On December 17th 2025, the US Congress decided to fully repeal the Caesar Civilian Protection Act, which frees Syria from a set of sweeping sanctions imposed during the tenure of Bashar Al-Assad. This follows from the 180-day suspension issued by US President Donald Trump in November this year and represents yet another significant diplomatic success for President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. The hopeful optimism that now surrounds the dominant narrative of Syria can be attributed to Al-Sharaa’s yearlong marathon of diplomatic engagements since the transition in Syrian leadership roughly this time last year. While Al-Sharaa has deftly leveraged the international stage to gather legitimacy, the same concerted effort is severely lacking to address pressing concerns within Syria. Violent events, polarisation and displacement within Syria are representative of a very fragile transition. There remain persistent challenges, particularly associated with sectarian violence, unperturbed occupation of Syrian land by neighbours Turkey and Israel, weak regulation, under-representation in senior state roles and deep humanitarian concerns. However, international actors continue to demonstrate a notable degree of confidence in Al-Sharaa’s leadership, despite the uneven consolidation of authority inside Syria. Having generated significant political momentum and a surge in foreign direct investment, this asymmetrical distribution in effort has dangerous consequences not only for the Syrian populace, but for Al-Sharaa himself.
Legitimacy by Presence and Transaction
Empirical research by The Loop suggests that a leader’s initial diplomatic engagements serve as an important signal of political priorities. This is similar in logic to the concept of the “first 100 days”, popularised after President Franklin Roosevelt passed an unprecedented number of bills after the Great Depression. Al-Sharaa’s first 100 days suggest a carefully sequenced diplomatic strategy centred on consolidating regional ties in order to unlock economic opportunity. Syria’s reinstatement into the Arab League in 2023 provided a ready-made platform for this outreach, but diplomacy directed towards the Arab world has been rooted in consistent presence and reassurance. Since being named transitional leader, Al-Sharaa’s first foreign engagement was with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, followed by talks in Ankara with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a meeting with the King of Jordan. In the months that followed, he participated in the Palestine Summit, the Antalya Diplomacy Forum and the Doha Forum in December. During each of these, he simultaneously held meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Turkey, Qatar, Libya, Iraq and Azerbaijan, repositioning Syria as a strong stakeholder in regional discussions, a priority Al-Sharaa explicitly articulated. Al-Sharaa also met with the President of the UAE, and attended a subsequent tripartite meeting with the Iraq Prime Minister in Qatar. With the exception of a meeting hosted by President Emmanuel Macron, formal diplomatic engagements beyond the region did not occur until May. The Syrian leader later claimed in October that he had attracted roughly $28 billion within the first six months of this year, mainly from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Through sustained regional engagement across the early part of his tenure, Al-Sharaa has managed to frame the Arab region not only as Syria’s political partners, but as the cornerstone of Syria’s economic recovery. In contrast, engagement with other global powers has taken on a more explicitly transactional character, structured around reciprocal signalling. In Beijing, for instance, the Syrian foreign minister Assad Al-Shaibani reaffirmed support for the One China policy, met by his Chinese counterpart’s recognition of the Golan Heights as Syrian territory. A similar logic was evident in Moscow, where Al-Sharaa openly acknowledged Syria’s dependence on Russian arms and Russian-controlled energy infrastructure, while President Putin reiterated his interest in maintaining access to airbases along Syria’s coastline. In both cases, diplomacy functions as a calibrated bargaining process, combining symbolic gestures with tangible strategic interests. Transactions, whether material or performative, become the mechanism through which trust is cautiously extended. This transactional logic has been even more pronounced in Al-Sharaa’s engagement with Western actors, where confidence-building has relied heavily on symbolic repositioning. Early in his tenure, Al-Sharaa articulated a liberal and pro-minority stance, subsequently joining the coalition against ISIS. Whether these measures have produced substantive change on the ground remains contested, but their diplomatic effect has been tangible. In April, the EU and the UK suspended sanctions on Syria and lifted asset freezes. These exchanges have been reinforced through performative diplomacy on the global stage. At the UN General Assembly in September, Al-Sharaa presented what he termed the “Syrian Story,” and later used the COP30 platform in Brazil in November 2025 to articulate Syria’s position on climate change.
Together, these engagements illustrate a diplomatic strategy where legitimacy is accumulated through carefully managed transactions. President Al-Sharaa appears to have identified the Arab world as a source of financial flows, while viewing Western powers as “permission givers” whose approval is necessary to unlock broader economic reintegration. The meeting Al-Sharaa held with Trump on 14th May 2025 in Riyadh was a critical catalyst to encourage the heads of other countries to normalise relations with him, despite his prior allegiance to Al-Qaeda and rising to power whilst being at the helm of a militant group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. In both cases, diplomacy functions as an exchange: access, reassurance and alignment offered in return for investment or trade concessions. It is this structured approach that has enabled Syria to re-enter the international stage with surprising speed. The apparent success of this strategy is palpable, especially through the influx of financial pledges towards Syria.
