Ethiopia is at war again. On 23rd September 2026, almost four years after the Pretoria Peace Agreement ended the 2020-2022 Tigray War, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allies seized Tigray’s airports and launched an offensive into Amhara and Afar. Within two weeks Ethiopia had expelled Eritrea’s diplomats, Eritrean troops had crossed into Tigray, and Addis Ababa was accusing Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing the rebellion. This is no longer only a domestic insurgency. It is becoming the front line of a regional confrontation, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) sits at its centre. For Cairo, the dam on the Blue Nile threatens the river that supplies almost all of Egypt’s fresh water. Egypt’s determination to check Ethiopia has drawn it into partnership with Addis Ababa’s rivals, and a Tigrayan rebellion that weakens Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed serves that end. That goes a long way to explaining why Tigray’s cause now finds sympathy in capitals that showed little interest in it during the last war.
In this resurgence of conflict, the TPLF has formed an opposition alliance with six other armed and political groups with the aim of ousting the Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, whom it accuses of presiding over “war, genocide, mass destruction, and utter poverty”. Following this, on 23rd September 2026, the TPLF-led coalition seized control of three airports in Tigray and launched a military offensive in the neighbouring regions of Amhara and Afar. This offensive followed months of small-scale violence between Ethiopian federal forces and Tigrayan rebels.
Ethiopian federal and pro-government forces retook Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, in early October, after the TPLF withdrew from the city on 3rd October, citing concerns for civilian safety. This does not signal total victory for the federal forces, as the TPLF chairman, Debretsion Gebremichael, stated that the group’s withdrawal was a temporary, tactical step. Worryingly, Gebremichael also declared that federal forces should expect the fighting to continue, describing this renewed violence as “a continuation of the previous war”.
Tensions between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF were already escalating, as relations broke down following the failure of both sides to meet the obligations set out in the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which ended the civil war in November 2022. However, these events, alongside drone strikes on Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, which a source linked to the opposition alliance said targeted the military’s headquarters, and airstrikes in Tigray’s Sheraro and Adwa, which killed at least 17 people, mark a turning point: a definite shattering of the fragile peace brokered by the treaty, in which both parties agreed to a “permanent cessation of hostilities”.
The Pretoria Peace Agreement – What Went Wrong?
It was hoped that the agreement would create a path towards a sustainable political settlement, in which the two parties would engage in constructive dialogue and end hostilities. Governments were too hasty to declare that the agreement had “silenced the guns and laid the foundations for normalcy to return to the region”. Whilst it did bring an end to the active fighting, both the federal government and the TPLF failed to follow through on its terms, leaving key disputes over territory, Tigrayan political representation, demilitarisation and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Tigray unresolved.
Fears of a Renewed Humanitarian Crisis
It is feared that an escalation of the current conflict could lead to another humanitarian crisis. The 2020-2022 Tigray War is considered one of the deadliest conflicts of the 21st century, having killed an estimated 600,000 people and displaced more than 3 million. A joint report by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch details the widespread crimes against humanity committed in Western Tigray, including the ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans, the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and mass detentions and abductions. The effects of the war are still being felt in the region.
More than 800,000 people remain displaced, food insecurity continues to affect communities, leading to “pervasive malnutrition and widespread hunger”, and healthcare systems have struggled to recover. If the fighting escalates and further harms civilians, climate shocks such as El Niño, which is forecast to increase rainfall in the Horn of Africa, could intensify the crisis by destroying crops and increasing the risk of waterborne disease outbreaks.
A Wider Regional Crisis
Prime Minister Abiy does not just face internal opposition. As in the last war, regional actors are involved. This threatens to further destabilise the Greater Horn of Africa, which is already beset by conflict and geopolitical tension.
Eritrea, which was aligned with the federal government in the Tigray War, has been accused of backing the rebel alliance. Despite Eritrea’s repeated denials, Ethiopia expelled ten Eritrean diplomats and closed its embassy in Asmara on 1st October. Eritrea responded by severing all diplomatic ties. Eritrean troops then crossed the border into Tigray and took up positions around Adigrat. In response, Ethiopian federal forces launched drone strikes on these troops.
The two countries are now engaged in their most serious direct confrontation since the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia border war over control of the town of Badme. That war displaced over 1 million people and is estimated to have killed 100,000. It also led to a severe breakdown in diplomatic relations between the two countries, which were partly restored in 2018 with the signing of a peace deal. Relations broke down again after 2022, both because Eritrea was dissatisfied with the terms of the Pretoria Peace Agreement and because of the long-standing dispute over Red Sea access. Ethiopia lost its coastline and became landlocked when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, and Eritrea sees Ethiopia’s repeated demands for direct access to the Red Sea through the port of Assab as an incursion on its sovereignty.
Long-standing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia centre on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The GERD, a top foreign policy issue for Egypt, is located upstream on the Blue Nile. Because Egypt lies downstream, any reduction in its access to the Nile’s waters, for example if Ethiopia were to hold back water in a drought, or if the GERD were to suffer operational or structural failure, poses a threat to Egypt’s water security. Egypt relies on the Nile for over 90% of its freshwater supply, for both domestic and agricultural use.
The construction and inauguration of the GERD have also proved contentious with Sudan, another downstream state. Beyond Sudan’s concerns about the dam’s safety and the regulation of water flows, relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have deteriorated because Sudanese officials have accused Ethiopia of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which have been at war with the Sudanese army, while Ethiopia has accused Sudan of supporting the Tigrayan rebels.
After several rounds of negotiations, Ethiopia’s reluctance to reach an agreement with Egypt and Sudan culminated in its unilateral filling and operation of the dam, which both Egypt and Sudan considered too rapid, with too much water released. In 2025, Egypt accused Ethiopia of “reckless” dam management after sudden releases from the GERD caused a surge in Nile floodwaters beyond the normal seasonal peak.
The diplomatic stalemate has deepened as Ethiopia continues to reject calls for joint management of the GERD and for a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s and Sudan’s water rights and sets out how the dam will be filled and operated during droughts or floods. This has led Egypt to threaten military action. In August 2026, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that “if any harm happened that could interrupt the flow of water, we have the right to defend ourselves under international law”.
The issue has also driven Egypt to cultivate strategic and diplomatic ties with Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, partly to counter Ethiopia’s influence in the region. Whilst Egypt insists that it has “no involvement in what is happening in Ethiopia”, its growing role in the region and its support for Ethiopia’s regional rivals raise the question of whether it could engage in a proxy conflict with Ethiopia if tensions escalate.
What Comes Next?
The Next Century Foundation will be watching closely, but watching is not enough. Civilians are already being killed, forcibly recruited and displaced once more, and the international community must not wait for the death toll to climb towards that of the last war before it acts. The states with real influence in Addis Ababa need to use it now. The United Arab Emirates, which has supplied Ethiopia with drones and weapons systems and shares its strategic outlook in the region, and Israel, long close to Addis Ababa through defence and technology cooperation, are best placed to press Prime Minister Abiy towards a ceasefire and towards talks under African Union auspices that finish what Pretoria left undone. They should also encourage Ethiopia to address the grievances that unite its opponents. A binding agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD would remove the main reason Egypt has to cultivate Ethiopia’s enemies, and a credible commitment that Ethiopia will seek Red Sea access only by negotiation would ease Eritrea’s fears. Equally, Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and the Sudanese Armed Forces should recognise that fuelling a war inside Ethiopia will not secure the Nile or the Red Sea; it will only bring a wider war to their own borders. We urge Ethiopia’s friends to step forward before this conflict becomes a regional war that none of its participants can win.
