Gaza Briefing: Friday 9 October to Thursday 15 October 2026 / Page Updated:  17 October 2026

The NCF’s weekly overview of developments in and related to Gaza, including the humanitarian situation, aid, peace efforts and related developments.

Overview of this week’s developments

• Casualties: Gaza’s cumulative death toll rose by 138, largely due to a retroactive correction to the total. 30 of these deaths occurred since the ceasefire. No new Israeli fatalities were reported.
• Aid: 955 trucks entered via Kerem Shalom, up 15% on the previous week, but the mix changed sharply: aid trucks more than doubled while commercial trucks fell by a third. Israel’s military then announced on 14 October that commercial goods had stopped entering, blaming a Hamas fee on trucks, which Hamas denies. Rafah was closed to passengers all week and only 10 people were recorded leaving Gaza (Gaza Crossings Authority, via an NCF exclusive).
• Reconstruction: Israel is still blocking construction of the first Board of Peace project, a base for the planned International Stabilization Force, with approval now expected only after Israel’s election on 27 October.
• Ceasefire anniversary: A year on, UN Human Rights says it has verified 1,076 conflict-related deaths since the ceasefire announcement, and calls the violence “simply unfathomable” during a supposed ceasefire.
• West Bank: Settler violence during the olive harvest continues, with a Washington Post photographer beaten on 16 October, and Israel has raided two Palestinian NGOs in Ramallah and downgraded the UK’s consulate in East Jerusalem.
• Elections: President Abbas has postponed the Palestinian legislative and presidential elections to 11 September 2027. Hamas called the delay “a step in the right direction”, and Egypt is proposing talks between the factions.

In This Update

• Deaths as a Consequence of War
• Humanitarian Aid and other civilian crossings
• Key Gaza related Developments
• Gaza Governance
• Upcoming Elections
• West Bank Key Developments
• West Bank Governance

Gaza related Deaths as a consequence of war

A note on this week’s reporting window: This week covers Friday 9 October to Thursday 15 October 2026 inclusive.

Since 7th October 2023

Since the ceasefire on October 10 2025

This week (2-8 October):

Sources: Gaza Ministry of Health as carried by Palestine Information Center, corroborated by Middle East Eye and Khaama Press. Israel: no new fatalities or injuries (Times of Israel/Al Arabiya-sourced totals).

Notes on this week’s figures

Gaza: the “since 7 October 2023” topline rose by 138 (74,254 to 74,392), while the “since ceasefire” counter rose by 30 (1,471 to 1,501). The gap of 108 is derived by subtraction and not independently itemised. It is consistent with the recurring pattern in which the Ministry adds deaths retroactively once identification details are approved, and with bodies recovered from rubble (the Ministry reports nearly 840 recovered since the ceasefire), which enter the cumulative total without entering the since-ceasefire counter. I could not find a published figure for this week’s retroactive additions. The 138 headline should therefore be read as roughly 30 deaths in the period plus a retroactive correction of about 108. Within the week, the 12 October daily report (74,382 killed; 1,493 since the ceasefire) fits the same trend, and the Ministry noted that some of the recent daily deaths were people dying of earlier wounds. Injuries rose by 134 on both the topline (175,306 to 175,440) and the since-ceasefire counter (5,189 to 5,323), which are consistent with each other.

The topline of 74,392 is reported by the Palestine Information Center as “approximately”; I found no second outlet carrying that exact total, so it is effectively single-sourced, though the 12 October figure from a separate outlet supports it.

Israel: no new Israeli fatalities or injuries were found in reporting for 9–15 October, so all four Israeli figures (since 7 October 2023: 1,806 fatalities, 3,004 injuries; since the ceasefire: 7 fatalities, 20 injuries) are carried over unchanged.

Humanitarian Aid for the week of 9–15 October

NCF Exclusive: Gaza Crossings Authority Weekly Report

This section is built entirely from the Gaza Crossings and Borders Authority’s own official weekly bulletin, obtained directly by NCF’s Head for Gaza, Adel Al Zanoon, through his personal contact with the Director General of the Authority. NCF is grateful to both for this access.

