Iraq’s parliamentary election took place on November 6th 2025 for the sixth time since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. This was the first election with the amended Election Law No.9, reinstating the very controversial modified Sainte-Laguë method.
Leading up to the election, there was speculation of low voter turnout considering the weak participation in previous years and Muqtada al-Sadr’s election boycott. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), however, announced a 56.11% voter turnout in the election, supposedly marking an increase in trust in the political system. This number does not account for the barriers to be classified an eligible voter, which has in turn influenced IHEC’s election participation results.
This election represents a turn to a focus on the prioritization of development and prosperity politics as opposed to ethnic or sectarian identities, possibly the beginning of a transformation in Iraq´s political culture. However, this election has established concerns that the electoral system suppresses smaller parties and independents all while protecting and serving established political elites.
Parliamentary Election Results – Top Political Blocs
The following list notes the leading political blocs of the parliamentary election by number of seats.
- Reconstruction & Development Coalition, led by Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani with 46 seats
- Takaddum Front, led by Mohammed al-Halbousi with 37 seats
- State of Law Coalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki with 29 seats
- Al-Sadiqoun Movement, led by Qais al-Khazali with 27 seats
- Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani with 26 seats
- Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri with 18 seats
- National State Forces, led by Ammar al-Hakim & Haider al-Abadi with 18 seats
- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani with 15 seats
- Azm Front, led by Muthanna al-Samarrai with 15 seats
- Sovereignty Coalition, led by Khamis al-Khanjar with 9 seats
Other minority parties, independents and small blocs gained 99 seats.
Shia-led parties won 180 seats out of the total 329 parliamentary seats, with the Reconstruction and Development coalition leading with 1.3 million votes, 370,000 more than its next highest competitor. While this bloc is Shia-led, it should be noted that the alliance includes several political parties.
Muqtada al-Sadr’s boycott raised expectations for the Sunni candidates to win additional seats, particularly in Baghdad. However, despite al-Sadr’s absence from this election, Sunni representation dropped from 80 seats from the previous parliamentary term to 73. The leading Sunni party, Takaddum Front, decreased from 44 seats in the previous election to 37. The biggest loss for the Sunni parties was Sovereignty Alliance, led by Khamis al-Khanjar, with only 9 seats. In Nineveh, a predominantly Sunni Arab province, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won the highest number of seats. This fragmentation of votes, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala and Ninevah, prevented the Sunni’s from taking advantage of the seats made available with the Sadrist boycott.
The KDP emerged strong, consolidating their position in power in the Kurdish region, with twice as many votes as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK’s seats increased slightly from 17 seats in the previous parliamentary election to 18 seats. There were also 5 minority-quota candidates backed by the KDP across Iraq, all winning seats and strengthening the party at the federal level. In the Diyala province, however, with a Kurdish minority, no Kurdish candidates won seats, the first time since 2005.
Overall, these results are positive for the KDP’s ability to form the new KRG cabinet now that the KDP is in the top set of blocs in terms of seats at federal level and can wield significant influence over the development of the next government.
The PUK aimed to win back voters in this election, many of which they had lost in the past 15 years. Instead, voters in PUK-dominated areas were more likely to switch to different political parties.
While al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development coalition led the election results in terms of seats, there is no set winner from the general vote. Negotiations between the blocs are required in order to form the largest parliamentary bloc and elect a prime minister.
IHEC has announced a relatively clean election. Jumana al-Ghalai, IHEC spokeswoman, confirmed that the number of appeals had reached 400 by the end of day, Thursday 20th November, marking the close of the three-day appeal window. Complaints received by IHEC are classified into three categories: yellow complaints are submitted with no evidence but require a response; green complaints require administrative investigation, but do not affect election results; and red complaints have potential to affect election results. All 71 yellow complaints submitted in election period have been rejected due to insufficient evidence. Of the 32 green complaints, some of which have been rejected, and the remaining complaints are being reviewed.
Government Formation
The election results were announced on Monday 17th November by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). IHEC will then finalize the vote by addressing complaints from when the polls opened. Due to the extensive negotiations necessary for the formation of Iraq’s new government, it is expected that it will not be formed for months.
Within a 15-day period of the election results ratification, the new members of the Council of Representatives hold a first meeting to elect the speaker with a majority vote. The Council then elects the President of Iraq which must have a two-thirds majority vote from the 329 members of the Council.
The process of post-election bargaining continues within the main parliamentary bloc as they select the prime minister, who will be nominated and appointed by the president within 15 days of the their election. Typically, the Shiite coalition builds a comprehensive political coalition with the main Sunni and Kurdish parties to form a government.
Once the prime minister-designate has been decided, they then have 30 days to provide members of their cabinet which will each undergo approval by the Council of Representatives. After the Council of Ministers is approved with the absolute majority of the Council of Representatives and the prime minister holds the vote of confidence, the new government will be formed. Traditionally, the role of prime minister is given to the Shia, the presidency has gone to the Kurds and the speaker of parliament to the Sunnis.
Although there are time frames provided for each of these phases, they typically extend beyond the time allotted for each phase as they entail extensive deliberation between political blocs and changing alliances.
With IHEC’s ratification of the election results, the current parliament’s term has concluded the the cabinet will strictly carry through ‘caretaker’ functions until the new government is fully formed.
The shape of this next government will be influenced by internal Shia negotiations. Following the election, there was a question as to whether Shia parties will reach an agreement to form and push their nominee for prime minister, or if Shia parties will split and collaborate with the KDP or the Takaddum Front in attempt to assemble the largest bloc influencing the formation of the next government.
