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EU Optimism and Serbian Reality

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On the 25th October, Serbia’s Student List, a grassroots movement, won the parliamentary election with 53% of the vote, breaking Vučić’s populist and corrupt fourteen-year rule. In this unprecedented win, the List has knocked the country into uncharted territory, with no prime minister named two weeks in. With a movement poised for power that was able to unite opposing ideologies against Vučić, international and Western European optimism surrounding EU accession and anti-Russian foreign policy has been renewed. But are these aspirations based in reality, or are they merely projections of Western European priorities in the region? The Student List’s foreign policy is clear and at odds with the EU’s, with their aims and success grounded in domestic anti-corruption policies. This said, progress toward EU accession is still possible, as the List’s reforms mirror those the EU requires.

History repeating itself

Whilst the Student List represents a revolutionary change in Serbian politics, it also echoes the student-driven, grassroots, Otpor (Resistance) movement. In 2000, non-violent protests fed a broad coalition that toppled Slobodan Milošević, the previous authoritarian nationalist leader. However, Otpor failed to define a post-dictatorship vision, lost domestic credibility and, as a party, won just 1.6% in the 2003 elections. Hope towards what the Student List can bring is founded in the differences between these movements, and in the idea that their win was not just resetting a cycle but an opportunity to break from historical precedent.

Both the Student List and Otpor united people with opposing ideologies against a specific figure (anti-Vučić and anti-Milošević), and both were borne out of specific events: the oppressive University and Media Acts in 1998 and the 2024 Novi Sad railway canopy collapse, a disaster that killed 16 people. Their similarities have fuelled pessimistic interpretations of where the Student List will end up. However, where in 2000 Otpor catalysed an electoral coalition, in 2026 the Students built this coalition themselves and won outright.

An important difference is that the Student List has very clear domestic aims: accountability, eradicating corruption, and depoliticising institutions and the judiciary. Blockages in the justice system have been removed since their victory, with long-stalled cases moving. This includes nine serving police officers and one former officer arrested for allegedly using excessive force during last year’s protests. Furthermore, the resignation of Manja Grčić, Director General of Serbia’s public broadcaster, after calls from staff, unions and the List, alongside the dismissal of eight editors, is a direct response to concerns over political bias in public media.

A hopeful EU

The List’s demands, which seem to be having an effect even before official power has been handed over, have encouraged international observers and EU officials, who see progress towards a functioning democracy, a recovery of Serbia’s stalled path toward EU membership and even expectations of pulling away from Russia.

Serbia has been a candidate for EU accession since 2012, with progress stalled by Vučić’s close alignment with Russia, corruption, and refusal to recognise Kosovo. By joining the EU, both stakeholders would benefit from the free trade region, with two thirds of Serbia’s exports going to the EU. Accession would also drastically weaken Russian power in the region, as Serbia has historically been Russia’s primary diplomatic, cultural and political channel into Southeastern Europe and the Balkans. This would ease European concerns over Russian influence.

Reality check

The EU’s optimism is not completely baseless; however, foreign policy was secondary to the domestic agenda, and where the List has spoken it has opposed Brussels’ expectations.  There are three factors that have slowed the progress of Serbia’s accession: lack of reforms, refusal to join sanctions on Russia, and failure to normalise relations with Kosovo. The Student List explicitly addresses all three, but views reform as the most significant, approaching its relationship with the EU as “fundamentals first”. It remains unlikely that the diverse coalition within the Student List will be able to agree on foreign policy regarding Russia and Kosovo.

Ilija Srdanović, the List’s lead candidate, suggests that foreign policy will be decided through open dialogue within Serbian society, so relations with Russia will be reconsidered, but only through public democratic decision not through international pressure. The List has clearly stated it will not impose sanctions on Russia, justifying this as sanctions do not solve problems, noting that Serbia itself was sanctioned. Serbians have deep cultural ties with Russia that make pivoting their position complex. In line with Serbia’s official position, the List’s priorities include keeping Kosovo within Serbia. EU Commissioner Marta Kos has said Serbia cannot make significant progress without aligning its foreign and security policy with Brussels, including on sanctions.

Democratic reform does not equal geopolitical realignment. The Student List is committed to EU integration but views chapters 23 and 24 (the domestic reforms of EU accession negotiations) as the main obstacles to progress, rather than foreign policy. As Bojana Zoric of the EU Institute for Security Studies clearly stated, ‘The student-backed list may embrace European democratic values, but this does not necessarily translate into a pro-EU foreign policy’. Closer integration with the EU is likely, but Serbia’s new government has not committed to aligning its foreign policy with Brussels and explicitly rejects external pressures to conform.

Conclusion

The EU’s hope is grounded in Serbia’s reforms but projected onto its foreign policy. The test will be whether the List holds together once it must govern, and how it moves forward in foreign policy. The memory of the Balkan war and years of Vučić’s government have decreased support for EU integration by 20% over the past 15 years. Serbia has committed to aligning with domestic reforms, but complying with EU foreign policy is a different matter. It will only do so on its own terms, democratically, and prioritising Serbia’s national interests. It could be unreasonable for the EU to deny accession based on a democratic decision in a reformed Serbia. Because of this, full membership is still distant, and the EU’s power in the Balkan region remains limited.

 

Image from Pixabay 

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