Crossing operational status, 9–15 October (7-day period):

Passenger movement, 9–15 October: 10 people left Gaza, all to Jordan (5 patients and 5 companions), and none returned. No departures were recorded to Egypt, and there were no evacuations or special-coordination cases. Rafah remained closed for all seven days. Last week, by comparison, no passenger movement was recorded at all, and two weeks ago 332 people left Gaza and 271 returned.

Truck movement, 9–15 October (all via Kerem Shalom):

Fuel breakdown (74 tankers): Diesel 49, Cooking gas 22, Petrol 3.

Truck contents by category: Food/provisions 641, Consumer goods/household items 145, Shelter/relief supplies 57, Medical/health supplies 23, Fuel 74, Fodder/seeds 10 (these sum to 950; see caveats).

Source: Crossings and Borders Authority – Gaza, weekly bulletin for 9–15 October 2026, via Adel Al Zanoon and the Director General.

Week-on-week context: total truck volume rose 15%, from last week’s 829 to 955, but the mix changed sharply. Aid trucks more than doubled (249 to 530, up 113%) while commercial trucks fell by a third (532 to 351, down 34%). Fuel tankers rose from 48 to 74 (up 54%), with diesel up from 33 to 49 and cooking gas from 15 to 22, and 3 petrol tankers after none last week. Kerem Shalom was open for goods all seven days, compared with five last week. By category, food/provisions rose from 576 to 641 and medical supplies more than tripled, from 7 to 23. The week’s volume is well below the 1,446 recorded for 25 Sept–1 Oct. On passengers, Kerem Shalom’s travel route reopened for one day, allowing the first recorded departures since the 25 Sept–1 Oct week, though Rafah, which was open three days in the 25 Sept–1 Oct week, remains closed. The bulletin gives no reason for the closures or for the shift towards aid trucks.

Caveats

• Single-source (Gaza-side authority), not independently cross-verified by an international body.
• Prepared from the Arabic text of the bulletin, with the English version matching it line by line. The truck totals check internally (351 + 530 + 74 = 955; fuel 49 + 22 + 3 = 74; passengers 5 + 5 = 10, all to Jordan), but the category breakdown sums to 950, not 955. The five-truck gap is unexplained in the bulletin; it is presumably a small unclassified or miscounted group, and we have kept the Authority’s figures as published.
• Groups 1/2/3 (Chamber of Commerce, UN2720, bilateral) remain deprioritized per the standing methodology.
• COGAT (gaza-aid-data.gov.il) remains unusable as a current source.

Key Gaza Related Developments: from 9 to 16 October

12 October: A year after the ceasefire announcement, UN Human Rights in the occupied Palestinian territory says it has verified 1,076 conflict-related deaths up to the end of July 2026 (268 children, 126 women and 682 men), 331 of them near the so-called “yellow line”. Its head, Ajith Sunghay, says: “Violence of this magnitude is outrageous at any time. To record it during a supposed ceasefire is simply unfathomable.” The office says Israel’s forces have expanded their deployment areas from about 53% of Gaza at the ceasefire to a stated goal of 70%, and warns that the pattern of attacks killing only women and children raises serious concerns that civilians are being directly targeted, which would amount to a war crime.

14 October: COGAT, the military body through which Israel oversees civilian affairs in Gaza, says no commercial goods have entered Gaza for two days, including fruit and winter clothing. It claims local merchants halted shipments because Hamas imposed a 10,000 shekel ($3,220) fee on each truck and demanded that 30% of sales be made in cash. Gaza’s government media office rejects this as disinformation, saying the fee is a voluntary donation to a fund for widows, orphans and others in need, and the head of Gaza’s private truckers’ union says Israel itself imposed the restrictions.

14 October: The Palestinian Prisoners’ Society reports that Israel has detained more than 2,000 Palestinian children since October 2023, with at least 350 still held in its prisons. The report describes abuse ranging from intimidation at arrest to “torture, starvation and denial of healthcare” and detention without charge, and notes that information on children arrested in Gaza is unclear because of the number of missing persons.

14 October: Publisher Faber withdraws Sally Rooney’s books from sale in the UK, removing the e-book editions, saying it cannot pass her UK earnings to her and calling this an “unconscionable situation for a publisher”. Rooney publicly supports Palestine Action, the group the UK government proscribed as a terrorist organisation in July 2025, and has said she would use her earnings to support it. She told the BBC that further publication of her work could be a “serious criminal offence”.