The Coordination Framework (CF) alliance of Shia groups has declared itself the largest parliamentary bloc with 175 seats and will now have the task of nominating a prime minister. In order to secure a second term, al-Sudani will have to acquire support among the Shia parties in the Framework. The two largest Shia blocs after al-Sudani’s are al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the al-Sadiqoun Bloc led by Qais al-Khazali which both have reservations for al-Sudani’s second term. In a CF meeting attended by al-Sudani, the Framework emphasized the need for cooperation and adherence to the set timeline to ensure a smooth transition to a new government. The CF has shortlisted nine potential candidates for prime minister, including the current Prime Minister al-Sudani.
Election Participation
IHEC released figures for the parliamentary election voter turnout, with an increase to about 56.11% of registered voters – quite a large jump from the 41% voter turnout in the 2021 elections. Turnout from voters was also much higher in Kurdish and Sunni provinces compared to Shia-majority areas. The southern, predominantly Shia provinces had the lowest turnout in the election. In particular, Baghdad with 71 allocated parliamentary seats had a low participation rate of 48.76%.
The election is positioned by some officials as a positive development for Iraq’s democratic process and that these figures show an increase in trust in the political system. IHEC affirms the high turnout and the full match between manual and electronic vote counts indicate the stability of Iraq’s electoral system and citizen’s trust in political processes.
However, these IHEC figures only count those who obtained or renewed voter registration cards as eligible voters and did not count those who intentionally boycotted or did not renew voter registration. Of 32 million eligible voters, only 21.4 million Iraqis updated their information and obtained a voter card, decreasing from 24 million in 2021. With a much narrower registry, this automatically increases voter turnout and does not accurately reflect Iraq’s political atmosphere. The decision to deny any out-of-country voting in this election is one of the factors that decreased eligibility, making the real participation rate much lower than IHEC has affirmed.
The political cycle leading up to the parliamentary elections raised concerns of the electoral process, with Muqtada al-Sadr’s boycott from the parliamentary elections and political violence. The Sairoon Coalition, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, gained 73 seats in the 2021 elections, but did not engage in this election, warning that the participation in the electoral process would only validate the “dominance of the corrupt”.
Another concern within Iraq’s political process is the buying of votes. Iraq’s economy supports a public payroll of approximately 4 million employees, the state being the main source of income. The International Labour Organization estimates that almost 38% of Iraq’s workforce is employed by the public sector, while between 600,000 and 700,000 people receive salaries from state-owned enterprises. Further, about 3.1 million are pensioners and 1.5 million households collect monthly social protection stipends. The political parties also control ministries and the distribution of jobs and contracts to their supporters, meaning that salaries, promotions and transfers may be dependent on the support of a particular party. When people are dependent on political parties for employment and salaries, the act of voting turns into an “act of compliance”.
The Halabja governorate was not considered its own constituency in this election. On April 14th of this year, Halabja became the fourth governorate of Kurdistan and the 19th governorate of Iraq with a majority vote in Parliament. As the 2023 election law classified the region under the Sulaimani constituency (with 17 designated seats), the governorate did not have a vote in this election. In the future, Halabja will have the designation as an independent constituency.
Restrictions on Smaller Parties and Independent Candidates
Despite the Sunni’s drop in seats, the biggest losers of the election were the smaller parties, independents and liberal candidates that were affected by the 2023 changes to the election law applying a modified Sainte-Laguë method, alongside the amount of spending by bigger parties. The 2025 parliamentary election was the first application of the amended Election Law No. 9 of 2020, which was reinstated in 2023, and its impact was clear throughout the political system. For younger people, many feel that due to structural barriers such as this election law and the dominance of elites, politics is not a pathway to influence or create political and social change.
This amended law reintroduced proportional representation with the formula using a first divisor of 1.7. Under the system used in November 2025, each list’s votes are divided by sequential odd numbers starting at 1.7, then 3, 5, 7, etc. The first divisor raises the number of votes needed to obtain the first seat, making it easier for elite blocs and weakening smaller parties or new candidates. Larger and established parties benefit from extensive networks and substantial funding.
Legal expert Mohammed Jumaa claims the amended law was “designed from the outset for the major blocs,” and when the starting divisor goes beyond 1.5, the system favours bigger blocs. In turn, elections are more influenced by elite bargaining rather than the popular vote.
Another administrative barrier to smaller parties and independent candidates is the financial power of larger blocs. Well-funded parties use their financial capacity to gain new votes. Larger parties undergo heavy campaigning to influence the vote in minority districts whose seats are under the 25% quota, using financial and organisational resources to shape the vote in smaller communities.
Concluding Remarks
This system favours financially powerful elites which acts to “recycle seats of power” rather than producing meaningful change. Each election cycle brings the same elite faces, patronage networks, and sectarian politics. The results of this election shows how the reintroduction of the 1.7 threshold has created a parliament saturated with established blocs and limits the abilities of smaller parties to enter the political realm, narrowing the chance for alternative voices to be heard.
IHEC’s 56.11% voter turnout marks a surge in election participation, when in reality it is a number shaped by political coercion and financial influence. Questions remain with the true participation of political processes, particularly with the buying of votes and the decreased participation of eligible voters. Above all, the modified Sainte-Laguë method reinstating the first divisor 1.7, brings much concern for the trajectory of smaller parties into Iraq’s political future. The results of the election imply that smaller parties and independents will struggle to get their foot in the door and participate in politics while the larger, more established elite blocs benefit from a process that secures votes.
- Main image featured above credit: Haider Noman Ibraheem Al Jazeera English, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
