Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). While rooted in an internal struggle for power, the conflict has become increasingly entangled in broader regional rivalries. Among the most consequential is the growing competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The two Gulf powers have increasingly diverged in their regional ambitions, competing for political influence and strategic leverage across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Rather than direct confrontation, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have turned to proxy competition, leveraging relationships with rival political and military actors to advance their strategic interests and extend their regional influence. In this context, Sudan is no exception.
As both publicly call for an end to the conflict, their respective engagements with the SAF and RSF raise a deeper question about the role of regional competition in sustaining the war and the extent to which their pursuit of influence is undermining prospects for peace.
Competing Interests in Sudan
Given its strategic position along the Red Sea, agricultural potential, and substantial gold and mineral resources, Sudan represents a valuable partner for both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For Riyadh, Sudan’s proximity to the Kingdom makes Red Sea security a strategic priority, given the sea’s importance to Saudi maritime trade and broader economic ambitions. Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, views Sudan as part of its wider effort to expand its commercial and maritime presence across the Red Sea, where investments in ports and logistics infrastructure have helped strengthen its position along key trade routes.
Sudan’s agricultural potential also offers both countries opportunities to strengthen food security through overseas investment, particularly given their limited arable land and scarce water resources. Its mineral wealth presents further economic opportunities. Gold exploration in Sudan can support Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to develop its mining sector under Vision 2030, while Sudanese gold contributes to the UAE’s established gold-trading and refining industry.
Beyond economic and strategic interests, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have previously relied on Sudanese mercenaries to advance their regional security objectives. During the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia reportedly exploited impoverished Sudanese families by offering financial incentives to recruit fighters, including children as young as 14. Sudanese fighters and lawmakers interviewed by The New York Times said that as many as 14,000 Sudanese, almost all of them from Darfur and most from the RSF, were fighting in Yemen at any one time, and that children made up between 20 and 40 per cent of some units. In 2019, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok confirmed that 15,000 Sudanese troops had been deployed in Yemen, while senior Sudanese officials put the figure at over 40,000 at the height of the war in 2016 and 2017. Although Sudan’s participation was formally a state deployment within the Saudi-led coalition, it was the RSF commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who mobilised these fighters on behalf of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Returning fighters said that their Saudi and Emirati commanders directed them largely by radio from a safe distance, leaving the Sudanese to hold the front lines. Saudi Arabia denied recruiting children. The UAE, meanwhile, recruited Sudanese fighters to support the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen. In Libya, the UAE also facilitated the deployment of Sudanese fighters alongside Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), increasingly relying on UAE-based private military companies to hire and deploy them.
These overlapping interests make Sudan’s political future particularly significant for both countries. The military and political actors who emerge dominant from the war will influence each state’s ability to protect its interests and expand its regional influence. As the conflict has continued, their relationships with Sudan’s rival military factions have diverged, placing Sudan at the intersection of their competing regional ambitions.
The Shift to Proxy Competition
Since the outbreak of war in Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have publicly endorsed diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, presenting themselves as supporters of peace. Saudi Arabia co-hosted the Jeddah negotiations with the United States in 2023, while both countries participated in the August 2024 talks in Switzerland. In September 2025, they joined Egypt and the United States in declaring that there was “no viable military solution” to the war and calling for an end to external military support. Yet these commitments sit uneasily alongside mounting allegations of their support for Sudan’s rival military factions.
The UAE has emerged as the RSF’s primary external supporter, despite consistently denying accusations of military assistance. Evidence cited by investigators points to several potential supply channels. Flight records and satellite imagery identified at least 86 cargo flights from the UAE to Amdjarass, Chad, between April 2023 and December 2024. Although Abu Dhabi maintained that these flights supported humanitarian operations, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan considered allegations that the route was being used to supply the RSF with weapons credible. Other investigations identified Chinese-made weapons in Sudan that appeared to have been re-exported by the UAE, alongside Serbian-made munitions and Bulgarian mortar rounds initially exported to the UAE and later found in RSF hands. In 2026, a further investigation documented hundreds of Colombian military contractors recruited by an Abu Dhabi-based security company to fight alongside the RSF. The contractors reportedly transited through UAE military facilities, where some received training from Emirati personnel.
These allegations take on greater significance in light of the UAE’s economic interests in Sudan. More than 90 per cent of Sudan’s gold has reportedly been exported or smuggled to Dubai. Abu Dhabi had also pursued a significant foothold in Sudan’s Red Sea economy through a proposed $6 billion agreement, signed in 2022, to develop an economic and agricultural zone alongside the Abu Amama port project. Although the deal was cancelled by Sudan’s government in 2024, the UAE has reportedly been trying to revive it.
Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has maintained closer ties with the SAF, although the extent of its military assistance remains contested. In February 2026, Intelligence Online reported that Riyadh had transferred M777 artillery systems to the SAF and that Sudanese personnel had received training in their use. Other reports have pointed to repeated flights between Saudi Arabia and Sudan as possible signs of logistical links, though these do not independently establish the purpose of the flights or confirm the scale of any military support. Riyadh has also appeared more cautious about direct arms procurement, as a proposed $1.5 billion arms deal between Pakistan and Sudan was put on hold after Saudi Arabia reportedly requested its termination and withdrew its proposed financing.
Alongside its political and security ties with the SAF, Saudi Arabia has likewise moved to strengthen its economic position. In early 2026, Sudan’s army-backed government signed a gold exploration agreement with Saudi Gold Refinery covering the Red Sea State, while a Saudi state-run refinery was reportedly preparing to purchase Sudanese gold. The developments offer Riyadh an opportunity to counterbalance the UAE and redirect some exports away from Dubai. In January 2026, Sudan also announced that Saudi companies would receive priority in reconstruction projects involving railways and ports, with discussions extending to logistics zones and the Abu Amama port project. Coming after the cancellation of the UAE-linked port deal, these initiatives could allow Riyadh to gain a stronger commercial and strategic foothold along the Red Sea.
Sudan Pays the Price
Sudan is facing a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, with millions displaced, hunger spreading, essential services collapsing, and civilians subjected to relentless violence. External military assistance contributes to prolonging the conflict by strengthening the military capabilities of the SAF and RSF, encouraging both parties to pursue a military victory rather than negotiate, and increasing civilians’ exposure to violence and atrocities. One of the deployed Colombian contractors reportedly told investigators that he trained RSF recruits, including “young children,” teaching them combat skills and how to handle weapons. This is a grave violation of international law, exposing a new generation to violence and risking long-term damage to Sudan’s social fabric and future stability.
The gap between Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s public commitments to peace and their respective alleged engagements with Sudan’s rival military factions raises questions about the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts that are not accompanied by concrete action. Both countries, alongside other external actors, must align their conduct with their stated commitments by ending military assistance that fuels the conflict, supporting effective enforcement of the UN arms embargo, and using their influence to secure a sustained ceasefire and an inclusive, Sudanese-led political process. Without meaningful action to address external interference, calls for peace risk remaining disconnected from the realities sustaining the war. Sudan’s future must be determined by its people, not by the competing ambitions of regional powers.