15 October: The Guardian reports that Israel has not allowed construction to begin on a temporary military outpost for the proposed International Stabilization Force, the first project awarded by the Board of Peace. Contractors and trucks of the US firm Arkel International have been barred from entering Gaza for two months. The outpost, on a former Gaza Humanitarian Foundation site, would house 150 troops from a 500-strong Moroccan and Kosovan contingent, and sources say the reconstruction programme cannot advance without it. The Board of Peace reportedly expects Israel to approve it only after the 27 October election.

16 October: More than 700 people, including families, rabbis and Knesset members, establish a new outpost, “Halutzei Gaza” (Pioneers of Gaza), on the Israel side of the border opposite Gaza City, organised by the Nachala settler movement. The movement calls on the government to move the outpost into a northern buffer area inside Gaza and wants the next coalition’s guidelines to include building communities in Gaza, repealing the Disengagement Law and encouraging emigration.

Gaza Governance

International Oversight: The Board of Peace

The Board of Peace was established by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted 17 November 2025, which gave it international legal personality and transitional administrative authority over Gaza. Its mandate runs to 31 December 2027 and requires further Security Council action to continue beyond that date.

• Chair: President Donald Trump, who heads the Board and its Executive Board/Committee, which is the Board’s primary strategic and decision-making body, with other members and heads of state to be announced (Tony Blair among those named).
• High Representative for Gaza: Nickolay Mladenov, the Bulgarian diplomat serving as the Board’s operational envoy on the ground, reporting to the Board.
• Gaza Executive Board, which supports the High Representative and the National Committee. Its fourteen members, as listed on the Board of Peace website, are:
  • Jared Kushner, adviser to President Trump and his son-in-law
  • Steve Witkoff, US special envoy for the Middle East
  • Susie Wiles, White House Chief of Staff
  • Sir Tony Blair, former UK prime minister and former Quartet Middle East envoy
  • Nickolay Mladenov, High Representative for Gaza and former UN Middle East envoy
  • Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s Foreign Minister
  • General Hassan Rashad, head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service
  • Reem Al-Hashimy, UAE Minister of State
  • Adel Al-Jubair, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Ali Al-Thawadi, Qatari diplomat
  • Sigrid Kaag, former Dutch deputy prime minister and UN humanitarian coordinator for Gaza
  • Marc Rowan, co-founder, chairman and CEO of Apollo Global Management
  • Yakir Gabay, Israeli businessman and major shareholder of Aroundtown
  • Michael Eisenberg, Israeli venture capitalist
• Palestinian role: Resolution 2803 provides for a “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” of qualified Palestinians to handle Gaza’s day-to-day governance, operating under the Board’s transitional authority and oversight rather than sitting on the Board itself. Hamas and other factions are explicitly barred under the resolution from any role in Gaza’s governance, direct or indirect. That committee is the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), composed of thirteen Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. It is not functioning inside Gaza, because Israel has not allowed it to enter. It operates from Cairo. Its members and their titles are:
  • Dr Ali Shaath, Chief Commissioner; Acting Commissioner for Energy and Transport, and for Awqaf and Religious Services
  • Ayed Awni Abu-Ramadan, Commissioner for Economy, Industry and Trade
  • Dr Jabr Ibrahim El-Daour, Commissioner for Education
  • Dr Bashir Rayyes, Commissioner for Finance and Treasury
  • Dr Aed Mahmoud Yaghi, Commissioner for Health
  • Sami Nassman, Commissioner for Interior
  • Adnan Salem Abu Warda, Commissioner for Justice
  • Osama Al-Saadawi, Commissioner for Land and Housing
  • Dr Ali Shehda Barhoum, Commissioner for Water, Utilities and Local Authorities
  • Abdel Karim Ahmed Ashour, Commissioner for Agriculture
  • Omar Shamali, Commissioner for Communication and Digital
  • Hanaa Nicola Tarazi, Commissioner for Social Security
  • Hossni Al-Mghani, Commissioner for Civil Peace
• Handover condition: the Board’s authority is to end once the Palestinian Authority “has satisfactorily completed” its reform programme and can securely and effectively retake control of Gaza, a judgement the resolution leaves to the Board itself.
• Britain and France voted for Resolution 2803 but have not joined the Board.

