The Spring of 2021 saw the October Revolution of 2019 reignite. Sparked by unlawful killings of activists, protests in Baghdad rallied to the slogan ‘Who killed me?’, displaying the faces of the dead on banners and flags. Experts had argued that violent repression had killed the October movement; ironically, it now seems this same repression has revived it.
October 2019
The people of Iraq had much to be angry about in October 2019. Poor economic conditions, widespread corruption, dismal public services – there was no end to the list of grievances which had built up over the sixteen years since the fall of Saddam. Localised protests in the preceding years were not uncommon but national unity was evasive, as it usually is in Iraq. Then suddenly, the touchpaper of the revolution was lit: on September 29th, popular counter-terrorism chief and leader of the fight against Daesh, Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, was demoted, allegedly at the request of Iranian-backed militia leaders. He was becoming too popular for comfort. Social media raged and activists set a protest date for October 1st. Iraq’s largest youth-led uprising in sixteen years was well under way.
The following two months saw over three hundred demonstrators killed (often shot in the back by snipers) as a bloody crackdown was launched on Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s watch, though arguably not at his behest. Promises of cabinet reshuffles and new economic proposals could not save his career and he resigned on November 29th 2019. The problem was a fundamental misunderstanding of the protests: demonstrators across Iraq were not only demanding better governance, jobs, less corruption and more real democratic accountability. They were also asking for an end to foreign interference in their government. Primarily this was a request to end Iranian meddling, but the USA and Saudi Arabia were by no means exempt from the demonstrators criticism. They wanted an end to the use of Iraq for proxy war. And so, Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi became the face of these protests, appearing on banners as protestors chanted both anti-government and anti-Iranian slogans. For the demonstrators, the source of Iraq’s woes was not only a government they perceived as corrupt, it was also Iran, and by extension most of the foreign powers, with one typical protestor complaining that “Iran controls every sector of Iraq. There are no job opportunities, no services, and yet the irony is, Iraq is a very wealthy country”. Unfortunately, the sudden arrival in Iraq of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps General Qassim Soleimani on October 2nd combined with the presence of Iran-backed militia snipers at protests only heightened these concerns.
In January 2020 Qassim Soleimani was assassinated by the US government in an air strike, as was a lesser-known individual, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the leader of the PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces). Iraq’s PMF (in Arabic: Hashd Al-Shaabi), were formed in June 2014 to fight against Daesh. These days the PMF are formally integrated as part of the Iraq military and receive government salaries. Importantly, some of the militias are backed by Iran and serve as Iran’s proxies. Although Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was behind much of the violence against protestors, the assassination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis has not aided protestors or the Iraq government, instead prompting a proliferation of even more PMF armed groups and a general splintering as top leaders went into hiding. These splinter groups have become less controllable.
May 2020
Five months and three candidates later, a new government was sworn in. New Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi promised justice for those killed in the protests and announced early elections (which he said were to take place the following June) to improve public confidence in the government. His appointment was surprising: despite pervasive Iranian influence, this former intelligence officer, largely independent and largely Westernised, had been allowed to lead Iraq. One of the big priorities of the demonstrators at the time had become that Iraq must not become a proxy theatre of war from which or within which either the US or Iran could launch an attack. Thus, when Mustafa al-Kadhimi declared that “Iraq will not be a ground for settling accounts and launching attacks on any neighboring [sic] or friendly country”, he aligned himself with this policy.
However, Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s agenda to hold swift elections was conditional on parliamentary support for electoral reform prior to those elections. Eventually it was delivered, albeit for a less complete version of electoral reform than most would have liked.
With all these considerations, it is hardly surprising that the elections were postponed until October 10th 2021 after the Iraq elections commission requested more time to prepare.
June 2021
The frail state of Iraq’s democracy perhaps explains why no one has yet been prosecuted for the 600 plus deaths and 35 targeted assassinations that have taken place since October 2019. Both Iraqis and the UN blame Iran-backed “militias” and one man, Jasb Hattab Aboud, has even tried to take a powerful Iran-backed militia leader to court, accusing them of kidnapping his son in October 2019. After prominent activist Ihab Jawad al-Wazni was killed by masked men on motorbikes on May 9th 2021, protests reignited to demand action. Two days later, the killing of Jasb Hattab Aboud added to the anger. Mass protests on May 25th led to one death and dozens of injuries in Baghdad.
A breakthrough appeared when Iraq’s authorities arrested Qasem Muslih, the leader of the PMF militia suspected to be responsible for Ihab Jawad al-Wazni’s killing. He was the first high-ranking official of the PMF to be arrested in connection with the assassination of an activist. However, in response, PMF forces surrounded Baghdad’s Green Zone, where government and foreign embassies are based, and a senior Iraq intelligence officer was assassinated in eastern Baghdad. Qasem Muslih was released two weeks later due to “lack of evidence”.
The run up to October 2021
These new protests matter because, without some greater attempt to meet their demands, demonstrators have said they will boycott the October 10th elections. Two political parties, the Iraq Communist Party and the Al-Beit Al-Watani (National Bloc) party, both formed after the October Revolution, have already declared they will boycott the elections and concerns are growing that the killings are producing a climate of fear which will stop Iraqis voting anyway. If the elections are boycotted, then the likely result will be a split between the two main Shia parties, Fateh and the Sadrists, which will end in a compromise candidate for Iraq’s premiership. Despite Iranian reservations and protestors disappointment, Mustafa al-Kadhimi fits this bill and therefore could gain a second term.
All the while, protests continue; and the protests are a phenomena that Iraq cannot postpone until October.
Image: “An Iraqi protester holds a flag in the October Revolution” by Mondalawy, CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons
