agreement soon, risking recurrent coercive action following last year’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The optimistic alternative, reaching a credible deal, requires significant concessions from the U.S., placing the ball in their court to ascertain willingness to sign an agreement with Tehran.
Understanding the fragility of the current moment requires situating the talks within the broader trajectory of US–Iran nuclear diplomacy, particularly the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement and the ensuing cycle of sanctions, retaliation, and accelerated enrichment.
The Onset: From the JCPOA to Maximum Pressure
Continuously enduring multilateral sanctions since 2006 for its nuclear proliferation endeavours, 2015 marked the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a U.N. Security Council-backed agreement that restrains Iran’s nuclear enrichment program in favour of sanctions relief. The JCPOA’s terms include:
- 3.67% cap on Iran’s uranium enrichment;
- 300 kg limit in uranium stockpile;
- Withering the number of centrifuges and the capacity of Iran’s R&D scheme;
- Thorough monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Today, estimates show Iran possesses around 400 kg of greatly enriched uranium, 60%, tucked into the underground tunnels that the US targeted in its bombing campaign on June 22nd, 2025. In addition, Iran continues to install and operate advanced centrifuges, revealing an ample plan of reconstruction, concealment, and dispersion following the mentioned attack.
This inimical situation mounted as a result of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, slamming Iran with not only the previously lifted sanctions but new ones too. The U.S. ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign backfired, and Iran, still hypothetically bounded by the JCPOA conditions, began exceeding nuclear-relevant commitments in 2019, ceasing to apply them altogether in 2021.
Coming under scrutiny, Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities found defending voices, stressing that a nuclear-armed Iran is the most confident outcome in restoring stability in the Middle East. This logic posits that, if Iranians became a second Middle Eastern nuclear powerhouse alongside Israel, it would reduce imbalances in military power and yield both regional and international stability. This rationale also undergirds the Western perception of Iran being governed in an ‘innately irrational‘ fashion; however, Iranian officials have previously stated that the nuclear undertaking is for the purpose of providing for domestic welfare, rather than improving its offensive capabilities. Moreover, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a jurisprudential fatwa (ruling on a point of Islamic law) prohibiting the production or use of weapons of mass destruction because they pose a threat to humanity. But arguably if Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will simply deter each other.
Mistrust and the Roots of Escalation
To this day, Iran’s stance on its nuclear longing stays unchanged. Preceding the second round of US-Iran negotiations on Tuesday, the head of the IAEA had met Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Monday, February 16th, in Geneva, Switzerland. The meeting concluded with Iranian officials once again delineating Iran’s position. Acknowledging Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Esmaeil Baghaei, Foreign Ministry spokesman, claimed that Iran accepted both the rights and constraints of the accord. He reiterates that uranium enrichment is part of the country’s ‘peaceful use of nuclear energy‘ framework, stated in Article 4 of the treaty. Moreover, while confirming the negotiating talks are moving forward, the spokesman depicted the negotiating environment as a ‘climate of complete mistrust‘.
What contributes to this hostile negotiating atmosphere, and the West’s apprehension when it comes to Iran’s intentions? Western policymakers remain sceptical of Tehran’s objectives due to longstanding allegations that Iran is pursuing a covert nuclear program even after the nuclear deal era ended, and because Iran’s leadership has repeatedly refused to discuss its ballistic missile program or regional proxy ties as part of negotiations, focusing only on limited dilution of enriched uranium and not broader security concerns.
Israel, holding talks only with the U.S. since being excluded from the negotiating table by Iran, views Iran’s hostile rhetoric and support for armed groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas as direct threats to its survival, a perception shaped by decades of violent confrontations and explicit statements by Iranian leaders vowing Israel’s destruction. These factors blend with recent military clashes and Iran’s efforts to rebuild nuclear and missile capabilities after the 2025 strikes to create an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and fear, where Western negotiators worry that Iran might exploit diplomatic openings to advance its strategic programs, while Tehran sees pressure as an attempt to curb its sovereign defence capabilities.
