In 2025, Iraq experienced its driest year in modern history. By December 2025, national water reserves had fallen from around 60 billion cubic metres in 2020 to less than 4 billion, while record-low flows in the Tigris and Euphrates forced the government to sharply restrict agricultural water use. The winter of 2025-26 brought a dramatic reprieve as above-normal rainfall allowed Iraq to recover. The question now is whether Iraq’s new government led by Ali al-Zaidi treats this extra water as temporary relief or as a chance to reform an agriculture and water-management system that has changed little despites decades of growing scarcity. The stakes are high as the UN ranks Iraq among the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries, making reform and careful management essential.

A temporary reprieve

Following Iraq’s wet winter of 2025-26, the UN estimated Iraq’s live water storage had risen from around 3.5 to 20 billion cubic metres. Yet this still replaced only around 26% of the approximately 56 billion cubic metres lost since 2020. On current projections, Iraq is expected to have a water deficit of around ten billion cubic metres by 2035, driving drought, soil salinisation and the loss of around 25,000 hectares of agricultural land each year. Water scarcity in Iraq thus remains a structural rather than a seasonal problem.

The upstream problem

Part of Iraq’s problem lies beyond its borders. Around 75 per cent of Iraq’s water sources originate from Turkey and Iran, leaving it highly exposed to upstream decisions, particularly on the Tigris and Euphrates. Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, which spans more than 22 major dams and 19 hydroelectric plants across the Tigris and Euphrates, as well as the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris have increased Turkey’s ability to regulate water before it reaches Iraq. For years Iraq has pushed for more reliable flows, but agreements have been short-term and largely unenforced.

In November 2025, the two countries signed a deal under which water infrastructure projects carried out by Turkish companies would be financed using revenues from Iraqi oil sales, though it remains largely unimplemented. Engagement has continued under the new government, Prime Minister al-Zaidi and Turkish President Erdoğan spoke in June, discussing water alongside oil exports and the Development Road project. Al-Zaidi is due in Ankara in late July to negotiate a new oil pipeline deal after the previous 52-year pact expires on 27th July.

Iran controls tributaries that feed the Tigris system, particularly the Sirwan and Little Zab rivers. Through dams such as Daryan and Sardasht and a series of diversion tunnels, Iran has redirected much of this water for its own agriculture and hydropower, sharply cutting flows into eastern Iraq. No water-sharing deal with Iran has emerged and the structural problem is unchanged, however Iraq’s new water resources minister, Muthanna Ali Mahdi al-Tamimi, is a member of the Iran-backed Badr Organization. In theory this alignment could give Baghdad better channels to Tehran on water, and he has stressed that his ministry will develop relations with both upstream neighbours to secure water releases into Iraq.

However, the most progress so far has come elsewhere. In June 2026 Iraq and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding on managing shared water resources, developing mechanisms for coordination and the exchange of data, particularly concerning the Euphrates.

Water use within Iraq

Upstream restrictions are only part of Iraq’s water problem. The other is how efficiently the country uses the water it receives. Around 80% of Iraq’s water is used in the agricultural sector which still relies on inefficient irrigation methods and deteriorating infrastructure. It is estimated that the irrigation network’s efficiency is around 30-40% with major losses from irrigation canals and the use of inefficient flood irrigation. Much of the infrastructure dates to the 1970s and 1980s, and corruption and political interference have since stalled or derailed the projects meant to replace it, leaving networks to deteriorate. Improving Iraq’s water security therefore cannot rest solely on negotiations with Turkey and Iran, it must also mean building a more efficient system and extracting more agricultural value from the water Iraq already has.

Government responses so far

Beyond talks with Iran and Turkey, Iraq has begun addressing how water is used on the ground: suspending wheat planting in September 2025, cracking down on illegal water use, and investing in more efficient irrigation. Most recently, in July, the Agriculture Ministry announced international contracts to install modern irrigation systems across 3.5 million dunams, (roughly 875,000 hectares) with the aim of easing pressure on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

While these are steps in the right direction, they have been criticised as being largely reactive, short-term fixes as opposed to structural reform of a decades-old inefficient system. The harder task is turning scattered irrigation projects into a wider agricultural transition that does not push the cost onto rural communities. Simply ordering farmers to use less water would do exactly that, a successful transition must combine restrictions with financial support, training and incentives that make efficient agriculture economically viable. For instance, government agricultural support could increasingly be conditional on farmers adopting efficient irrigation, respecting water allocations and adapting crop choices to local water availability, rewarded with subsidised equipment or affordable financing in return.

Better water allocation initiatives are being put in place. In July 2026, with reserves recovering, water resources minister al-Tamimi stressed that provinces should comply with approved water-allocation quotas so that supplies are distributed fairly. Ali al-Zaidi’s government could build on this by making water allocation more transparent, measurable and consistently enforced, rather than tightening controls only when reservoirs reach critical levels. In May 2026, the FAO provided the Ministry of Water Resources a satellite-based WaPOR monitoring tool for the West Gharraf Irrigation Scheme, tracking water productivity, irrigation supply, crop-water deficits and the fairness of irrigation distribution, as well as identifying illegal water abstraction. It currently applies to a specific irrigation scheme but offers a model that could be scaled nationwide, letting Iraq use satellite data to understand where water goes and whether allocations are respected. Implementing this would mark a fundamental shift in Iraq’s water policy from emergency response to permanent water governance.

Whilst national initiatives like the WaPOR monitoring tool are essential, Iraq must avoid always applying a one-size-fits-all approach, since water priorities differ by governorate. For example, Basra is said to need more water-efficient irrigation systems, the establishment of local water storage facilities, the rehabilitation of canals, and stronger governance of industrial water use. Whereas in Sinjar, the priority is climate-smart agriculture, including drip irrigation, rainwater harvesting, and ensuring support reaches women, youth, and internally displaced people.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi cannot control next winter’s rainfall or upstream governments’ decisions. What he can control is how efficiently Iraq uses the water it receives, how consistently allocations are enforced, and how seriously he pursues water negotiations with Turkey and Iran. Irrigation contracts are a useful start, but real reform means changing agricultural incentives, supporting farmers through the transition, and using data to hold allocations in place.