NCF Research Officer Hannah Little, analyses the US stance on Taiwan after remarks by the Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and explores what this could mean for the future of peace across the Taiwan Strait.
On Saturday 31st May, US Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth gave a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore giving another peek at Donald Trump’s developing strategy for Taiwan. The event, hosted by British think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is usually seen as an opportunity to compete for influence among Asian nations. Although the conference is ironically named after a mythical utopia of a harmonious land in the Tibetan mountains, the dialogue was confrontational. Peace accross the Taiwan Strait continues to hang in the balance.
This year, the US sent one of its largest delegations yet, with Hegseth’s speech drawing most of the attention. Despite a notably minimal presence from China, without its Defence Minister and main speech on Sunday, responses from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Chinese embassy in Singapore have ensured the event remained a platform for regional competition, crucial for understanding future prospects for peace across the Taiwan Strait.
As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains clear on its intentions to settle the dispute as an internal affair, the focus turns to Trump and whether his isolationist outlook extends to the South China Sea.
The Question of Trump’s Isolationism
Under the banner of ‘America First’, Trump’s first and second term have indicated some level of commitment to isolationism with the rejection of traditional alliances, multilateralism and global policing. Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine and reduce NATO’s reliance on the US through ‘tough love’ tariffs and encouragement to increase defence spending, shows his reluctance for America to take an active role, if any at all, in global conflict. This unease around American interventionist policy continues to test the Trump administration’s patience, as seen in the threat to “walk away” from the peace talks in Ukraine, giving the impression that Trump is not one for slow negotiation.
However, there is reason to believe isolationism only goes so far for Trump, especially regarding China-Taiwan. China has been a consistent source of concern for Trump, with disputes around the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, restrictions on Chinese-based technology companies, and now, the fierce trade war. The Trump administration have been maintaining American support for Taiwan through bipartisan visits, quietly removing the wording “we do not support Taiwanese independence” from a State Department fact sheet and placing a pause on the highest tariffs for the island.
While Trump hasn’t dramatically changed the existing deterrence frameworks, including the non-committal policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, calls from members of his party such as Trump’s former national security advisor, Mike Waltz arguing for strategic clarity seem to be taking hold, signalling a move towards a more confrontational position with Beijing. But with paleoconservative voices still influential within the Trump administration, taking the historical view that Woodrow Wilson’s departure from isolationism in 1917 was the greatest misstep in US foreign policy for undermining the founding American principle of non-intervention, it remains unclear what course Trump will take with China-Taiwan.
Foreign policy analysts have been puzzled by this paradox: how does a President, who so strongly campaigned on not getting dragged into foreign intervention, reconcile this with a more hostile deterrence strategy, as tensions mount with China? Trump’s isolationism needs to be more comprehensively understood if peaceful exchange is to be imagined in the Taiwan Strait. The latest remarks from US Defence Secretary give an opportunity to answer that question.
Three Takeaways from Hegseth’s remarks:
- Not so Isolationist
The Trump administration continues to view China as a threat which needs to be countered. Hegseth, while likening the new US administration’s approach to the pragmatism of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, drew clear battle lines with China, noting their absence from the conference and declaring China an “imminent” threat to the region. He described China’s ambitions as exploitative and existential for Indo-Pacific nations, maintaining that America “will not be pushed out” to indicate concern for both Asian and American interests.
If there was any doubt about whether isolationism would mean no response to Chinese actions in the region, this was set straight when Hegseth declared Trump’s intention to not let China invade Taiwan during his presidency, with the last resort being to “fight and win”. This challenges the view that Trump is China’s best hope for settling the Taiwan question without interference and brings some clarity to Trump’s previously vague stance.
It also suggests that Trump is moving away from the officially agreed ‘strategic ambiguity’, a position in which the US does not explicitly recognise Taiwanese statehood or declare their intention to intervene in the dispute. The response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry was a warning to the US not to “play with fire” and “abide by the one-China principle”, indicating that this will undoubtedly remain a sticking point for both powers.
