Beginning in April 2023, the ongoing clash between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has brought immense devastation and catastrophic consequences to the civilian population.

In response, The Next Century Foundation, in collaboration with notable partners, has prepared a written statement to the 53rd United Nations Human Rights Council.

Written Statement

Click HERE for the written statement

Comment on the NCF Statement on Sudan follows:

The following comments have been received from our most senior interlocutors on this statement:

1. You suggest that France and Italy should be encouraged to take a more active role in the peace negotiations, alongside the UK. Why confine EU support to just two member states and not the EU as a whole? EU policy on Sudan is shaped in Brussels by the EU Special Representative. France and Germany also have Sudan Envoys and are currently among the most active member states. EU interests in Sudan go much wider than the migration issue. They also include support for democratic transformation, averting a humanitarian catastrophe, preventing the spread of terrorist organizations, ensuring Red Sea maritime security, and avoiding destabilization of the wider region.
2. It’s always useful to remind HMG of the UK’s historic responsibility to be active on Sudan policy. However, in current circumstances, it’s not realistic for one country from outside the region to act as sole mediator, particularly given the AU’s emphasis on African solutions for African problems and the need to involve Gulf states with influence on the warring parties. The important thing is for international and regional actors to work together in a coordinated way. However, if, as seems to be the case, the AU wants to play the lead coordinating role, it needs to articulate a coherent approach on transition to a civilian government and the exit of the military from politics.
3. It’s not a good idea to rush to elections in 18 months. It’s not just about technicities. Early elections are exactly what the SAF and elements of the Bashir regime would like to see as they know that, without widespread reforms to create a conducive environment for free and fair elections, the NCP can be back in power. Many civil society activists already thought that the two-year transitional period envisaged in the Framework Agreement was too short to achieve all the objectives expected from a technocratic transitional government. After all the devastation caused by this war, the task facing any future government will be even greater. The nature of the eventual elections (Presidential, parliamentary, or both) should depend on what kind of governance system the Sudanese themselves choose when a new constitution is drafted. Inking of fingers may indeed be one way of reducing electoral fraud but the Bashir regime devised multiple ingenious ways of rigging elections, including tampering with the voter registration system, manipulating the electronic vote counting system etc, in addition to problems with the current election law. If “the deep state” is still in place, there would be no chance of holding free and fair elections.
4. There is a clear need for civilian involvement in the next phase of mediation talks.
5. Your suggestion of a geographical division of responsibility/areas of control between SAF and RSF forces is a novel idea, though I doubt if a division on these lines would be acceptable to most Sudanese civilians or indeed the warring parties. The pro-democracy movement has made clear that, as part of the process of democratic transformation, they want a reformed single professional national army that is not ideologically aligned or involved in politics or the economy, is representative of all regions of the country, and is mandated to protect Sudan’s citizens and the Constitution, not the regime of the day. Creating a new national army would require integrating the RSF and all the other armed groups, Creating two zones of influence – for the RSF West of the Nile and for an unreformed SAF East of the Nile – would risk legitimizing two parallel armies, which are waging a reckless war with complete disregard for the civilians they are supposed to protect. As of now, SAF controls the northern part of the country and regards this as crucial to its interests because it is the route to Egypt, which is the SAF’s main backer, while the RSF regards its control of much of central Khartoum as its strongest negotiating card.