The state of divisions within Yemen, between competing political groups and entrenched historical regional identities, begs the question; is a one-state solution the end-goal? Is it even possible? Should it perhaps be two states, one for Southerners and one for Northerners? Or perhaps some kind of confederation? The ‘x-state solution’ question reeks of failing normative thought that has plagued Palestine-Israel. None of these would be easy to carry out in the current conditions and the idea of secession in an already severely unstable region begs a question of feasibility. But then again, Southerners may ask what other choice there is? To re-attempt unification with the north that once decimated them?
The North/South division of identity in Yemen has been demarcated by centuries of differing rule in the North and South. Centuries prior, the North was ruled by Ottomans and Zaydi Imams and the South occupied by the British through the Protectorate of Aden. The Yemenis in the South fought off the British for independence, eventually establishing the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1967, the only communist-oriented state in the Middle East at the time. Due to the deterioration of Soviet support and effects of the ending Cold War, by 1990 the North and South sought unity with the ostensible intention of lightening each other’s burdens. However, by 1993 Ali Abdullah Saleh, from the North, won elections that shifted political power to the North. This progressed violently, eventually turning into a civil war, ending in the sacking of Aden in 1994. The South surrendered. Yemen has since been fraught with war for decades. This history is core to existing grievances in the Southern Yemeni identity.
Today, the more populous North is governed by the Ansar Allah, otherwise referred to as Houthis by Western media, with Iranian support. The internationally recognised government of Yemen (hereon IRGY) is essentially a government-in-exile sustained by Saudi Arabia, claiming rule over all of Yemen. It is headed by the Presidential Leadership Council (hereon PLC), whose President Rashad Al Alimi spends much of his time in Saudi Arabia. Most importantly for the current day, the voices of Southern Yemenis have remained obscured, not for lack of want. With support from the UAE, the STC have been the most visible representation of the Southern Movement, who recently attempted, and failed, to take control of southern Yemen up to pre-unification borders. In retaliation, President Rashid Al Alimi sacked the two main Southern representatives within the PLC, Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, head of the STC, and Faraj Al-Bahsani, their vice president, accusing the former of ‘high treason’. As the IRGY and Saudi-led coalition forces began to take back the STC home of Aden, thousands of people poured into the street demonstrate their support for the STC and the Southern Movement. Despite their failed military operation, the southerner dream remains intact, and although many outside of Southern Yemen argue that secession may worsen divisions, Southerners may respond that there never was a united Yemen, but rather two fused together by force; as the Southern Hirak website puts it, “before unification, we were one people in two states, but after unification, we became two peoples in one state.”
A budding Southern nation?
Yemeni nationalism is a dying breed. Factors that contribute consist of deteriorating material conditions since unification, the absence of unifying leadership or common enemy and most prominently, decades of northern political domination and marginalisation of Southern Yemenis. The internationally recognised government of Yemen is also resented by Southerners as a representation of the continuation of northern dominance. Formerly they were allies based on their anti-Ansarullah stance, but by December 2025 that was no longer enough to maintain the status quo with the IRGY.
The solutions suggested by many Southerners range from autonomy to secession, the latter of which being more popular. They hark back to the PDRY (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), the secular, democratic culture of Southern Yemen, and how freedom from the north will loosen the vice-grip of elites on the South. These claims are part of a new Southern nationalist dream, in which there lies some truths but also flaws of nationalist reimagination of what once was, as with any nationalism. These flaws of imagination, of the secessionist dream, may actively contribute to a worsening of the already destitute conditions of Yemen.
By all means, given the history of the PDRY, a secular democratic governance is more popular amongst southern Yemenis, especially given that many involved in the Southern Movement are former members of the PDRY government. However, the very act of secession does not necessarily ensure freedom from elite capture. As a matter of fact, it could introduce a situation whereby an undercooked overhaul develops vulnerabilities to elite capture, given the very possible chance that certain relationships between involved political actors by which elites already maintain their interests are overlooked. This is all the more accentuated by the involvement of large regional players like Saudi Arabia and the UAE who will prioritise their own interests and protect elites that play important roles for them. Elites from the north are not the only ones they should worry about.
Stepping into an economic gamble.
One of the shortcomings of a movement based on separatism is that it does not propose a more constructive political alternative. The Southern Movement, also known as Al-Hirak, is known for not having developed a functional platform for negotiation, although their large diversity of perspective need not be negative given the right conditions. Regardless, with the recent attempted offensive by the STC, one has to ask what the STC sought to do. Without a process of system-building, military control means very little. On the other hand, the STC’s control of Hadramout and Al-Mahra governorates were so short that there was no chance of seeing a manifestation of the STC’s more constructive goals, aside from a declaration of a two-year countdown to an independence referendum.
The Southern Movement, besides lack of consensus, has other difficulties on its plate when it comes to secession. The traditional border for the south of Yemen covers large swathes of productive areas, in particular Hadramout which they recently attempted to control. It is home to large oil reserves and key trade routes through ports. Southern secession attracts a lot of backlash for two reasons, the first being competition over these high-resource areas and threat of being cut-off from key economic supply, and also Saudi Arabia’s fear of a political arena outside of their control. This policy review from last year comments on how Yemen’s regions are economically independent, both relying on the South’s oil revenues and the North’s agricultural production. The authors argue that because of this, secession could exacerbate economic instability. However, one could argue, though unlikely, an independent southern state could negotiate trade agreements with other nations and/or the north. But another factor appears here – that of international recognition and backing. The STC are currently in a bit of a rough spot after its offensive, and Saudi Arabia and President Al-Alimi have dominated the press line on STC leadership. They may be popular at home in the south, but if the STC are to remain the frontline of southern secession, they will need to rebuild their recognition from scratch. Depending on what the next months will bring, the STC’s diminution may leave room for other Southern Movement groups, changing the power distribution in that scene. Also, December saw the UAE withdraw entirely from Yemen due to an ultimatum from Saudi Arabia. So far it seems that the UAE is not willing to risk tensions with them for whatever interests in Yemen, though only time will tell. Regardless, their withdrawal of support from the STC means that the Southern Movement currently has no major support from another nation.
Abandoning an elite-centred platform.
The STC still remain the dominant political group within the Southern Movement because they are so integrated into the south’s social and political spheres, with a strong support base and ability to mobilise. They have strong public representation but are a contested group. However, much of the existing fragmentation and likely fragmentation to come in the Southern political sphere rests on the overrepresentation of elites in negotiations. The STC’s failures can in some way be attributed to the hubris of elites in positions of power. As mentioned before, the Southern Movement is very diverse in the political stances of its different groups, but it fundamentally needs a way of engaging all voices. With a real participatory platform that reduces exclusion from political discussions, a new league of inspired leadership can emerge with real and imaginative ways of resolving the mess of a situation that exists at this moment. With that, some kind of reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and serious and good-faith working relationship, from both sides, could provide some hope for the conditions of all Yemenis.
Featured photo is of an STC checkpoint in Socotra, an island off the coast of Yemen. Photo by Hardscarf. The photo is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.
