In September 2026, Ansarullah (Houthi) forces advanced along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, seizing the port city of Mocha and capturing Mayyun (Perim) Island, which sits within the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The latest escalation comes amid the resurgence of Yemen’s long-running conflict between Ansarullah forces and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, while also unfolding within a wider regional confrontation. While the immediate consequences are being felt along Yemen’s coast, the implications of the escalation extend to the other end of the Red Sea.
One may ask: What exactly does a crisis unfolding in Yemen have to do with Egypt?
The answer lies in the geography of the Red Sea.
From Bab El-Mandeb to Suez Canal
Bab El-Mandeb represents the southern gateway to the Red Sea, while the Suez Canal forms its northern gateway to the Mediterranean. A vessel travelling between Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal normally passes through Bab el-Mandeb to reach Suez. This makes the security of the two waterways closely interconnected. The Suez Canal can remain fully operational, yet insecurity at Bab El-Mandeb, even a heightened perception of risk alone, can make the wider Suez route too risky or costly for shipping companies, pushing carriers to reroute and bypass the Red Sea altogether. For Egypt, this means fewer vessels using the Suez Canal and lower revenues from its operation.
This is not merely a hypothetical risk. The Red Sea crisis of 2023-2024 demonstrated how quickly insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb could reverberate through Egypt’s economy.
The crisis emerged amid the Gaza war that began in October 2023. In November, Ansarullah began attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea, initially targeting ships it considered linked to Israel. The attacks subsequently expanded to other commercial vessels and U.S. naval forces, prompting an international military response, including US and UK strikes on Ansarullah targets in Yemen. As the violence intensified, major carriers rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope.
The effect on the Suez Canal was immediate. According to the International Monetary Fund, trade transiting the Suez Canal fell by around 50 percent during the first two months of 2024 compared with the previous year. Furthermore, revenues fell from approximately $10.25 billion in 2023 to around $3.99 billion in 2024 amid the disruption.
September 2026, however, presents a different threat.
The 2026 Escalation
The 2026 escalation emerged from a fragile post-truce environment, as the dispute over Sanaa remained unresolved. In August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition effectively imposed a blockade on Sanaa International Airport, halting regular commercial flights, citing security concerns, including the prevention of weapons transfers to Ansarullah. This has severely restricted travel from Ansarullah-controlled areas, including for medical treatment. The April 2022 UN-brokered truce allowed limited flights to resume, but its expiration in October left the broader political and military divisions intact. Sanaa remained under Ansarullah control, while the government and its Saudi allies continued to contest its authority over the capital and its airspace.
This fragile calm began to unravel in July 2026, when an Iranian aircraft carrying Ansarullah officials and Iranian personnel attempted to land in Sanaa. On 13 July, Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces struck the airport’s runway, forcing the aircraft to divert to Hodeidah. Ansarullah retaliated with missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, including an attack on Abha International Airport. And this is where the Red Sea comes back into the picture. Ansarullah then announced a maritime blockade targeting Saudi-linked shipping through the Red Sea and warned shipping companies against using Saudi ports. Ansarullah officials also warned that the Bab el-Mandeb could be used as a “strategic asset” against states involved in hostilities with Yemen.
By August and September, the escalation had developed into a broader military campaign. Yemen’s Government forces increasingly declared the restoration of Sanaa as their strategic objective. Fighting intensified around Hodeidah and toward the Bab el-Mandeb, alongside continued attacks on Saudi territory.
Is Bab El-Mandeb Becoming a Long-Term Security Threat?
Unlike the 2023–2024 Red Sea crisis, which was driven primarily by episodic attacks on shipping amid the Gaza war, the current escalation is rooted more directly in Yemen’s renewed conflict, which is entangled with wider regional rivalries. Iran provides support to Ansarullah, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have supported different forces within the anti-Ansarullah camp. That camp is itself divided. The Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), both oppose Ansarullah but pursue different political and territorial goals.
