The US-Iran war is about to enter its third week. Although President Donald Trump declared on 10 March that the war “is very complete, pretty much”, there are still no clear signs of an imminent end to this war. Overshadowed by the ongoing war, the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, the first such visit in nearly a decade, carries immense weight for both US-China trade and cross-strait security. It remains to be seen how this diplomatic encounter will ultimately reshape the trajectory of China-Taiwan relations.
Getting rid of China’s key partners
From China´s perspective, since the beginning of 2026, the United States appears to have sought to pressure China by targeting Venezuela and Iran, both important Global South partners of Beijing. In January, shortly after the President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro met China’s Special Representative for Latin American Affairs, Maduro was arrested by US forces. At the end of February, the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran, and Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz as a consequence. The disruption of a route conveying 20% of global daily oil consumption jeopardises China’s primary source of sanctioned imports, whilst simultaneously threatening over 7 million barrels of legitimate Middle Eastern seaborne crude arriving daily.
US strikes against Venezuela and Iran place economic pressure on China’s oil supply chain. They are also percieved as sending a political signal. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington may be expressing dissatisfaction with the decline of US influence in Latin America and the Middle East, amid China’s expanding global engagement.
Targeted decapitation operations against senior leaders in these states also demonstrate exceptional US resolve. For the People’s Liberation Army, which has little recent experience of large scale warfare, such displays may produce a deterrent effect.
This could encourage President Xi Jinping to reassess the cost of direct confrontation with the United States. It may particularly affect calculations about a potential conflict with the USA over Taiwan. These dynamics could give Trump greater negotiating space ahead of the summit.
China’s potential bargaining advantages
However, the US-Iran war does not necessarily merely disadvantage China.It may also create opportunities for Beijing. Trump’s military action against Iran did not receive formal authorisation from Congress. Even some Republicans have privately expressed concerns that the conflict could last for several months. This may weaken Trump’s negotiating position with China. It also allows Beijing to reinforce its narrative that Washington undermines global stability while claiming to uphold the international liberal order.
From a political and economic perspective, should the conflict surpass Trump’s four-to-five-week estimate, the United States remains exposed to heightened inflationary risks, rising energy costs, and a steady increase in military casualties. Such outcomes would be politically damaging ahead of the midterm elections and could place significant pressure on both Trump and the Republican Party.
From a military standpoint, the intensive deployment of sophisticated missiles and naval assets against a secondary power like Iran risks depleting the strategic reserves necessary for any Taiwan Strait contingency in the short term. Interestingly, given China’s dominance over critical mineral exports essential for missile production, the USA may need China´s cooperation to avoid a shortage in missile stockpiles. Consequently this may weaken Washington’s negotiating position in the forthcoming talks.
China has not directly criticised Trump’s military action against Iran. Instead, Beijing has limited its criticism to condemning the assassination attempt against Iran’s supreme leader. This restrained stance may give Xi greater flexibility during the summit. It could allow him to test Trump’s position on sensitive issues, including the possibility of US military intervention in a Taiwan contingency.
If China were to use force against Taiwan, any conseuent US conflict with China could arguably become prolonged. Many Republicans and a large share of the American electorate would be reluctant to support such a war. Should Trump fail to achieve meaningful progress on the Middle East before the summit, he may also face growing anti war sentiment at home as well as the risk of losing support from Western allies.
Such conditions could provide Xi with greater room to manoeuvre. If public support for the current war declines amid concerns over legality and widening political divisions, Beijing may interpret this as evidence that Washington is unwilling to enter another long conflict. Such perceptions could embolden Xi in discussions on cross-strait relations.
A more ambitious scenario could see Xi and Trump reaching an understanding during the summit. Beijing could try and pressure Iran to accept a ceasefire (though chances of success may be slim), allowing Washington to withdraw from the conflict without losing face. In return, the United States might increase purchases of Chinese energy and agricultural products to support China’s domestic economy. Washington might also make limited concessions on Taiwan related issues, such as reiterating opposition to Taiwanese independence.
However, political realities make this outcome less likely. Aside from the slim likelihood that Iran would accept a ceasefire (Iran wants a full negotiated settlement as an end to war), Trump needs to strengthen Republican prospects in the midterm elections, while Xi is attempting to revive China’s slowing domestic economy. It is therefore more likely that the two leaders will focus primarily on tariff policies and economic cooperation. Progress on Taiwan related issues may remain limited. China may at most call for reductions in US arms sales to Taiwan. Nevertheless, Taiwan could still feature more prominently in three potential future summits.
What can Taiwan do next
Unfortunately, Taiwan lacks the leverage to negotiate directly with either the United States or China. In the face of the instability in the international liberal order created by the US Iran war and the uncertainty surrounding the Trump Xi summit, Taiwan’s globally leading semiconductor industry remains one of its most important strategic assets. This technological advantage can serve as a critical bargaining chip. It may help deter Chinese aggression while securing continued US security support.
Moreover, if Taiwan seeks to safeguard its interests amid the geopolitical repercussions of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, strengthening regional partnerships across the Pacific will be essential. Building closer relations with Japan would be particularly important. Tensions between China and Japan have recently intensified following comments by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting that Japan might assist in Taiwan’s defence.
Finally, China is likely to continue intensifying grey zone operations against Taiwan. These include information warfare and the cutting of undersea cables, actions that do not immediately threaten core US interests in the Indo Pacific but gradually erode Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. Taiwan should therefore strengthen its cyber security infrastructure and increase its defence budget to maintain credible deterrence. Continued investment in asymmetric warfare tactics will raise the cost of any potential Chinese invasion. Through a strategy of deterrence by preparedness, tensions across the cross-strait relations may be mitigated.