Current state of implementation (as of 17 October 2026): the transition remains stalled. Hamas has agreed to disarm on condition that Israel’s forces withdraw, but Israel has not withdrawn; the National Committee (NCAG) intended to administer Gaza remains outside the Strip, in Cairo, because Israel has denied it entry, so it has no practical authority; and a group of Palestinian police recruits already vetted by Israel for training abroad have also been barred from leaving Gaza. High Representative Mladenov has said mediators have a “framework” to rebuild but that Hamas’s disarmament remains the precondition, and that the Board is “not bound by a calendar.” Separately, the Board unveiled a $2.4–2.45bn, six-month reconstruction blueprint in late September (see Key Developments). On 15 October the Guardian reported that Israel has still not allowed construction to begin on the first Board of Peace project, a temporary outpost for the proposed International Stabilization Force (150 troops from a 500-strong Moroccan and Kosovan contingent), two months after the contract was awarded, with sources expecting a decision only after Israel’s 27 October election. Board officials describe the outpost as a prerequisite for all later reconstruction work. On the ground, Israel’s forces now hold about 60% of Gaza according to Al Jazeera’s one-year review, against the 50% envisaged in the plan, and the National Committee remains in Cairo.

Hamas:

In July 2026, Hamas announced it will transfer civilian and security governing authority to the NCAG. The transfer remains in progress, with the implementation of Hamas’ disarmament and the full establishment of NCAG authority still unresolved.

Hamas has traditionally organised its leadership across four pillars: Gaza, the West Bank, the diaspora/external leadership and, historically, a prisoners’ portfolio. Israel’s assassination of most of the pre-war leadership has significantly reshaped this structure over the past two years:

• Overall Chairman of the Political Bureau: Khalil al-Hayya, elected 20 July 2026 (35–34 over Khaled Mashal), replacing the five-member collective leadership that governed since Yahya Sinwar’s death in October 2024. Formally based in Doha, Qatar, but widely described as Gaza’s de facto leader and remains Hamas’s lead ceasefire negotiator.
• Political leader inside Gaza: Ali al-Amoudi, a Sinwar ally released in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, is the figure reported to be managing Hamas’s internal political affairs in Gaza following al-Hayya’s promotion, and was described by Israel as deputy chairman of Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza. Israel targeted him in an air strike on an apartment building in Gaza City’s Remal district on 3 October, which killed at least five people. Israel has not confirmed whether he was killed; senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad has said that reports reaching Hamas confirm he survived. This is Hamas’s claim only and has not been independently verified, and as of 17 October we have found no further confirmation either way. Hamas has not formally confirmed his appointment, deliberately keeping it ambiguous for security reasons.
• Diaspora/external leadership: Khaled Mashal, who lost the July 2026 leadership vote to al-Hayya, continues to lead Hamas’s operations and diplomacy abroad.
• West Bank / prisoners’ portfolio: Zaher Jabarin leads Hamas’s West Bank operations and also formally holds the “Office of Martyrs, Wounded, and Prisoners” portfolio, the closest surviving equivalent of the historic separate prisoners’ leadership.
• Military wing (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) commander: Mohammed Odeh. This is arguably the most operationally significant of these roles, given Hamas’s stated refusal to disarm. Odeh succeeded Izz al-Din al-Haddad after al-Haddad was killed in an Israel airstrike on 15 May 2026, and previously commanded Hamas’s northern Gaza brigade. (On 29 September 2026, Israel killed Izz al-Din Al-Beik, described as head of Hamas’s armed wing specifically in northern Gaza, a subordinate command to Odeh’s strip-wide leadership of the Qassam Brigades, and confirmed killed by both Israel and Hamas.)
• The Shura Council, headed by Muhammad Ismail Darwish (Abu Omar Hassan), functions as Hamas’s overarching consultative, legislative, and decision-making body, responsible for electing the group’s Political Bureau and charting its strategic direction. It is an institution rather than an operational command. Its head is not comparable in day-to-day significance to the political and military figures above, and is listed here for completeness rather than as a power centre in its own right.

