Chair of Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), Cheng Li-Wen, departed on 7 April for a six-day visit to China, describing the trip as a ‘peace mission’. The visit follows an invitation from President Xi Jinping. On 10 April, Cheng met Xi in Beijing, marking the first high level political engagement between China and Taiwan in a decade. Cheng presented the visit to bolster Asia-Pacific stability and foster long-term peace between Taiwan and China.
What Was Discussed During the Peace Mission?
During her meeting with Xi, Cheng asserted that peace represents a shared moral value for both sides of the Strait. She urged both parties to transcend political confrontation to construct a ‘community of shared destiny’ focused on mutual prosperity. Based on the shared political foundation of opposing Taiwan independence, Cheng advocated for an ‘institutional solution’ to prevent conflict. Her rhetoric aimed to position the Taiwan Strait as a global model for peaceful resolution while emphasising that the region should not serve as a chessboard for external intervention.
Xi responded by reiterating that the trend towards the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ would not change regardless of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. He reaffirmed that, based on ‘The 1992 Consensus’ and opposition to Taiwan independence, Beijing was prepared to deepen exchanges and cooperation with political forces in Taiwan, including the KMT, and ensure the future of cross-strait relations remained ‘firmly in Chinese hands.’
Cheng’s remarks indicate a significant departure from traditional KMT discourse. She appears to be steering the party toward a more pro-Beijing political trajectory that aligns with China’s historical narrative. Both sides sought to establish a formalised and sustainable framework for peace that denies the legitimacy of external involvement from powers such as the United States or Japan. This collaborative messaging represents a deliberate attempt to frame the Taiwan issue as a purely domestic Chinese affair.
A Rare Move to Distance the KMT from Japan
A notable feature of Cheng’s visit was her unusual decision to raise Japan during a speech at the Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Mausoleum in Nanjing on 8 April. Unlike previous KMT leaders, she referenced Japan’s colonial rule over Taiwan, the First Sino Japanese War, and wartime aggression against China, invoking what she termed historical trauma.
This was highly unusual in diplomatic practice, particularly during a visit focused on cross Strait relations. It also suggests Cheng may be moving away from the KMT’s historically more accommodating posture towards Japan. she echoes Beijing’s reaction to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent statements on Taiwan, framing Japan as harbouring strategic ambitions regarding the island. Xi also alluded to Japan’s historical occupation of Taiwan in his own remarks, reinforcing a shared effort to frame the future of Taiwan as a matter for Chinese actors alone.
Strategic Significance of the Peace Mission
Strategically, Cheng’s visit signifies a departure from the KMT’s traditional framework of balancing close ties with the United States alongside friendly relations with Japan. The party appears to be shifting towards a position more closely aligned with Beijing. Consequently, this visit is intrinsically linked to the broader strategic competition between China, the United States, and Japan regarding the future of the Taiwan Strait.
The timing of the visit is particularly noteworthy. It occurred while the KMT continued to obstruct President Lai Ching-te’s proposed eight-year, $40 billion special defence budget. This represents the largest arms procurement programme in Taiwan’s history and is designed to fund US defence acquisitions to strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare capabilities. Crucially, this obstruction persists despite a US Senate delegation’s bipartisan appeal on 29 March, which urged the KMT to approve the package to bolster Taiwan’s deterrence capacity.
In this context, the KMT’s opposition to the defence budget, combined with Cheng’s visit, may be interpreted as a signal of de-escalation towards Beijing. This stance indirectly supports China’s long-standing objective of slowing or weakening US arms sales to Taiwan.
Furthermore, the visit appears calculated to influence the strategic environment ahead of a potential Trump-Xi summit in May. Beijing likely intends to demonstrate to Washington that it can mitigate geopolitical risks in the Asia-Pacific through political engagement rather than coercion, thereby enhancing its negotiating leverage.
Through this engagement, Beijing aims to reinforce the narrative that Taiwan is an internal matter rather than an issue for international security mechanisms. This strategy simultaneously attempts to undermine the legitimacy of US security commitments to Taipei. Since assuming the KMT chairmanship in October 2025, Cheng’s rhetoric has increasingly mirrored this framework.
From Beijing’s perspective, the visit suggests to Washington that political dialogue is a viable alternative to military unification. It also positions the KMT as a strategic counterweight to Taiwan’s growing pro-independence sentiment, potentially creating leverage to press the United States into moderating its support for Taiwan.
Could Japan Intervene Under Constitutional Reform?
The synchronised references to Japan by Cheng and Xi underscore Beijing’s intent to drive a wedge between Taipei and Tokyo. This coordinated rhetoric aims to undermine the narrative that the Japan-UK-US alliance must play a pivotal role in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing consistently seeks to characterise Taiwan as an internal affair and remains opposed to external intervention. Following the Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks on potential alliance involvement, China has intensified efforts to delegitimize Japanese engagement. However, Prime Minister Takaichi’s 14 April declaration to propose constitutional amendments next year will likely destabilise Beijing’s attempts to isolate Taiwan.
The Takaichi-led Liberal Democratic Party advocates deleting Paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan from maintaining military forces. This proposal seeks to explicitly incorporate the Self-Defence Forces into the Constitution, easing legal constraints on Japanese military power. Additionally, the party aims to amend Paragraph 1 regarding the state’s right of belligerency and grant the Cabinet emergency powers for rapid mobilisation during contingencies. These developments imply that in a Taiwan Strait conflict, Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defence in a formalised manner. Consequently, China would face the combined military pressure of the United States and Japan, significantly raising the costs of subverting the status quo through force.
Conclusion
At present, there is no clear evidence that Cheng’s Peace Mission has secured lasting stability for Taiwan. The ‘institutional solution’ she proposed remains devoid of concrete detail. As an opposition leader, Cheng’s primary responsibility is to scrutinise the ruling party, which inherently limits her capacity to shape Taiwan’s long-term strategic trajectory.
Following the visit, Beijing announced several ‘pro-Taiwan’ measures, such as pilot programmes for individual mainland tourists, the restoration of direct flights, and the resumption of Taiwanese seafood and media imports. However, these measures effectively represent the unilateral lifting of prior Chinese restrictions. Consequently, they appear more as tactical political concessions than as credible signals of future peace.
Cheng is attempting to steer the Kuomintang toward a political course significantly different from its traditional approach. It remains to be seen whether her pro-China stance will influence the 2028 presidential election or play a role in the evolving Japan-China-US triangular relationship. Furthermore, the impact of her approach on the Trump-Xi summit, particularly as Japan shifts its strategic posture in the Taiwan Strait, remains a subject of international observation. The long-term efficacy of this political shift depends on how these external geopolitical variables align over the coming years.
