The US-Iran deal: hanging by a thread 

On Sunday, 14 June 2026, as the US-Israel war on Iran approached its 16th week, US President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that ‘The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete,’ suggesting that the conflict may finally be nearing its end. Three days later, both sides signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding, agreeing to ‘the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.’ 

However, before the ink had even dried, continued bombardment of southern Lebanon by Israel, killing at least 47 people since Thursday midnight, stalled progress. In response to the attacks, Iran postponed a meeting, scheduled to take place in Geneva on Friday, that was set to formalise its peace agreement with the US. Instead, both Israel and Hezbollah have agreed to renew their ceasefire, in spite of the fighting, and in Lebanon, hope is, once again, replaced by uncertainty. 

Israel: not done yet

Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz made clear his government’s intention to keep soldiers in territory seized by Israel in southern Lebanon “indefinitely”, remaining committed to fighting the Iranian-backed militia group, Hezbollah. This statement was made despite Iranian threats to strike Israel in retaliation to its targeting of south Lebanon and southern Beirut suburbs. Since Hezbollah opened fire on Israel on March 2nd, almost 3,800 people have been killed in Lebanon and a further 1.2 million displaced by an Israel’s offensive that shows no sign of abating. Civilians are left “hesitant” to return to what is left of their homes in the south, which will require “a lifetime to rebuild”.

Whilst it is hoped that Iran’s deal with the US might give Lebanon a vital reprieve, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is beset by both political and personal concerns that give him reason to remain in Lebanon, despite significant international pushback. With elections scheduled for October this year, his victory is far from certain. Failure to prevent the Hamas-led attack on October 7 2023 has drawn sustained criticism, now compounded by underwhelming results in Iran. Having been shut out of negotiations, Israel has watched from afar as its American ally struggles to complete a complex nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, the government of Iran, though badly wounded, still stands defiant. Considered a victory in Tehran, this outcome only exacerbates the national mood in Israel. Simultaneously, Mr Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial on corruption charges cuts both ways. His premiership might shield him from conviction, the risk of which many Israelis don’t want looming over their leader. Failure to receive a controversial pardon from Israel’s President Isaac Herzog highlights the increasing desperation of Mr Netanyahu’s situation.

Hezbollah’s proven staying power and ability to inflict significant damage on Israel makes it too large a threat for Tel Aviv to ignore. Many of  Mr Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners demand continued military pressure against Hezbollah, a stance shared by many Israelis, who feel they need “protecting’”from a leader who “isn’t afraid of war”. Therefore, the Prime Minister may now feel that remaining committed to fighting the armed group is the final gambit that gives him the chance to save both his political career and his own freedom.

Iran and America: Lebanon’s lifeline?  

While Israel attempts to decouple the Lebanese question from the wider conflict, Iran has maintained its insistence on an end to Israel’s military operations in Lebanon as a condition precedent to its endorsement of the wider peace deal. Many view Iran’s motives as more strategic than they are sincere, including Lebanon’s president Joseph Aoun, who has previously accused Iran of using Lebanon as leverage in its negotiations with the US. The question as to whether or not the security of Lebanon as a sovereign state is as important to the government of Iran as protecting its most powerful proxy in the region is highly contested. Yet, it does not refute the fact that Iran has indeed made good on its promises to defend Lebanon against a threat it cannot face on its own. 

Lebanon has also benefited from a degree of diplomatic cover from the US when faced with intense aggression by Israel. Anti-Israel rhetoric in the US, initially ignited by the crisis in Gaza, now intensified by what is largely considered an unnecessary war in Iran, has shifted the formerly ironclad US-Israel nexus. On multiple recent occasions, President Trump has expressed dissatisfaction with the way that Israel has managed the conflict in Lebanon. In response to an airstrike by Israel on Sunday, which targeted Dahiyeh in southern Beirut, at a time when the achievement of a US-Iran peace agreement was imminent, President Trump stated that ‘this morning’s attack on Beirut should not have happened’, demanding all sides to ‘stand down.’ Furthermore, following Israel’s attacks on Thursday, US Vice President JD Vance also criticised the behaviour of America’s ally, emphasising the need for all parties to ‘work together’ in order to ‘see this deal to completion.’ Be it genuine sentiment or empty words, these comments from the Trump administration provide some hope to a nation that, for too long, has been paralysed by uncertainty. 