Best and Worst-Case Scenarios: De-escalation vs. War
As far as the best-case scenario goes, further negotiations between the U.S. and Iran culminate in a limited but meaningful agreement that curtails immediate proliferation risks and stabilises the region. The deal’s centrepiece would be Iran capping or rolling back its uranium enrichment levels, widening IAEA inspections, and complying with greater transparency over its nuclear facilities. In return, the U.S. must show a credible guarantee of phased sanctions relief, contrary to the 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA.
Technical monitoring mechanisms already exist from the 2015 groundwork authorised by the U.N. Security Council, proving that supervision is feasible if political will exists. While tensions remain high, both sides have described talks as constructive, implying neither Washington nor Tehran is keen on commencing a conflict.
A narrowly focused agreement solely tackling the nuclear issue – even one that does not resolve missile development or regional proxy disputes – could lengthen Iran’s nuclear breakout time, reassure European allies, and reduce pressure for military action. While fragile, such an outcome would reflect a pragmatic recognition on both sides that war would be economically and strategically costly.
Latest developments show that Iran agreed during the Geneva negotiations to submit a written proposal outlining how it intends to address American concerns. Whether Iran will accept all nuclear conditions, and how the U.S. will weigh its sanctions relief strategy are detrimental contingencies to the prospects of the best-case scenario.
The worst-case scenario would involve the collapse of negotiations followed by direct U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, potentially justified by intelligence assessments that Iran is approaching weapons-grade capability (90% enriched uranium, Iran currently retaining 60% enrichment). Past military interventions are evidence that violent action does not fully eradicate the nuclear programme, but rather just delays it. Furthermore, Iran has already made it clear that it is prepared for retaliation in case of any strikes upon its territory.
Iran’s response would most likely be asymmetrical. Besides missile attacks and emboldening non-state proxies (such as Hezbollah), Iran repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz as a reprisal to any attack. This would have a calamitous effect on crude oil prices, since this artery accounts for a fifth of global oil flows and would cut off the most affluent oil producers in the region (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE). The Strait of Hormuz is already in an alarming state, given the military drills Iran is conducting as a response to the rapid build-up of American military forces in the Arabian Sea.
Another pivotal area of disagreement that could perturb U.S.-Iran talks is Washington’s yearning to push the discussion beyond the nuclear issue. Given the aforementioned reconstruction efforts following previous strikes, Iran’s missile stockpile is also under scrutiny, yet completely avoided by Iranian officials during the bilateral talks. Iran has abandoned its self-imposed missile-range limit of 2,000 km by deploying the Khorramshahr system, thought to extend the missile’s range to 3,000 km. Besides this, Israel’s officials estimated the size of Iran’s remaining arsenal following the 2025 strikes to be 1,500 missiles and 200 launchers, while also considering Iran’s plans to replenish its stocks following the destruction caused by the U.S. and Israel attacks. Beyond the long-range missile capabilities that were subject to retaliatory tactics against Israel, this warns about U.S. regional bases possibly becoming targets, drawing Washington deeper into conflict.
Conclusion: Diplomacy Before Deployment Peaks
In sum, US–Iran nuclear diplomacy is unfolding against an accelerating military build-up that may soon reach its peak. The deployment of additional U.S. naval assets, particularly the planned arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group, emphasizes how negotiations are taking place under acute time pressure. Should diplomacy stall while military deployments intensify, miscalculation – rather than deliberate intent – could trigger open conflict within days. Conversely, a narrowly tailored agreement remains the only viable pathway to prevent a rapid slide from coercive signalling into regional war.
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Additional comment from the NCF Secretary General: Some policy decisions are already made by Iran and have been shared with us by them with their permission to disclose them:
- The Straights of Hormuz will be closed if Iranian shipping is interfered with by the USA. Otherwise they will not close the Straits.
- Since the war with Israel, Iran has adopted a policy of strategic ambiguity on the nuclear weapons issue. In the absence of an agreement, this policy will continue. Note that this strategic ambiguity is in place now, i.e. the amount of enriched uranium Iran has and the degree to which it is enriched and indeed whether Iran now already has a nuclear weapon are issues open to speculation.
- In the event of a strike by the USA, the counter-attack will include action against Israel.
Featured photo above is of Hassan Rouhani, seventh president of Iran and Ali Akbar Salehi, former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, at the Bushehr Nuclear Plant. Photo by Tasnim News Agency. The photo is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.