- Deterrence Without Entanglement
In his speech, Hegseth outlined a deterrence strategy, promising “more dilemmas, more complications, more questions”, committing to use both covert and overt actions. He argued for the increase of military presence in the South China Sea, including mobile missile systems to protect the ‘first island chain’. This long in the making deterrence strategy aims to prevent the Chinese navy entering US led defence and trade networks, indicating Hegseth’s motivation to build on existing frameworks and continue to securitise the region as vital for US interests. Taking a more aggressive stance than the Biden administration did, Hegseth continues Trump’s hard power approach to foreign policy, showing willingness to use all diplomatic levers at their disposal.
Hegseth does however disparage the US’s previous interventionist record, but he critiques how it worked against American interests rather than from a moral or material standpoint. He acknowledges the cost of deterrence for the American taxpayer, but is consistent in defending this as pursuing American interests. Here, Hegseth sheds light on Trump isolationism as a transactional and nationalistic phenomenon rather than one of disengagement or moral commitment, explaining its conditional use. Hegseth seems to be aiming to present US action as walking the middle ground between neoconservative nation building and full isolationism.
- New Cold War
Finally, Hegseth’s speech employed cold-war-like ideological framing and language as he sought to compete with “communist China” by defending the US as a peace-oriented, reliable ally. Hegseth encouraged Asian nations to increase their defence spending to be capable allies for the US to collaborate on common goals. He proudly highlighted Trump’s success in this area with Europe and reassured that the Indo-Pacific was now their “priority theatre”.
This echoes a paleoconservative viewpoint, describing the need for allies who “do the heavy lifting in service of our shared interests”, exemplifying that Trump requires self-reliant and loyal allies, a role which he can steer them towards for their best interests. This positive and negative reinforcement can be seen in Trump’s close relationship with former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, in his first term, to reward their massive increases in military spending, an example which the current Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, has followed.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry hit back by accusing the US of promising of peace while continuing to orchestrate instability in the Asia-Pacific, to question the honesty of US intentions in the region. China’s stance has been consistent that “no country is in a position to interfere” in the conflict, a red line which isolationism should be compatible with.
But this cold war rheotric at the Shangri-La Dialogue seems to echo that of the Heritage Foundation’s 2024 report arguing for a US withdrawal from most regions in the world except the continuation of pressure on Iran, and the protection of the Indo-Pacific from China. This strongly indicates that Trump’s isolationism only goes so far, and is secondary to great power competition with its greatest percieved threat, China in the New Cold War.
This New Cold War paradigm, which has been taking hold of US foreign policy since the 1990s, is being accelerated by Trump’s confrontational rhetoric, and will become more exposed as he dramatically reorientates US military priorities to be almost completely China-facing, with all other commitments deprioritised in the name of isolationism.
What could this mean for peace in the Taiwan Strait?
China has confirmed its intention to seize Taiwan, with its military capability reached by 2027, indicating the inevitability of some kind of conflict given a clear intention by both sides to decide the future of Taiwan. With the notion that a Trump second term provides China an opportunity to fulfil their wishes for Taiwan soundly dismissed, the likelihood of conflict depends on the dialogue between the great powers and Taiwanese authorities over the next few years.
Hegseth’s speech and the increasing cold war rhetoric can start to explain the inconsistensies in Trump’s isolationism, which appears to want to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Given the similarities to Heritage Foundation reports, it can be inferred that Trump is not truly isolationist, but instead wants to narrow US priorities to focus on the Indo-Pacific, and organise almost exclusively around a New Cold War paradigm of foreign policy. China’s recognition of Trump’s “cold war mentality for bloc confrontation” suggests that the region’s geopolitics will increasingly align with this model. For Taiwan, strong rhetoric from both sides means the tension is only likely to increase, while the world waits for a trigger.
As Trump continues to blur the line between strategic ambiguity and quasi-alliance, room for negotiation tightens, but not to the extent that it is impossible for peace. The phone call to Xi Jinping on the 5th June, initiated by the White House, was described positively by Trump despite pressure from Xi of the dangers of dragging the two powers into confrontation over “a small number of Taiwan Independence separatists”. Phone call communication is a good sign that both sides want to at least talk and not just escalate. However, if both continue to securitise the issue and place more emphasis on its conclusion, the delicate balance between the two great powers could end.
