The USA Midterm Elections: The Iran War and Israel on the Ballot

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The following article was co-authored by Next Century Foundation Research Officers Elizabeth Hurst and Talia Newton.

 

The US midterm elections delivered the sharpest rebuke to a sitting administration in nearly twenty years. Voters appear to have rejected the Republican Party over the cost of living and a war with Iran that most of them never wanted, with many seeing it as serving Israel’s interests rather than America’s, arguing that Netanyahu’s influence drew Trump into a war threatening America’s strategic interests.

This sweep, referred to as a “blue wave”, does not, on its own, change Washington’s relationship with Israel. In the weeks before the new Congress is sworn in, decisions are being taken that could bind the United States more tightly to Israel’s military than ever before. It is crucial that the new majority is held to its mandate; Americans want out of the war, and out of financing Israel. 

Assessing the Blue wave

As of 19 November, the Democrats have, with the two independents who sit with them, 56 Senate seats to the Republicans’ 44, reversing a 53–47 Republican majority. In Mississippi, the race for Democrat Scott Colom over Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith made him the first black senator in the state since the 19th Century. James Talarico also became the first Democrat elected to the Senate from Texas since 1988, running a campaign focused on the rising cost of living under Republican leadership, and Troy Jackson unseated Republican Susan Collins in Maine.

In the House, Democrats have won 257 seats to the Republicans’ 171, with seven races still uncalled by 18 November. This is their largest majority since 2008. They also took governorships from Republicans in Georgia, Iowa, Nevada, Ohio, Texas and Alaska, and will hold a majority of governorships (30 of the 50) for the first time in sixteen years. Starting in January, the opposition can block, investigate, and slow much of the President’s agenda.

There were historic firsts in this election cycle. Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan will be the first Muslim US senator, and Keisha Lance Bottoms of Georgia the first Black woman to serve as a state governor. But broadly, this election also marks significant gains for socialist-aligned candidates. At least five incoming members of Congress are affiliated with the Democratic Socialists of America, the largest socialist bloc in Congress’s history, and they have pledged to pursue an arms embargo on Israel. 

Leading up to the election, Trump had historically low approval ratings. CBS exit polling found the economy was voters’ top concern, and most said military action against Iran had been the wrong decision. The US and Israel launched that action together on 28 February. Vice President JD Vance wrote that “the reason we lost is the war,” adding that voters wanted to change America’s relationship with Israel. President Trump accepted the war was a factor but said he would have done it again. 

US & Israel: Alliance at a Crossroads

On election day, President Trump announced that US military aid to Israel would end after this year, under an arrangement with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That aid is $3.8 billion a year under the current agreement. Israel would still be able to buy American weapons. Yet the aid agreement runs until 2028, funding is set by Congress, and Israel’s government has not confirmed the deal.

Section 219 of the defence bill now before Congress would create a US–Israel Defence Technology Cooperation Initiative. A Pentagon “executive agent” would coordinate joint research, development and production in artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, drones, cyberwarfare and missile defence. Netanyahu has framed this as Israel moving “from aid recipient to partner.”

There has been bipartisan opposition to this move. Critics are led in the House by Democrat Ro Khanna and Republican Thomas Massie, and in the Senate by twelve senators including Chris Van Hollen and Bernie Sanders. They warn that the plan would move support for Israel out of the scrutinised foreign aid budget and into Pentagon procurement, with far less oversight. They argue it would create long-term dependencies that make future policy changes costly. They also warn that a linked intelligence provision could stop a future president from limiting intelligence sharing with Israel. 

The US and Israel are now at a crossroads. Instead of explicitly writing a foreign aid check, the United States could weave Israel’s arms industry into its own. That would tie American weapons programmes, and American responsibility, to the conduct of Israel’s military in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. Though an “end to aid” implies cutting reliance on Israel, this could in practice mean a deeper, less visible partnership. Timing is therefore critical. The House passed its version of the bill in July, but the Senate has not passed its own. The final text may be settled by the outgoing Congress in its lame-duck session, before the new majority takes office in January.

US and Iran: What might change?

The US-Israeli war on Iran was undeniably a turning point in the recent US midterm elections, with a reported 77% of voters listing the US involvement in Iran as “very important” or “extremely important” to their vote. President Trump himself has since come out and stated that he believes Iran to be partially to blame for the landmark republican loss, but in his usual fashion stands firm on the righteousness of his decision to launch the war. One may think that an electorate turning away from war and reflecting this through their votes would send any leader rushing to sign a deal before the next election and claim the medal of the ultimate peacetime president. However, concerningly, in his most recent communication regarding Iran via Truth Social, President Trump has said he doesn’t “need a deal with Iran” and has called for national focus to shift to the “crime and corruption” in “Democrat run Cities and States,” which begs the question: how will the US midterms impact relations with Iran?

When the democrats take control of both chambers of Congress, they will have the opportunity to push through a ‘binding war powers resolution’ . This would direct Trump to withdraw US forces from the hostilities abroad, which presents a potentially effective democratic channel through which the conflict could be ended. In the era of stark democratic backsliding, it would be refreshing to see constitutional democratic mechanisms used to enact change. However, such an action may ultimately not be legally enforceable. A Democratic-controlled Congress can impede President Trump’s actions, but cannot automatically prevent him from exercising his constitutional powers. 

Moreover, history has shown that President Trump favours executive orders. He cited emergency powers to impose tariffs and introduced four executive actions to address Covid-19 during his first term. Given his history of bypassing Congress with little regard for its constitutional importance, it is likely that, should a binding war powers resolution come into effect he would seek a loophole to circumvent it.

However, given that the new Congress will not take effect until January, the more pressing concern is perhaps not what happens when it is, but what President Trump may do in the meantime. It is perhaps too hasty to evaluate what may happen when they do, as a bigger concern is what Trump may do in the meantime. Taking a closer look at his leadership, and indeed his psychology, paints a concerning picture. He may push rapidly for a perceived military win in Iran to make up for the big, personal hit taken by the midterm results. To lose an election in the final stretch of his presidency because of action he directly pursued strikes at how Trump constructs his sense of self. Leaving that decision unvindicated puts both his ego and legacy at risk. At this point a perceived military win may seem more appealing than a negotiated agreement, which may risk confirming perceptions that the war was a regrettable choice. 

As seen across his approach to foreign policy, particularly in talks with leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin or China’s Xi Jinping, Trump is a leader who prides himself on a patriarchal display of masculine strength. An agreement with Iran that the public might read as an acknowledgement of a military blunder, and therefore as weakness, may be too much to bear. The future of relations with Iran may therefore rest not on the future of the Republican Party, or even the greater good of the country Trump serves, but on his personal legacy and sense of self built on clumsy displays of supposed strength.

Serious military and economic constraints on the US’s ability to sustain further military action against Iran are a limiting factor that could equally impact the outcome of the US midterms on foreign relations with Iran. Regardless of whether Congress was controlled by Republicans or Democrats, serious concerns have been raised regarding the US’s military capacity, specifically regarding munitions stockpiles, to sustain long military blows with Iran that impact any decision to make peace or escalate fighting. While Trump may wish to not back down or even to escalate the conflict in hopes of a tangible display to accredit his decision, a Congress attempting to block action and hesitant military generals will prove difficult to move.

Image credit: Mike Newbry via Unsplash

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