Domestic discontent may also explain why Donald Trump has decided to take this stance. The growing sentiment that the president has “gone too far” in Iran and, in doing so, abandoned his promise to put America first, provides significant concern with mid-terms fast approaching in early November. A year and a half on from the beginning of Trump’s second term, the political landscape has shifted dramatically. In congress, Republicans are bearing the brunt of a war that most are now wishing out of existence. Perhaps the damage is already done, but redemption in Lebanon may help to soften the blow.

Hezbollah, the state, and the question of disarmament  

In Lebanon, forceful external intervention fuses with tenuous political gridlock to create an extremely delicate political climate. At the centre of it all lies Hezbollah, whose role continues to polarise the nation. Since its formation in 1982, the resistance group has claimed major historic feats, including its expulsion of Israel’s forces from southern Lebanon in 2000 after more than 15 years of conflict. As the group’s military stature increased, so did its popularity. Over time, however, public perception of Hezbollah has shifted. Following a fragile ceasefire with Israel agreed in November 2024, bringing a nominal end to 13 months of conflict, hostilities were re-ignited in March after Hezbollah opened fire in support of Iran, following the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This immediately sparked frustration throughout Lebanon, whose citizens have grown weary of the armed group repeatedly exposing the country to unnecessary conflict. Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s Prime Minister, also condemned the decision, calling it a “strategic mistake”.

For decades, Hezbollah’s military capabilities have far exceeded those of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Years of political turmoil and economic strife, culminating in the 2019 financial crisis, have left the Lebanese military starved of sufficient funding, equipment, and organisation. Iran, by contrast, supplies Hezbollah with the technology, training, and weaponry needed to sustain a disciplined and well-equipped fighting force. While the majority of LAF soldiers are forced to work second jobs to make ends meet, Hezbollah commands loyalty in Shia communities by providing access to social services, education, and healthcare. Therein lies the controversy: while many suggest that Hezbollah’s disarmament would ultimately reduce the threat of conflict, others fear that replacing it with the militarily inferior LAF puts Lebanon at severe risk of being left dangerously exposed.

The responsibility to provide a solution to this complex dilemma is in the hands of the Lebanese state. Soon after coming into office 16 months ago, both Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam declared that the monopoly of arms in the country should be held solely by the Lebanese government, heavily backed by both the US and Israel as part of a broader Hezbollah-disarmament plan. However, translating this into a tangible reality will take time, which, under intense foreign pressure, the Lebanese government has not been granted. It may in fact be a cloud cuckoo land daydream. Given Hezbollah’s refusal to comply while Israel’s forces remain in Lebanon, and the latter’s eagerness to do so, it is clear that neither side is willing to concede. Furthermore, rather than weakening Hezbollah, a prolonged occupation by Israel could end up reviving its legitimacy. By once again positioning itself as a resistance to Israel’s occupation of large parts of Lebanese territory, the group can justify its own credibility as a necessary extension to an inadequate military. The state therefore faces an almost impossible task: satisfy both sides while beholden to neither.

A sliver of hope for Lebanon?

Whilst Lebanon does and must play a crucial role in determining its own short and medium term future, a larger question looms over both Lebanon and the wider region: Can America stand up to Israel? If so, significant change may be in order. 

For Lebanon to navigate a path to regain its sovereignty and agency over the levers that a functional state is expected to control, such as its military and foreign policy, it needs to overcome massive hurdles. Some of which are, as always, out of its control. However, for the first time in decades, there is a sliver of hope that a longer term solution for the stability that the country desperately needs might be attainable. The next few days and weeks will be very telling.