Gaza, Ukraine, Greenland, Venezuela: Trump is swiftly establishing a new power based international order in which no quarter is given. NCF Research Officer, Domingo Lapadula di Stefano, himself of Venezuelan extraction, gives his opinion:
As Maduro is stolen away from his bed by Trump, his former official right-hand takes the mantle of president. She bears two faces – obedience towards Trump and loyalty to Maduro (and thus towards her supporters). The status quo remains virtually unchanged, despite the hopes of many Venezuelans. The supposed alternative to the Chavista administration, Maria Corina Machado, continues to offer her Nobel Peace Prize to Trump, pandering with the failing hope of new power.
The US air strikes on Venezuela and abduction of Maduro creates uncertainty and a looming danger remains for the average Venezuelan. Although Maduro’s abduction was bold, and for some Venezuelans a cause for celebration, many are preparing for more violence and repression. Needless to say, the attack and capture of Maduro is a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty and conjures memories of the US invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein. The attack sets a precedent. Some experts in international law have called it a “crime of aggression”. Though not new behaviour for the US, America’s current government is more explicit about its motivations, unlike previous administrations. US interventionism denies an already deprived agency to Venezuelans, as it has in other countries, and is manipulating an authoritarian situation into one that can escalate and become a further catastrophe for Venezuelans.
The implications of Venezuelan military structure
Despite removing the head of the administration and ostensibly convincing the now-appointed acting president Delcy Rodriguez to support “collaboration” with US, there are many moving and unaccounted pieces in the political situation of Venezuela. This includes other influential figures such as Vladimir Padrino López, the defence minister and general-in-chief, and Diosdado Cabello, hardline interior minister and the real right-hand of Maduro, who have come out to condemn the US and rally support to oppose it. The military in Venezuela have a confusing and bureaucratic structure, with approximately 2,000 generals and admirals as of 2019, significantly larger compared to the US’s 219 generals. The design is primarily an apparatus of repression but also functions to prevent the military from effectively turning against the government. This also means that it is less capable at coordinating against external threats and the top brass are certainly aware of this. Hence, parts of the military may know certain things and receive orders, whilst others don’t. For example, by the Colombian border, one border official remarked that “it’s a bit tense but we have been given no new orders” since the invasion. Aside from the structure of the military, cooperation is an uncertainty. Some may be willing to follow through with demands for cooperation from Delcy Rodriguez, but only if the top brass agree to do so. Furthermore, the PDVSA, Venezuela’s state oil company, is run by the military, so if there isn’t a calm scene of cooperation with the US, things could become a bloody, oily mess, particularly given Trump’s threat to escalate militarily if the Chavista administration does not collaborate.
Trump’s reasoning for the attack on Venezuela is still difficult to discern if you leave hegemony out of the mix. One factor is the untapped financial potential of Venezuelan oil, with a degrading oil infrastructure sat on top of the largest oil reserves in the world. The latter part has become a selling point told to the point of exhaustion by those who seek foreign investment into Venezuela, most notably the main opposition figure, Maria Corina Machado. Furthermore, the considerable influence of the American oil lobby is likely to play a significant role in directing Trump’s administration towards resources in Venezuela, given their historic presence in Venezuela prior to Chavez’s period of rule.
Another factor is energy security. China, prior to the attack, was the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil, accounting for 68% of crude oil exports. The other side of the coin is that repairing Venezuela’s oil infrastructure will be a considerably difficult business. It will take years of stable work from American oil companies such as Chevron to complete and billions of dollars of investment, so what other interests are there? In addition, there is the question of gold and rare earth minerals. Venezuela is notorious for its illegal gold mining industry that has been environmentally destructive and lacks any transparency to its operations. It has the largest gold reserves and substantial supply of rare earth elements, highly sought for modern technology. Venezuela has such a large reserve of several high-demand resources that it is an irremovable factor for the US’ invasion.
Potential realities for Venezuelans
How does all this link to the potential realities that Venezuelan people in the everyday will experience? It comes down to the importance of the military in Venezuela. They are deeply involved in many of these industries, particularly in oil, and recently gold. In fact, most of the industries that Trump imagines redirecting to benefit the US are controlled in some way by the Venezuelan military. Hence, the US’ focus will probably be looking towards finding a way of working with the Venezuela’s Chavista administration rather than removing and rebuilding one. A key indicator is the cooperative stance between the US and Delcy Rodriguez. Trump is coercing Rodriguez, noting a worse situation for her than Maduro if she does not cooperate, which is an unpredictable method. On top of this, Trump has made clear he has no interest in supporting Edmundo Gonzalez or Machado into presidency, citing their lack of support. Utilising the current administration as opposed to removing it provides certain advantages to Trump’s agenda that will worsen quality of life for the Venezuelan people, although almost any direction at the moment is likely to negatively impact them. Because Venezuela has such an extensive repressive apparatus and military involvement in resource extraction, finding a way to force the Venezuelan administration’s cooperation is more feasible. The repressive apparatus would function to keep down popular insurrection as well as Venezuela’s armed factions and gangs that operate around its borders and less populated areas with variable success. However, the US has dangerously stirred the pot, inviting violence against the Venezuelan administration and/or the US.
All this is to say that there are two primary near futures, but by no means the only ones, since it is too early to know and our perspectives are considerably limited. One is some form of military escalation, provided Venezuela’s top brass choose to resist Trump’s agenda. This would prove disastrous for the people of Venezuela, likely contributing to mass displacement and destruction of infrastructure. The second potential reality is an intensification of repression through the existing administration. This is already the case, where those who supported the removal of Maduro express fear of stronger repression from the administration and its supporters in a time when they are rallying support. According to Foro Penal, Venezuela’s main prison justice activist organisation, as of November 2025 there are 887 known political prisoners in Venezuela, many from popular protests. The prison system has a reputation for “revolving doors” with their political prisoners, releasing some only to arrest others. With the US supporting this administration for its own explicit gain, this could become a much nastier situation for political freedoms, given Trump’s concerns over oil rather than human rights. In either situation, the US may have something to gain economically, particularly given the significance of the military industrial complex and its influence if a military escalation happens. One positive future possibility is that of new elections, most likely after a ‘transition’ overseen by the US. Despite being difficult to achieve, it would certainly be popular and is already being called for by opposition members, who have been looking for an opportunity to emerge from this disruption of the status quo. It would definitely be the most important path out of a repressive administration.
As a Venezuelan
Ultimately, one cannot help but feel a certain foreboding about the whole situation. The way that Trump speaks of Venezuela, the way he threatens war on one hand and collaboration on another gives no calm about what the future holds. The constant production of drug-trafficking narratives to justify his imperial aspirations feel like thinly veiled threats to re-establish American dominance in Central and Latin America. Delcy Rodriguez seems to be attempting to play both sides, entertaining Trump’s demand for cooperation whilst also retaining a rhetoric of national resistance, so things remain unpredictable. Alongside the failure so far of international bodies to deal with the genocide in Gaza, faith in any kind of international law is diminishing. This would not be the first post to mention the kind of precedent Trump is re-establishing. The ‘re’ is important though – the US is historically imperial, even founded on the conquest of land and resources, itself an example of settler colonialism. Regardless, the foreboding should be realistically limited and not dilute hope that Venezuela will find a path of peace, freedom and fairness.
