Iraq’s political stability remains constrained by fragmentation, weak institutions, and persistent external pressure. The entanglement of competing political factions and armed groups within the state, alongside the ongoing rivalry between the United States and Iran drives this instability. After months of political deadlock, a government has finally formed, but its incomplete nature reveals further instability.
An Incomplete Government
The approval of Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi’s government in May 2026 ended six months of stalemate following Iraq’s parliamentary election in November. However, only fourteen of twenty-three ministers secured parliamentary approval. Although the partial government is operational, its effectiveness is limited by the absence of key ministers such as those for Defence and Interior. Other remaining unallocated ministerial positions include Planning, Higher Education, Reconstruction and Housing, Culture, Labour, Youth and Migration. The remaining cabinet positions are hoped to be selected in early July following the parliamentary recess.
The principal obstacle to government formation was disagreement among factions within the Coordination Framework, the dominant parliamentary bloc consisting of a coalition of the major Shia political parties, over the choice of prime minister and other ministerial positions. By convention since 2003, a Shia Muslim is selected as a prime minister, a Sunni Muslim is chosen for the position of Parliament Speaker and a Kurd is elected as president. Similar disputes may complicate efforts to fill the remaining cabinet posts. Howvere the government faces pressure from the United States, particularly regarding the influence of Iran-backed armed groups.
Foreign Influence: Between the United States and Iran
Internal disputes in Iraq are often aggravated by external interference from the United States and Iran. Iraq has long balanced these competing influences amongst many others; however, the rising regional tension between the United States and Iran has intensified the situation. Despite being caught in the crossfire, Iraq (officially) remains committed to staying out of the war and retaining neutrality. The reality is of course that some of its militias have weighed in with repeated strikes ruthlessly targeting Kuwait on the one side and, to a lesser but still substantial degree, the pro Western semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq, officially called the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Iranian influence is deeply rooted in Iraq’s society extending from armed groups to politicians and senior figures. Many of Iraq’s militias have deep rooted connections to Iran that are difficult to unravel as they encompass decades of ideological alignment and support. The US-Iran war has highlighted these relations as Iraq’s government ostensibly (but not too effectively) attempts to limit the involvement of armed groups in the conflict. The timing couldn’t be worse for a fragile transitional government to attempt to prioritise security concerns.
The desire to eliminate both political and military Iranian influence is more of a priority for the US than ever. Both President Trump’s active role in the selection of prime minister and the US’s wider suggestion that the government should disarm the Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq reflects this ambition.
Prior to Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi’s nomination, former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was put forward for the position of premier. President Donald Trump opposed this proposal warning that the US would withdraw support from Iraq if Nouri Al Maliki became prime minister. The rejection stemmed from concerns about Nouri Al Maliki’s ties to Iran and dissatisfaction with his previous terms. US concerns about Iranian influence on Iraq extend to all fronts. While President Trump endorsed Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi’s nomination, he reiterated his expectation groups and individuals closely linked to Iran would be excluded, suggesting that Iraq should ‘form a government free from terrorism’.
The Challenge of Militia Integration
The disarmament of Iran-backed groups in Iraq has (ostensibly) been made a priority of the new government due to US involvement. On June 15th, in Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s meeting with Special Presidential Envoy Tom Barrack, he reiterated their ‘shared commitment’ to continue plans for ‘the complete disarmament and disbandment of all armed groups and formations operating outside the authority and control of the Iraqi state’. However, it is questionable how and if these plans will play out at all in reality.
This comes after Iraq has experienced an unprecedented pressure strategy from the US. The primary form of leverage comes from the US control of Iraq’s oil export as funds are directed through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Since 2003, the US has exercised financial control over Iraq’s oil export revenues, originally a mechanism to protect international legal claims. For example, in late April, the US suspended shipments of US dollars to Iraq’s central bank in response to attacks by Iran-backed militias that had targeted US facilities since the war began. The US’s ability to exert pressure on Iraq is genuine, but it is equally debatable that Iran’s regional influence has been seriously weakened.
While militias have long been integrated in Iraq’s politics, the regional tensions have amplified this issue, with certain Iran-backed groups doing rather more than merely attacking Kuwait and Kurdistan. Since the beginning of the war, Iran-aligned groups have conducted drone and missile attacks on US interests in Iraq. The physical involvement of Iraq in the conflict between the US and Iran has intensified likely futile pressures to bring arms under state autonomy.
In early June, Iran-backed militias Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib al-Imam Ali announced they would sever all organizational ties with the Popular Mobilization Forces and transfer their weapons and personnel to state authority. While presented as a step forward to disarmament, the reality is this move is move of a ‘rebranding’ as weapons would only be transferred to an institution dominated by these same groups. Other factions like Kataib Hezbollah and Haraket Hezbollah al-Nujaba fiercely oppose the disarmament, considering themselves part of the Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ and refusing to integrate with the state. While there is no current timeline for disarmament, the government has formed a committee that will ‘establish mechanisms for the integration of the relevant formations and for transferring weapons, equipment, and military camps to the Iraqi security authorities’. The prospect of genuinely placing the weapons under state control is unlikely to come to fruition due to the significant obstacles it will face.
Constraints and Prospects for Stability
Efforts to disarm armed groups have remained a persistent source of contention across successive governments, with limited progress achieved. Whether Iraq can establish a true state monopoly on the use of force remains an open question. The challenge stems from the fact that many of the groups facing disarmament are also embedded within political system itself. This structural contradiction creates a situation in which those tasked with facilitating disarmament may have little incentive to support measures that could diminish their own influence.
Even if disarmament efforts were successfully implemented, its impact on state authority is far from certain. The redistribution of weapons from militias to state institutions that are themselves influenced by those same groups may do little to alter power dynamics. In this sense, the political influence of Iran-backed militias is unlikely to disappear with a merely symbolic “disarmament” alone.
Iraq’s new government remains structurally incomplete and politically constrained, with the absence of key minister considerably constraining the state’s capacity. Competitive influences between the US and Iran, will continue to shape Iraq’s agenda. The pursuit of balance between these two powers remains key in retaining neutrality and avoiding Iraq become an area of regional conflict.
Any attempt to integrate militias into Iraq’s state security is likely to remain fragmented and largely ineffective. The reality is that armed groups are unlikely to fully surrender control. Those that are claiming to comply with disarmament are only willing because they inhabit the structures that they are to cede to. The current government remains weak and under contradictory pressure from the US and Iran, it likely lacks the ability to reverse this structural pattern.
Although the absorption of militias into the state structures is largely a cosmetic measure, it will contribute to a broader process of state consolidation. By partially bringing the armed groups under state authority, though largely symbolic and ineffective at this time, it could lead to a gradual shift away from the autonomy and influence of these groups. Even if the disarmament of militias is fractional, it represents a preliminal step in the right direction towards a more stable future for Iraq.
Iraq will feature in the forthcoming NCF Healing the Nations conference.