Palestinian Authority (PA):

The PA is the internationally recognised Palestinian governing authority, with a stated objective of eventually assuming governance responsibilities in Gaza. Under Resolution 2803, the Board of Peace’s handover of authority is explicitly conditioned on the PA “satisfactorily completing” its reform programme. On 10 October President Abbas postponed the Palestinian elections to September 2027 (see below), which will be read as a further test of that reform commitment.

Upcoming Elections

Israel – Knesset Election

Next Scheduled Election: 27 October 2026

All 120 seats are contested under nationwide proportional representation, with a 3.25% threshold, and a government needs 61 seats, so coalition-building will decide the outcome. The Board of Peace’s decision on the Gaza outpost is widely expected to wait until after the vote.

Palestine – Legislative and Presidential Elections

Postponed: 11 September 2027 (previously 28 November 2026 for the legislative vote)

On Saturday 10 October President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree postponing the legislative elections set for 28 November 2026 and combining them with the presidential vote on 11 September 2027, according to the Palestinian news agency Wafa. The PLO Executive Committee said conditions in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza were not conducive to elections. It cited Israel’s refusal to allow election materials or international observers into Gaza, Israel’s military raids, settlement expansion and settler violence, its withholding of Palestinian tax revenues, and the lack of progress on Gaza reconstruction and the international stabilisation force. Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accused Abbas of “fooling the international community”.

The postponement reverses the commitment Abbas repeated in his UN General Assembly address on 24 September to hold the first Palestinian parliamentary vote in 20 years, a vote France and Saudi Arabia had pressed for. Fatah’s secretary-general Jibril Rajoub had already said in September that the vote would not go ahead on time, and the candidate nomination period closed on 7 October with no major list filed.

Reactions have been mixed. Hamas, which had planned to contest the vote and had been forming an electoral alliance with Islamic Jihad and the faction led by Mohammed Dahlan, called the postponement a “step in the right direction” and said conditions were unsuitable for a free election, adding that it must lead to a serious and comprehensive national dialogue. Dahlan’s faction called it an “attack on democracy” that deepens the crisis of legitimacy. Mustafa Barghouti of the Palestinian National Initiative spoke of “great disappointment”. Sources told The National that Egypt is proposing a meeting of Palestinian factions the following week, with Hamas’s Khalil al-Hayya and Dahlan among those invited, although Egypt has not officially announced it.

West Bank Key Developments: from 9 to 16 October

13 October: In a daytime raid in Ramallah, Israel’s forces search the offices of two Palestinian civil society organisations, the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees and the Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, and confiscate Addameer’s equipment. Troops also enter the courtyard of the Palestine Medical Complex, the West Bank’s largest government hospital, with snipers deployed around its entrances, and fire stun grenades and tear gas at journalists covering the raid, injuring one. Four photojournalists are separately detained near Hebron. Israel designated both organisations as terrorist organisations in 2021, alleging links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a claim the groups reject. On the same day, according to the Palestinian Prisoner’s Society, Israel’s forces arrest at least six children in Hebron.

15 October: Britain’s expanded sanctions framework on human rights and international humanitarian law takes effect. It allows Britain to target individuals and entities that directly commit serious violations, or that finance, enable or promote them, with asset freezes, travel bans and bans on serving as company directors. Construction companies, developers and financial institutions involved in West Bank settlement expansion could be covered. The Foreign Office says the framework is global and does not target any specific country. The change comes days before the 19 October deadline for bids on 1,234 housing units in the E1 settlement plan, part of about 3,400 units, although the tender committee’s review has been postponed until after 19 November. No new sanctions have yet been announced against companies involved in E1.

16 October: China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi tells Israel’s President Isaac Herzog, at a meeting in Baku, that Israel should stop and reverse its “forced establishment” of West Bank settlements. He describes the Palestinian question as “the greatest historical injustice of this century”, backs a two-state solution, and says the immediate priority is fully opening access to Gaza to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.

16 October: Masked settlers attack Palestinian olive harvesters near the village of Abu Falah, close to Ramallah. Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine is pushed to the ground, beaten and kicked, and her cameras and phone are taken. She is treated for a large leg wound and a hand injury. Three Palestinians are treated at Abu Falah, one of them shot in the thigh according to Wafa, and four more are treated after separate clashes near Burqa. Israel’s military says its forces dispersed the confrontation with riot control measures and warning shots, condemns the incident and has opened an investigation. Prime Minister Netanyahu says that Israel “unequivocally condemns violence against anyone.”

