“El Obeid crisis could be worse than El Fasher” – Dr Mukesh Kapila, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan.

Despite diplomatic efforts led by U.S. Special Envoy Massad Boulos to facilitate peace negotiations in Sudan, no sustained, coordinated peace talks addressing the ongoing conflict remain. The international community must amplify its support for these initiatives and urge both parties towards productive negotiations; otherwise, the violence is likely to escalate further.

Since the onset of the Sudanese conflict in April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have engaged in ongoing clashes aimed at claiming and reclaiming land and territory within Sudan. This has resulted in the displacement of more than 12 million individuals, with 40% facing severe hunger, communities destroyed, and civilians subjected to sexual violence, ethnic violence, and violations of human rights. 

In the summer of 2026, these tensions have escalated, with significant attacks occurring between the SAF and RSF in the city of El Obeid. This attack has raised widespread concern that the escalating violence in El Obeid resembles the RSF siege of El Fasher, which persisted from 2024 to 2025  and was characterised by the United Nations (UN)as genocide, potentially leading to another substantial number of casualties, destruction, and displacement. 

Why El Obeid? 

El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan State, is recognised as one of Sudan’s most significant commercial centres and primary transit nodes. The city strengthens connectivity between central Sudan, the southern regions, and Darfur, and its strategic positioning makes it a prominent urban centre and a vital logistical hub for military activities and humanitarian assistance. It is also one of the most significant military hubs in western Sudan, making it strategically important not only to the SAF but also to the RSF. With the SAF controlling the region, the RSF has begun expanding military pressure around the city. Although neither faction has officially declared intentions for a full-scale offensive, the escalation in military activity has raised concerns about the potential for a broader assault.

Impact of the Growing Conflict in El Obeid

As the conflict intensifies, essential services have been severely affected, worsening civilian hardship in an already critical situation. The UN has documented that recurrent attacks have disrupted water and electricity supplies, caused fuel shortages, and contributed to rising food and commodity prices. A significant concern is the outbreak of waterborne diseases, as the combined destruction of water infrastructure and limited humanitarian access may compel civilians to ingest unsafe drinking water.

Displacement is also a great concern in El Obeid, as Numerous civilians have already been displaced from various regions within Sudan. Due to the severe impact of the ongoing conflict on the city, many residents are compelled to relocate once more, with some experiencing displacement for a second or even third time. With Sudan having the largest and most rapid displacement emergency globally, the continued attacks in various regions have severely impacted civilians; in El Obeid, they are forced to move countless times.

Rising Tensions

As of July 2026, the SAF announced that it has regained full control of a major highway linking the capital, Khartoum, to El Obeid. The highway, which the RSF had controlled for most of the period since April 2023, can now allow the SAF to move troops, weapons, fuel, and supplies, and it will also block the RSF’s push to seize the city. This also greatly impacts the humanitarian crisis, as it cuts travel time significantly and could reopen the important trade route for livestock and agricultural products from the Kordofan region, which was largely isolated by RSF positions.

However, as of August 2026, the RSF has intensified its drone and land attacks. While in recent weeks the RSF has temporarily halted its assault due to international pressures, they have deployed additional forces, similar to the SAF, thereby increasing the likelihood of violent confrontations. With plans to double down ⁠on attacks and eventually reach Khartoum, which the SAF recaptured early last year, the increase in attacks by the RSF will continue to create a hostile environment leading to violent attacks. 

What Next

In July 2026, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) convened an emergency session to address the imminent threat of atrocities in and around El Obeid. Human rights organisations have appealed for the Council to exercise its preventive mandate by convening proactively, rather than responding post facto to catastrophic atrocities.

Additionally, the Boulos Initiative, devised by the International Quad, comprising the United States of America, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Arab Republic of Egypt and The Quartet of Special Envoys focuses on aligning the positions of the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN, and the Arab League are the most recent strategic effort to end the conflict in Sudan. While these initiatives have offered key recommendations for better coordination, sequencing, and impact of peace mediation efforts for Sudan, these plans have encountered considerable political obstacles. International support from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which endorse the SAF, and the United Arab Emirates, which supports the RSF, has met resistance from SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who has expressed grievances about the UAE’s involvement in the mediation process. Ongoing delays and the lack of a structured peace process jeopardize the potential for constructive resolution, potentially permitting both the SAF and RSF to consolidate their positions further and to justify ongoing military actions through the absence of negotiations.

Beyond El Obeid

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the international community must escalate diplomatic initiatives to secure an immediate ceasefire and endorse inclusive peace negotiations that genuinely incorporate civilian groups, women, and local communities. The increasing violence in El Obeid exemplifies the catastrophic repercussions of permitting the conflict to proceed unchecked. Absent urgent measures, the violence may extend beyond El Obeid to additional cities and regions, thereby exacerbating Sudan’s humanitarian crisis and endangering more civilians. El Obeid must serve as a cautionary example: without persistent international pressure for peace, Sudan’s subsequent humanitarian crisis could already be materialising in other areas.

For further insight into international efforts to address the crisis, read about the NCF Sudan Office’s participation in the 62nd Session of the UN Human Rights Council here.

Photo shows the UNAMID mission which has now sadly pulled out of Sudan completely because of the war