The Limits of the Diplomatic Veil: The Picture within Syria
While this strategy has generated early diplomatic momentum, it exposes where attention has been concentrated, and where it remains notably absent. The purposeful and systematic intensity that has underpinned Al-Sharaa’s outreach is largely missing in Syria’s engagement with Israel. In the last year, contacts between the two nations have been limited to just two engagements, both largely mediated by external powers with no discernible effort to establish a framework for de-escalation. This absence has coincided with continued attacks by Israel and expansion on Syrian soil. In late November, air raids by Israel in Syria killed at least 13 people, including two children. Israel stated that the strikes targeted members of Jamaa al-Islamiyah, a Lebanese Islamist group with alleged ties to Hezbollah, a claim the group rejected, insisting it does not operate outside Lebanon. A similar ambiguity characterises relations with Turkey. Despite repeated high-level engagements, there is no articulated roadmap to address the status of territories under Turkish control. Both Israel and Turkey continue to occupy significant portions of Syrian land, yet Al-Sharaa’s diplomacy has stopped short of outlining a strategy for the restoration of de facto Syrian sovereignty in those regions. Overlooking relations with neighbouring states in search of more lucrative diplomatic bonds has proven, and will continue to prove harmful for Syrians.
Internally, Al-Sharaa’s vast promises of constitutional reform, equality and democratic governance have yet to translate into meaningful institutional change. In a parliament election, only 6 of the 119 seats were filled by women or minority representatives. With only 6000 pre-appointed voters and 74 seats set aside for presidential appointees, the process was neither public nor meaningfully democratic. The continued marginalisation of minorities within formal political structures coexists with violence directed towards those communities. The Alawite community, in particular, has experienced several incidents of targeted violence since the leadership transition, despite Al-Sharaa’s repeated assurances that minority protection remains a priority. As recent as Boxing Day, an Islamist militant group Saraya Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for an explosion at an Alawite mosque in the Homs region. After the murder of a Bedouin couple in the Homs region, significant gunfire was targeted towards Alawite neighbourhood. Such revenge attacks remain common in Syria, with sects accusing each other of crimes without any independent investigation or juridical process. Prejudice and malice remain the guiding principles of punishment. Legal proceedings have begun in November regarding the violence in coastal Syria in March, a case where state authorities remain responsible for the investigations while themselves being implicated. No independent investigation has been conducted and state-declared death tolls are significantly lower than wider expectations. The implementation of the March agreement between Al-Sharaa and commander in chief of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, to integrate the SDF into state military institutions also remains unlikely, despite initial expectations that it would be finalised by the end of 2025. Despite a paper-thin ceasefire declared late in October, clashes have renewed between the SDF and the Syrian government forces on the 22nd of December.
Political Hyperopia or Intentional Oversight?
There is a fundamental disconnect between Syria’s externally oriented diplomatic successes and the unresolved challenges of internal consolidation. This disconnect may reflect a form of intentional oversight. The international arena is far more amenable to transactional diplomacy and reciprocal bargaining than domestic governance. Syria’s internal conflicts are rooted in deep-seated histories of subordination and mistrust, which cannot be resolved through deals or symbolic agreements. Addressing these issues requires sustained trust-building mechanisms and strong institutions, conditions which are currently absent. In this sense, external legitimacy becomes a convenient distraction, diverting attention from internal problems that are slower and more difficult to solve. Perhaps the disconnect stems from a form of political hyperopia, an underlying assumption that international legitimacy and investment can precede, and ultimately facilitate, national stabilisation. Alternatively, the emphasis on external legitimacy may be necessitated by the persistent suspicion surrounding Al-Sharaa’s political past, particularly his entanglement with al-Qaeda. The shadows cast by his previous affiliations and his role within coercive structures of power complicate his claims to legitimacy. These legacies heighten the importance of external validation, especially from Western actors. In this context, diplomacy functions not only as economic outreach but as a reputational repair.
Any of these assumptions carry substantial risks for all involved. Syria’s internal environment remains characterised by heavy dependence on humanitarian aid and weak legislative frameworks. In this context, the unusually high risk appetite demonstrated by investors raises particular concerns for Syria itself. Accepting capital in the absence of robust legal safeguards, rigorous due diligence, security or political stability increases the risk of asset capture and the potential siphoning of national resources to external operators. This simply deepens uncertainty over the country’s long-term recovery. For Al-Sharaa himself, Syria’s recent history of leadership collapse serves as a stark warning about the consequences of neglecting internal legitimacy and institutional consolidation. Governing in the aftermath of a toppled dictatorship, he faces the same structural vulnerabilities that undermined his predecessor: a fragmented authority and residual elite networks, discussed in another Next Century Foundation article. Early indications that these dynamics remain active are already visible. A Reuters investigation published in December reported that figures closely associated with the former Assad government are seeking to mobilise armed networks in coastal Syria. While this may simply be a premature threat, it reveals how quickly unresolved power structures can translate into an organised challenge. While the current leadership has relied on intermediaries like Khaled Al-Ahmad (former Assad loyalist and childhood friend of Al-Sharaa) to persuade Alawite communities, such measures are ultimately insufficient substitutes for durable internal consolidation. External legitimacy and investment may buy time, but cannot guarantee regime stability or survival.
Ultimately, it is the Syrian populace who bear the greatest uncertainty. The gap between the international reception afforded to their president and the realities on the ground raises unresolved questions about whether this early diplomatic success will translate into tangible improvements in quality of life, economic security or protection for minority communities. Al-Sharaa has advanced Syria’s external standing, but whether this approach can deliver durable stability at home remains an open and consequential question.