West Bank Governance

The Palestinian Authority (PA):

The PA is the interim self-governing body for the West Bank (and, in principle, Gaza), established in 1994 under the Oslo Accords. It exercises limited civil authority in parts of the West Bank, while Israel retains overall security control and full control of much of the territory.

• President of the PA and Chairman of the PLO: Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Yasser Arafat as PLO Chairman after Arafat’s death in 2004 and was elected PA president in 2005. He is 90, also leads Fatah, and so heads all three bodies. His four-year term expired in 2009 and he has largely ruled by decree since.
• Prime Minister: Dr Mohammad Mustafa, appointed by Abbas on 14 March 2024. An economist and former adviser to the president, he is a member of the PLO Executive Committee and heads the Council of Ministers, which is largely technocratic. The Prime Minister’s office website also lists him as Minister of Foreign Affairs, alongside Varsen Aghabekian Shahin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. In April 2026 he told an EU-hosted meeting in Brussels that “security without sovereignty will not endure” and called for “one state, one government, one law and one gun” in Gaza, with full Israel withdrawal. He holds office at the president’s pleasure, and the Legislative Council, which has not met since 2007, plays no part in confirming him.
• Interior Minister and security: Major General Ziad Hab al-Reeh is Minister of Interior and is responsible for overseeing the Palestinian security forces, which include the National Security Forces, the Civil Police, Preventive Security and the Presidential Guard. He is a former head of Preventive Security and a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. The most prominent security figure outside the cabinet is Major General Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service and a member of Fatah’s Central Committee since May 2026. The president is formally commander in chief, and we have not been able to establish a single official with overall command of the West Bank security forces, so the chain of command should be read as shared between the president, the Interior Minister and the agency heads. The PA’s security forces operate only in the areas where Israel permits.
• Legitimacy: There have been no national elections since 2006, when Hamas won the legislative vote. A Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research poll in August 2026 (1,270 respondents in the West Bank and Gaza) found that 80% want Abbas to resign and that his approval rating is 18%.
• Reform: Abbas pledged at the Fatah congress in May 2026 to reform the PA and hold long-delayed elections. The PA also faces international pressure over corruption and political stagnation, and Resolution 2803 makes the Board of Peace’s handover of Gaza conditional on its reform (see Gaza Governance).

Fatah, the PLO and the PA:

These three are often conflated but are separate bodies. The PLO is the umbrella body recognised internationally as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It includes Fatah and smaller factions such as the PFLP and DFLP, but not Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Fatah, founded by Yasser Arafat in the late 1950s, dominates both the PLO and the PA. The PA is the administrative body created under Oslo.

Succession:

• Interim successor: On 27 October 2025 Abbas issued a constitutional declaration naming the vice president of the PLO Executive Committee, Hussein al-Sheikh, as interim president if the post falls vacant. The interim president would serve 90 days while elections are held, with provision for one renewable extension if elections cannot be held. Commentators have said the choice is unlikely to be warmly received.
• Marwan Barghouti: Jailed in Israel since 2002, he retained his Fatah Central Committee seat at the May 2026 congress with the highest number of votes, and the August poll above found him the most popular Palestinian political figure (39% favoured him as Abbas’s successor). Israel has not signalled his release.
• Yasser Abbas: The president’s son was elected to the Fatah Central Committee at the same congress. Analysts say this does not clearly put him on a path to the presidency.
• Mohammed Dahlan: Based in the UAE and expelled from Fatah in 2011, he retains a faction of supporters. His faction called the election postponement an “attack on democracy”, and he is among those invited to proposed reconciliation talks in Egypt.

Palestinian Elections

Postponed: 11 September 2027, for both the legislative and presidential votes (the legislative vote had been set for 28 November 2026).

On 10 October Abbas issued a decree postponing the elections and combining them on one date, according to Wafa. The PLO Executive Committee cited a lack of security in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, including Israel’s military raids, settlement expansion and settler violence, and its refusal to admit election materials and observers to Gaza. Hamas called the delay “a step in the right direction”, and Egypt is proposing a meeting of the factions. The full account is in the Upcoming Elections section of Gaza Governance.

Image featured above is from Gaza by hosny salah from Pixabay