At the same time, the conflict is now taking place much closer to the maritime corridor itself, which changes the nature of the risk. Ansarullah’s expansion along Yemen’s Red Sea coast gives it a stronger position around Bab el-Mandeb. This does not mean that the strait is impassable. Rather, the concern is that the conflict could become more permanently embedded around the critical maritime chokepoint. If Ansarullah consolidates its territorial gains while the conflict remains unresolved, insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb could become a persistent feature of the Red Sea rather than a temporary disruption.
There are already signs that operators are becoming more cautious. S&P Global reported on September 17 that no Very Large Crude Carriers had transited Bab el-Mandeb since September 9, compared with 24 crossings in August and 63 in July. The decline suggests that some operators are already adjusting their behavior, although the corridor remains operational.
Egypt’s Response
For Egypt, the concern is therefore not only another episode of attacks on commercial vessels, but whether continued instability around Bab el-Mandeb could make the maritime route a recurring source of uncertainty for shipping and, consequently, for the Suez Canal.
Cairo’s response has combined maritime security cooperation with diplomatic engagement. On July 30, Saudi Arabia and 13 other countries, including Egypt, endorsed the establishment of the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance. The initiative focuses on maritime security, freedom of navigation and the protection of trade and energy routes across the Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Its framework includes intelligence sharing, operational planning, joint exercises, training and maritime operations, while participation in operational activities remains a sovereign decision for each member state.
Following the latest escalation, Cairo also stepped up its monitoring and diplomatic engagement. On the 11th of September, Cairo established a crisis team to monitor developments and has maintained communication with several actors involved in the crisis, including Ansarullah, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United States. During Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Cairo on September 15, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi also reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to the security and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea.
While Egypt has an interest in strengthening its maritime security, it also has an interest in preventing the conflict itself from escalating further. The two objectives are related, but they are not interchangeable, raising questions about the broader role Egypt should play in regional security.
Could Joining the Makkah Pact Be Part of the Solution?
Signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan on 7 August 2026, the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement declares that an armed attack against one member shall be regarded as an attack against all. From an Egyptian perspective, the question is partly about the scope of the commitment. Cairo has traditionally sought to pursue what it describes as “strategic balance” in its foreign policy, which emphasizes diversifying partnerships, avoiding polarization and preserving its independence in decision-making. A binding defense commitment would introduce a different set of obligations, particularly if regional conflicts increasingly overlap with Egypt’s security interests.
However, the more important question is, what could a security pact realistically resolve? Egypt’s own costly military intervention in Yemen in the 1960s offers a historical reminder of the limits of military solutions. Today, the conflict involves multiple Yemeni and regional actors with competing interests. A collective-defense arrangement can provide a mechanism for responding to external attacks, but it cannot resolve the political divisions within Yemen or the wider regional rivalries that continue to fuel the conflict. Its role would therefore be more about managing the security consequences of the conflict than addressing its underlying causes. As long as the conflict continues to deteriorate, the risk of further attacks and disruption around Bab el-Mandeb is likely to persist.
This makes de-escalation and renewed political negotiations part of the broader response to the insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb. Reducing the longer-term threat to the maritime corridor requires addressing the conflict driving the insecurity, something Egypt cannot accomplish alone. The involvement of regional and international actors with different forms of influence makes broader diplomatic engagement essential to reduce the escalation.
Conclusion
For Egypt, protecting the Suez Canal means not only responding to threats to navigation, but also addressing the wider conditions that make the Red Sea route vulnerable to disruption. The latest escalation raises the possibility that instability around Bab el-Mandeb could become a more enduring security concern. Egypt’s response therefore cannot be reduced to protecting a single waterway or joining a particular security arrangement. It requires balancing its economic, security and diplomatic interests while addressing both the immediate threat to navigation and the wider conflict driving the insecurity. As the situation around Bab el-Mandeb develops, maintaining that balance will remain central to Egypt’s approach to Red Sea security.
(Image: Vyacheslav Argenberg from Seattle, WA, USA, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons)
